




THE CENTRE CANNOT HOLD: IDENTITY AND 
LANGUAGE IN THE POSTMODERN FICTION OF 




PHAY CHOONG SIEW JOSEPHINE 
(BA (Hons) NUS) 
 
A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS 
DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH LANGUANGE AND LITERATURE 





I am deeply grateful to Dr. Susan Ang for correcting every draft of this thesis, for 
the books and films she recommended and lent me, and for her generous guidance, 




Introduction: The Centre Cannot Hold—Crime Fiction and Postmodernism .................. 1 
Crime Fiction and Postmodernism .................................................................................... 1 
“The Centre Cannot Hold” .............................................................................................. 12 
Defining (De)centredness ............................................................................................... 19 
Raymond Chandler: Fragmented Worlds, Fractured Selves ............................................ 29 
“I” is for Identity: The Private Eye/I and Centredness .................................................... 30 
“L” is for Language: Language, Lies, and Links/Connections .......................................... 41 
“P” is for Postmodern: Play-acting, the Press, and a World in Pieces ............................ 48 
Patricia Highsmith: Deviance in the Open .......................................................................... 61 
Materialism, Identity, and Language .............................................................................. 61 
Displacements, Games, Liminality .................................................................................. 73 
The Impossibility of Connection...................................................................................... 85 
Agatha Christie: A Multiplicity of Meanings ...................................................................... 89 
Re-reading Christie: The Spy Novels ............................................................................... 90 
Breaking Binaries: The Detective Novels ...................................................................... 114 
Back to the Future: Signs, Signifiers, Simulation ........................................................... 120 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 125 




This thesis argues that Raymond Chandler’s Marlowe novels, Patricia Highsmith’s 
Ripliad, and Agatha Christie’s detective as well as spy novels are postmodern in 
their presentation of the world in general, and identity in particular, as a 
“kaleidoscope”—to use Christie’s image—of arbitrary signs. I show that the fiction 
of all three authors includes a variety of decentring elements which undercut any 
sense of stability that readers might derive from, e.g., the centring figure of the 
private eye/I, all-seeing detective, or subversive anti-hero. For instance, all three 
authors highlight the fluidity, and therefore instability, of identity, as well as the 
fragmentary nature of the world and the isolation of the individual. What further 
marks these authors as postmodern is that, although they present the world as a 
“waste land” that cannot be made whole again, they do not bemoan the fact that 
“the centre cannot hold.” On the contrary, they foreground the creativity and 
humour that can be found in such a situation. Chandler suggests that any attempt to 
hold on to “grand narratives” about “Truth” by making a distinction between “the 
original” and “the copy” is childish; Highsmith compares forgery, i.e. the blurring 
of the line between “truth” and falsehood,” to Art; while Christie’s tongue-in-cheek 
parodies of other texts are themselves exuberant testaments to the enjoyment we 
experience when we let go of assumptions about the stability of language or about 
the polarity of “truth versus falsehood,” “good versus evil,” etc. 
 At present, there is little recognition of the postmodernism of Chandler, 
Highsmith and Christie. The critical consensus seems to be that the Marlowe 
novels, for all that they deal with endemic crime and corruption, are still centred by 
the figure of the Romantic private detective and his unique voice. Similarly, while 
it is obvious that the Ripliad challenges conservative assumptions about sexuality 
Phay v 
or conventional views on morality, the novels are still seen as “thrillers,” i.e. 
“light” reading that does not “seriously” or “meaningfully” change readers’ views 
of the world. Christie is yet more underrated as a writer: her fiction has come to 
stand for “formulaic fiction”; critics and laymen alike associate her with cozy 
conservatism. Reading their work through the lens of postmodern theory therefore 
brings to the surface unexpectedly radical elements in the novels, such as their 
presentation of identity as a form of simulation. At the same time, acknowledging 
the postmodernism of Chandler, Highsmith and Christie allows us to explore the 
place of popular crime fiction in postmodernism. Finally, bringing together three 
such different authors—Chandler, Highsmith and Christie represent different sub-
genres, styles, ideologies, and sociohistorical contexts—answers Maurizio Ascari’s 
call for a re-examination of the assumptions that shape our understanding of crime 
fiction.
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The postmodern would be that which in the modern 
invokes the unpresentable in presentation itself, that 
which refuses the consolation of correct forms, 
refuses the consensus of taste permitting a common 
experience of nostalgia for the impossible, and 
inquires into new presentations—not to take pleasure 
in them, but to better produce the feeling that there is 
something unpresentable. . . . The [postmodern] 
artist and the writer therefore work without rules and 
in order to establish the rules for what will have been 
made. 
 
-- Jean-Francois Lyotard, “Answer 




Crime Fiction and Postmodernism 
In the light of Jean-Francois Lyotard’s assertion that postmodernism1 differs from 
modernism in that the former breaks with forms of “recognizable consistency” that 
“continue to offer the reader or spectator material for consolation and pleasure” 
(“Answer” 15), it seems somewhat perverse to argue that the fiction of popular 
crime writers like Raymond Chandler, Patricia Highsmith, and Agatha Christie 
might also be postmodern. After all, structuralist analysis
2
 tells us that popular 
crime fiction is more recognizably shaped by generic conventions and dominant 
ideologies, and therefore, perhaps, more anodyne, than writers of “more literary” 
                                                          
1
 I use the terms “postmodern” and “postmodernity” as most scholars do: “postmodernism is . . .  a 
style or a genre, while postmodernity is said to refer to an epoch or period” (Malpas 9). 
2
 See, e.g., Tzvetan Todorov’s influential “The Typology of Detective Fiction” in The Poetics of 
Prose, or John G. Cawelti’s Adventure, Mystery, and Romance: Formula Stories as Art and 
Popular Culture. See also Umberto Eco’s “Narrative Structures in Fleming” in The Role of the 
Reader. 
Phay 2 
literature. That is, despite its foregrounding of criminality, deviance, and 
disorder—concerns which, presumably, are the opposite of comforting—it would 
appear that popular crime fiction represents disorder only to impose order, and 
thereby soothe the reader. For instance, we might say that Chandler, Highsmith 
and Christie soothe their readers through the centring effect of the panoptic private 
eye or great detective; through form—all three authors, for instance, favour 
recurring characters and plot patterns; and finally, by evoking a sense of safety 
through soothing descriptions that seem to “sanitize” crime (Christie and 
Highsmith) or through the use of metaphors that implicitly convey the idea that 
language can put together a shattered world (Chandler).  Read thus, it would 
appear that popular crime fiction is escapist literature. Furthermore, Lyotard’s 
assurance that the postmodern writer “inquires into new presentations—not to take 
pleasure in them” (“Answer” 15) attests to a lingering academic distaste for texts 
which “merely” give readers “consolation and pleasure.” In such a context, crime 
fiction’s “escapism” seems to make it perverse to argue that popular crime fiction 
might be postmodern.  
 Nevertheless this thesis seeks to make the case that the fiction of Chandler, 
Highsmith, and Christie is postmodern. I argue that the Marlowe novels, the 
Ripliad, and Christie’s spy and detective novels all challenge conventional 
beliefs/assumptions about the stability of identity, language, “truth,” etc. It is 
undeniable that certain elements of their fiction may have a reassuring effect. For 
instance, Chandler’s presentation of Marlowe as a Romantic, knightly figure does 
provide some hope in an otherwise bleak picture of society. However, as I show in 
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the next chapter, this comfort is undercut by many decentring elements in the 
novels, such as Chandler’s suggestion that identity—even Marlowe’s—is always 
unstable since it is not an ontological
3
 fact—i.e. not a stable, fixed, concrete thing 
which exists and can therefore be studied, understood, or defined in definite 
terms—but an effect created out of arbitrary4 signs. In fact, the fiction of Chandler, 
Highsmith and Christie is postmodern precisely because their centring, 
“conservative” formal and ideological elements serve to emphasize the importance 
of other decentring, subversive elements that realize in form the authors’ almost 
poststructuralist depictions of the world as a multitude of texts made up of signs 
which have no inherent links to particular referents/meanings. By arguing thus, 
this thesis seeks to put texts which appear distressingly (or is it boringly?) familiar 
beneath a post-structuralist lens and thus offer a re-examination, not only of 
specific texts, but also of what it means to be “postmodern” in the context of the 
crime genre. 
 The rest of this introduction lays out the aims and implications of this 
argument, explains my apparently incongruous choice of texts, and defines key 
terms like “centredness” and “decentredness.” After that the thesis is divided into 
chapters, each concentrating on one author. I begin with Chandler, who, contrary 
to the view that it is the figure of the private eye/I who holds an apparently 
decentred world together, actually questions, through Marlowe’s confusing and 
                                                          
3
 I use the term “ontology” to mean that which has to do with existence, is “real” and therefore can 
be studied, defined, classified, etc. By saying that Chandler’s novels present “identity” not as 
ontological fact but as an effect of language, therefore, I am saying that in Chandler’s novels, 
“identity” is not even something that exists in abstract terms—“identity” simply is an empty word 
when applied to Chandler’s characters. “Epistemology,” on the other hand, has to do with how we 
know things. 
4
 I use “arbitrary” in the Saussurean sense, to refer to the fact that a word, e.g. “Chandler,” and its 
referent(s)—the man, the idea of the author, etc.—has no real logical or historical connection. 
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frequent slippages of identity, the very stability and coherence of identity itself. I 
argue that the centring effect of the figure of the “tough guy” detective as well as 
his “distinctive” voice is limited and undermined by other features of the text: 
Marlowe not only travels through a fragmented world, but is himself presented as 
a fractured self—which fits in with how the novels repeatedly highlight the 
fragility of identity, and reveal identity to be an effect constituted out of empty 
signs. Indeed, the connections between signs and meanings are revealed as 
arbitrary and ever-shifting, while connections between people are constantly 
associated with danger and guilt. The world is therefore a “waste land” of 
fragments and isolated individuals that cannot be made whole or centred. But grim 
as the novels seem when one looks merely at their content, there is a satirical, 
darkly humorous tone to them, which, when coupled with Chandler’s evident 
scorn for those who would try and arrest the play of signifiers, suggests a 
postmodern, ludic appreciation of the play of signs. 
 I then move on to Highsmith, who portrays, to a greater degree, the world 
as a conglomeration of arbitrary signs that can be manipulated for criminal ends. 
Where Chandler, cynical as he is, retains a greater attachment to conventional, 
almost Romantic, ideas of morality, Highsmith upends such beliefs entirely by 
putting us on the side of the character whom conventional mores would have us 
consider the villain. Highsmith also takes Chandler’s exploration of the fragility of 
identity one step further by systematically showing how all the ontological “facts” 
which we assume constitute an individual—e.g., actions, possessions, external 
signifiers like names—are actually empty signs as well. Put differently, through 
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her focus on Ripley’s skills as an impersonator and forger, Highsmith questions 
our understanding of “reality” and “truth” and shows that even material and 
therefore supposedly immutable, “unfakeable” “facts” or “signs,” e.g. of identity, 
can be changed and faked. That is to say, the world of the Ripley novels is a 
postmodern one. Like Chandler, moreover, Highsmith constantly displays in her 
fiction images of fluidity
5
 and fragmentedness, thereby suggesting that the world 
we live in, like the world of her novels, is fundamentally a disorderly one. And 
like Chandler, Highsmith’s novels, although largely chilling in tone, reveal a 
subversive humour. Indeed, through the motif of games, Highsmith highlights the 
play element in society and thereby draws our attention to the uneasy commingling 
of chaos and order in a hyperreal world. 
 Finally, in Christie’s fiction we encounter the mixed text of centredness 
and decentredness par excellence. Christie’s tongue-in-cheek parodies of generic 
conventions in the earlier, and experiments with form in the later spy thrillers, are 
recognizably postmodern in their skepticism regarding attempts to control the play 
of signification and in their presentation of the world as a text, i.e. as a tissue of 
signs with shifting meanings, while her detective fiction, contrary to expectations, 
actually challenges binary forms of thinking and destabilizes attempts to “fix” 
identity by “sorting” individuals into neat categories. Thus Christie’s characters 
tend to be, simultaneously, insiders and outsiders, thereby staging for readers a 
(postmodern) situation in which borders and categories are revealed to be porous. 
This, in turn, reminds readers that attempts to essentialize and categorize 
                                                          
5
 By “fluidity” I mean “changeability,” “shapelessness” or “formlessness,” as well as the quality of 
being difficult to define and pin down. 
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individuals are futile attempts to control the chaos of the world. In Christie, as in 
Chandler and Highsmith, there are few or no remaining “Truths” on which the 
world can be centred, and this is also reflected in Christie’s use of form, 
particularly in her spy novels, to evoke unsettling feelings of impermanence and 
thus draw our attention to the transient and ever-changing nature of (post)modern 
life.  
 
 The purpose of this thesis is threefold. Firstly, this thesis fills a gap in the 
study of the intersection of popular crime fiction and postmodernism in literature. 
Popular fiction—of all kinds, not just of the crime genre—still remains under-
represented in serious academic studies, while studying crime fiction allows us to 
study the very sites on which our ideas about morality, deviance, what constitutes 
“crime,” etc. are formed and reformed, and as such has especial relevance to the 
postmodern world in which we live today. That is, postmodernism’s anti-
essentialism, anti-foundationalism and relativism make societies increasingly wary 
of judging or imposing normative definitions on others’ identities and actions; this 
in turn makes the demarcation of “right” from “wrong,” “guilty” from “innocent,” 
and “normal” from “deviant,” much more complex and troubling. Therefore, 
studying crime fiction in the context of postmodernism allows us to explore how 
societies chart a course between their valorization of plurality, relativity and 
openness on the one hand and a conflicting desire for certainty, closure and fixity 
on the other.  
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 Secondly, this thesis seeks to give a different perspective of the work of 
Chandler, Highsmith, and Christie: “postmodernist” is not an empty label—
“postmodernist” accurately expresses both these authors’ presentation of language 
and identity as a conglomeration of shifting, arbitrary signs and the humorous, 
almost mischievous spirit in which these views of the world are presented. Calling 
these popular authors “postmodernist” also challenges the prevailing view that 
popular fiction is: merely entertaining; deals with “serious” issues such as crime or 
death briefly and in a way designed to reassure; is constrained by generic 
conventions and therefore has little literary merit. Pointedly experimental language 
or forms are only two possible means of getting readers to think about life and 
language: writers like Chandler, Highsmith, and Christie reveal an alternative—
they mix centring and decentring elements not so much to “sugar-coat” 
unpalatable presentations of the fluidity of “reality” and “truth,” but to mirror the 
very way in which we go about our lives, where a semblance of certainty masks 
the uncertainty beneath. Put differently, a postmodernist lens allows us to 
appreciate the startling extent to which the work of Chandler et al. challenge 
assumptions about the stability of identity, language, and reality. 
 By highlighting the postmodernism of these authors I hope also to refute 
the claims of conservatism/escapism made against Christie and, by extension, 
Chandler. Christie is perhaps the author who seems least likely to fit the label 
“postmodernist”—indeed, “Christie” has become, in popular culture and criticism 
alike, a sort of byword for “coziness” and “conservatism,” i.e. all that is opposed 
to postmodernism. Oddly enough, in spite of Christie’s willingness to play with 
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the detective sub-genre’s conventions—e.g., by making the narrator the murderer 
in The Murder of Roger Ackroyd (1926), or by making all the suspects the 
murderers in Murder on the Orient Express (1934)—Christie’s writing continues 
to be perceived as “formulaic.” Thus Christie’s extensive corpus is often reduced 
to a set of conventions
6
 which are conflated with, or taken to be representative of, 
the conventions of the detective sub-genre as a whole. This (mis)conception of 
Christie arises in large part from the hitherto structuralist emphasis on looking for 
patterns across her work—an approach that has also shaped the perception of 
Christie as a conservative writer whose books express nostalgia for an idealized 
Britain. This same structuralist emphasis leads critics like Malmgren to conclude 
that the subversive potential of Chandler’s fiction is limited by the fact that the 
Marlowe novels ultimately adhere to generic conventions. 
 That I may be reading too much into what are “merely” generic 
conventions might, indeed, be one objection against calling the work of Chandler 
et al. “postmodern.” It might be argued that a focus on instability, disorder, threats 
to one’s identity, etc., is a natural and unavoidable result of the genre’s subject 
matter—i.e. a focus on disorder is simply the basic requirement of a crime text, so 
Chandler, Highsmith and Christie do not particularly stand out in a “postmodern” 
way simply because a host of other crime writers do similar things. It seems to me, 
however, that to argue thus is to over-emphasize the fact that crime fiction is 
“genre fiction” as well as to underestimate the genre, and these authors, somewhat. 
While it is true that all crime fiction deals with topics like crime, guilt, fear, etc., 
not all crime fiction evokes an atmosphere of uncertainty and threat—later in this 
                                                          
6
 See, for instance, Bargainnier, Malmgren, Porter, and Thompson. 
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chapter I examine two examples of “cozy” fiction in which reassuring, centring 
devices mitigate any sense of threat—and among those that do, there are major 
differences in the way this atmosphere is used. At the same time, since Chandler et 
al. are considered “masters” of their respective sub-genres—or, at any rate, have 
been and continue to be, massively popular—it seems reasonable to assume that 
their works possess qualities that other crime novels or stories do not. This 
“special something” is, I contend, an atmosphere, tone, and awareness of textuality 
that is best encapsulated by the term “postmodern.” 
  Furthermore, in the case of Highsmith and Christie, judging by the dearth 
of readings focusing on their use of motifs, figurative language, narrative 
technique, etc., critics seem to be implicitly accusing them of “non-literariness.” 
This thesis therefore concentrates on the “literariness” of Highsmith’s and 
Christie’s writing, and by doing so, makes a case for seeing these authors as 
writers of more than just “mere” entertainment. Also, Chandler, Highsmith and 
Christie were chosen precisely because they are some of the most popular—
indeed, pioneers—of their sub-genres. Hopefully, then, this revised view of 
Chandler et. al. will contribute to the re-examination and re-evaluation of popular 
crime fiction as a whole—indeed, perhaps even to a rethinking of the “popular” in 
“popular literature.”  
 My bringing together of three apparently very different authors is also 
something of an experiment in reading without a prior acceptance of assumptions 
about sub-genres. In this I have been influenced by Maurizio Ascari’s argument 
that there is a need to “trace a counter-history of crime fiction, both by disinterring 
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texts that have had little or no critical attention devoted to them and by 
reinterpreting . . . works that we believe we know all too well” (xiii). Ascari does 
this by unearthing the relationships that link the detective mystery to its 
sensational, Gothic, and supernatural roots—a “heritage” that, Ascari 
demonstrates, was “denied” by both “detective novelists and critics . . . in order to 
emphasize [the] rational character” of their chosen sub-genre and thereby 
legitimize it. That is, Ascari shows that there is a need to take into account the 
assumptions and value systems that shape critics’ readings of crime texts.  
 For instance, although scholars now celebrate multiplicity in the 
interpretation of texts as well as acknowledge the porosity of generic boundaries, 
the awareness of existing sub-generic taxonomies continues to shape critics’ very 
conceptualization of the possibilities afforded by the genre. Take, for instance, the 
Cambridge Companion to Crime Fiction, edited by Martin Priestman. Priestman 
and the contributors clearly take an inclusive view of what constitutes “crime 
fiction”—the prefatory Chronology makes no sub-generic distinctions—yet the 
contents page makes it immediately apparent that “crime fiction” is divided into 
“French Crime Fiction,” “The Golden Age,” “Spy Fiction,” etc. (these are all titles 
of individual essays in the anthology). Such clarity is useful but becomes 
problematic when a prior awareness of difference shapes the study of crime 
fiction, concretizes canons, and obscures interesting relationships between authors 
who are not “placed” in the same generic, ideological, or historical category (e.g., 
Chandler and Highsmith). 
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 Thirdly, this thesis makes an argument for reading crime fiction through a 
post-structuralist lens. Contrary to the structuralist emphasis on unity, it is 
precisely the duality and the juxtaposition of multiple points of view that we need 
to analyse in the work of popular crime authors—especially those whose 
reputations continue to suffer somewhat from the persistent equation of “popular” 
to “formulaic.” This emphasis on rules and structures stems largely from the fact 
that the first critics to seriously study the genre used structuralist methods: John G. 
Cawelti’s seminal structuralist analysis of popular genres like the thriller, the 
western, and romance kick-started this movement by giving scholars a framework 
for exploring a new field of study which, as was believed then, did not respond 
well to techniques used to critique “High” Literature. Cawelti’s work also made 
the study of popular literature more respectable, one suspects, in no small part 
because of the scientific “aura” of structuralist analysis. But it is this very 
structuralist method of reading—with its attendant emphasis on rules and 
conventions—that has led to the charges of conservatism and escapism against 
popular crime fiction
7
. Put differently, so much effort has been put into exploring 
how crime writers depict the healing of a shattered world, that it is time to pay 
more attention to how these same authors also suggest that “the centre cannot 
hold” and that there may, in fact, be no need to put this fractured world back 
together since humour and pleasure may be gotten out of plurality and 
fragmentedness as well.  
                                                          
7
 See, e.g., Evans, Knight, Form and Ideology in Crime Fiction and Crime Fiction, 1800-2000, 
Malmgren, Porter, and Thompson. Readings of the “conservatism” of each author I study will be 
referenced in the pertinent chapter. For scholars who take a more balanced view and suggest that 
popular crime fiction is a mix of reassuring and unsettling elements, see Hilfer, “Inversion and 
Excess,” and Hutter. 
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“The Centre Cannot Hold” 
 This section explores the relationship between postmodernism and crime fiction. I 
briefly explore the role of crime fiction in a postmodern world, and suggest that 
crime fiction might even be considered a manifestation of the shift in literary 
styles and concerns we call “postmodernism.”  
 It must be said that although the term “postmodern” has been widely used 
since the 1970s (Malpas 5
8), there is still debate as to what “postmodernism” and 
“postmodernity” stand for, what effects these words translate to in the “real 
world,” and how theories on the postmodern might shape disciplines ranging from 
architecture to literature. Nevertheless, regardless of whether one defines the 
“postmodern” as a culture, a historical epoch, a zeitgeist, an artistic movement, or 
a new development in economics and politics—all of which are aspects of the 
concept of the “postmodern”—the sense comes through that “postmodern,” e.g., 
when applied to literature, represents a re-examination or extension of the beliefs 
and assumptions of modernism.  
 Firstly, both postmodernists and modernists recognize the fragmentedness 
of the world, but while modernists seek to “make the world whole again” through 
Art, postmodernists are skeptical of both the distinction between “high” and 
“popular” art as well as the possibility of putting a fractured world together. 
Secondly, modernists reaffirm literature as a means of returning meaning and 
order to a chaotic world—the underlying assumption being that “text” and 
                                                          
8
 See also Sim viii-x for a concise history of the use of the term, and also Histories of 
Postmodernism, edited by Mark Bevir, Jill Hargis, and Sara Rushing. 
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“world/reality” are separate categories even if they are able to influence each 
other—postmodernists see that the world is a text. Thirdly, the modernist 
worldview is serious, which comes through in the earnestness of the modernist 
text, whereas parody is, if not the dominant mode of the postmodernist text, then 
nevertheless a major element of it. Finally, postmodernists question the idea that 
“truth” is singular and uncomplicated, view with reserve—if not suspicion— 
hierarchy, order and fixedness, and valorize “individuality,” “freedom,” and 
“subversion.” “Postmodernism” is, therefore, a mode of thinking or writing that 
experiments, questions and subverts older artistic forms, and thereby encourages 
the reader to explore his/her assumptions about, e.g., language and identity, as well 
as accept openness, relativity, and decentredness. 
 This brings us to the question of the function of popular crime fiction in a 
postmodern world. What sets postmodernism apart from modernism is a 
valorization of fluidity, fragmentation and freedom—all of which translates, to 
detractors, as disorder and deviance. Fiction about crime, i.e., about chaos and 
deviance, takes on new significance in such a context. If the fiction of Chandler, 
Highsmith, and Christie does not reassure readers that order exists, and does not 
provide an escape from the disorder of the “real world,” as critics have suggested, 
why is it so popular? I suggest that the fiction of these authors is compelling—and 
therefore, presumably, popular—precisely because it becomes a site for readers to 
engage with a decentred world and the issues arising from that decentredness: e.g., 
loss of confidence in one’s sense of one’s own identity, a growing awareness that 
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“reality” is constituted through signs and is therefore a language that can be 
manipulated for various purposes, etc. 
 Put differently, we might even say that crime fiction holds up a “distorting 
mirror” to “reality” that allows us to see that it is “reality” which is really 
“distorted.” I use the word “distorting” deliberately: crime fiction is not a 
“distorted” mirror, although to the layman and even some critics, crime fiction is a 
sensationalized version of criminal events—i.e. events which are “abnormal” and 
“deviant” and therefore removed from “reality”—and in this sense, a “distorted 
mirror.” However, crime fiction, qua fiction, presents a subjective view of the 
world that foregrounds particular issues and downplays or ignores others, which in 
turn allows crime fiction, again qua fiction, to foreground issues like subjectivity 
and point of view. As Emile Zola put it, art is “a corner of nature seen through a 
temperament” (quoted in Brian Nelson’s introduction to The Kill). Crime fiction 
is, in this sense, a “distorting” mirror. At the same time, notwithstanding the 
simplistic view of fiction as “untruth,” crime fiction, however dramatized and 
“coloured,” does allow readers to grapple with complex views of “reality”: as I 
shall show, for example, Chandler et al. allow readers to see that the apparently 
stable world around us is a conglomeration of arbitrary signs. Paradoxically, then, 
crime fiction is a distorting mirror that “truthfully” reveals the “distortedness” of 
reality. 
 I go into such detail because this is not a gratuitous metaphor; it allows us 
to see that crime fiction, regardless of sub-genre or period, can be considered as a 
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postmodern genre, and that postmodernism is a form of crime fiction
9
.  It is no 
coincidence that Lyotard compared postmodernism to a mode of thinking and 
writing that functions as a distorting mirror, which, as I contend, is precisely what 
crime fiction does as well. In his “Note on the Meaning of ‘Post-’” (1988) Lyotard 
argued that “the ‘post-’ of ‘postmodernism’ does not signify a movement . . . of 
repetition but a procedure in ‘ana-’: a procedure of analysis, anamnesis, anagogy, 
and anamorphosis that elaborates an ‘initial forgetting’” (80; my emphasis).  
 Although Lyotard is describing his understanding of postmodernism, what 
he says might equally serve to describe popular crime fiction. “Analysis”: just as 
postmodernism entails questioning of the attitudes and values of modernism, so 
crime fiction uses the “formulaic” themes of the genre to express both 
epistemological and ontological doubts, while at the same time using the formal 
conventions of the genre only to ring the changes on them and question the 
assumptions underlying such conventions. “Anamnesis”: as Tzvetan Todorov 
makes clear, the crime story has to investigate the past in order to move forward—
although a post-structuralist view would modify this to say, instead, that the crime 
story has to investigate, and in so doing, create, the past in order to move forward. 
Crime fiction, then, is structured as a sort of anamnesis, and also foregrounds the 
issues attendant on this re-examining the past. “Anagogy” is more obscure: the 
reference to religion—surely the grand narrative par excellence—is surprising at 
first, given that this is Lyotard speaking, but perhaps incidental. The emphasis, 
                                                          
9
 This is a paraphrase of Diane Elam’s thesis in Romancing the Postmodern, which argues that both 
the romance genre and postmodernism “share a common concern with the persistence of excess” 
and that exploring this connection allows us to understand “what the historical and cultural stakes 
are in the privileging of realism over romance in the tradition of the novel” (2). 
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really, is on interpretation. We might say, therefore, that just as postmodernism 
explores and interrogates the processes and politics of interpretation, so does the 
crime genre, which stages a hunt for meaning, but only to question the very 
processes by which that meaning is formulated. Finally, “anamorphosis”: just as 
postmodernism seeks to distort what we assume is “normal” in order to provoke an 
examination of these assumptions, so crime fiction, as I have suggested, forms a 
distorting mirror of the world that paradoxically, manages to unsettle us and 
thereby give us pleasure. Clearly, the close parallels between the “structure” of 
postmodernism and of crime fiction suggests that the popular crime fiction of even 
the early twentieth century is a manifestation of postmodernism. 
 I would also like at this point to address the question of whether crime 
fiction is more concerned with ontological or epistemological issues. The 
following chapters will show that the crime fiction of Chandler et al. is also 
postmodernist in the sense that it is as much concerned with ontology as 
epistemology. This claim might seem surprising, given that Todorov’s influential 
analysis of crime fiction seems to suggest that it is, if anything, modernist, i.e. 
concerned with epistemology rather than ontology and with containing the sense 
of decentredness arising from an increasingly chaotic world. I suggest, however, 
that there are problems with Todorov’s theory and that ontological doubt is as 
much an element of crime fiction as epistemological anxiety. 
 As Brian McHale has convincingly argued, “the dominant of modernist 
fiction is epistemological,” whereas “the dominant of postmodernist fiction is 
ontological” (9, 10; emphases original). In this light, Todorov’s theory implies that 
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crime fiction functions in a modernist mode. Todorov famously argued that “at the 
base of the whodunnit we find a duality”—i.e. that the detective story is not 
singular, but dual, consisting as it does of “the story of the crime,” and “the story 
of the investigation” (The Poetics of Prose 44-45).  The whodunnit, in other 
words, contains at the same time, “two points of view about the same thing” 
(Poetics 46). Todorov calls this duality a “paradox,” and accounts for it by arguing 
that the story of the crime “is in fact the story of an absence” (Poetics 46).  
 By saying this Todorov implicitly revises his earlier statement about there 
being two points of view in the “classical” detective novel—there is one unifying 
point of view, the narrator’s, while the point of view of the Other, the criminal, is 
gestured towards, hunted down, and finally, neutralized by becoming part of the 
detective’s explanation, or story. This is tantamount to saying that the story of the 
crime, which “tells ‘what really happened,’” gives way to the story of the 
investigation, which “explains ‘how the reader (or the narrator) has come to know 
about it’” (Poetics 45). The whodunnit, it seems, is more concerned with “how do 
I know what really happened,” then what really happened itself. This, according to 
Todorov, is what distinguishes the whodunnit from other sub-genres. Therefore, 
the whodunnit is a modernist form if read in the context of Todorov’s arguments, 
although Todorov does not explicitly put it this way. 
 There are problems, though, with Todorov’s theory. It is odd that Todorov 
deems it necessary to account for the genre’s duality in the first place. The 
implication is that Todorov has assumed previously—due, perhaps, to the 
structuralist emphasis on the unity of the text—that dualities need explaining 
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away. In any case, his argument that the story of the investigation takes 
precedence over the story of the crime does not hold in actuality. Just because 
readers do not witness the crime does not mean the story of the investigation takes 
precedence over the story of the crime. The moment of the crime itself may not be 
“immediately present in the book” (Todorov, Poetics 46), but the events leading 
up to the crime are certainly present and significant in novels written by authors 
ranging from Christie, to contemporaries of Christie’s like Josephine Tey, and to 
later writers like P.D. James.  
 I am not arguing with Todorov’s point that “how we know” is one of the 
questions asked by the text, but that “what happened” is an equally important part 
of the reading process. That is, the events leading up to the crime may be used to 
foreground suspicions that even ontological certainties may not be certainties. Put 
differently, a whodunnit does not just ask questions about how we know someone 
is guilty of a particular crime such as murder—it can also ask what “guilty” or 
“murder” means in the first place. Whodunnits do not, therefore, stop at 
epistemological questions—many “classic” whodunnits, including Christie’s, 
reveal a greater degree of decentredness by asking questions about ontology as 
well, and are in this sense “postmodern.” 
 Take, for instance, Tey’s Miss Pym Disposes (1946). It has the hallmarks 
of a “classical” whodunnit—it is set in a small, isolated community bubbling over 
with hidden tensions, and narrated by an outsider who in this case is also the 
detective—but asks ontological as well as epistemological questions about crime 
by foregrounding the events leading up to murder, and not only the murder itself. 
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From the beginning the reader is faced with a string of actual and implied 
wrongdoings: a student steals an anatomical model for private study; another 
student cheats during an exam; a normally wise principal makes a bad decision 
that “robs” an excellent student of a promising career; yet another student 
mentions that her grandmother was suspected of murder; kleptomania and theft of 
food are spoken of. When a murder finally occurs, it appears to be an accident. 
This provides readers with the chance to tackle both epistemological (“how do I 
know who’s guilty?”) and ontological questions (“what is a crime?”). The actual 
execution of crime is, in any case, the avowed focus of attention in other crime 
sub-genres, particularly psychothrillers like the Ripliad. 
 Todorov’s theory, then, can be challenged in parts. Crime fiction, even that 
most “conservative” of its sub-genres, the “classical” whodunnit, asks both 
epistemological and ontological questions. As McHale has shown, the dominant in 
postmodern theory is precisely that: the shift of concern from epistemology to 
ontology. Rethinking Todorov’s theory therefore makes it possible for us to put 
crime fiction in a postmodern context, which, as the previous sections have shown, 
provides a renewed understanding of both postmodernism and an important genre. 
 
Defining (De)centredness 
In a bid to move away from emotionally-loaded definitions of crime sub-genres 
that result in evaluations of each sub-genre’s “worth,” Carl C. Malmgren uses, to 
great effect, the categories “centred” and “decentred” to distinguish between the 
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“classical” detective novel, hard-boiled private eye novel, and psychothriller10. 
Malmgren argues that the “essential difference between the worlds of mystery and 
detective fiction can be expressed in the notion of centredness: mystery fiction 
presupposes a centred world; detective fiction, a decentred world” (13; 
Malmgren’s emphasis). By “centred” Malmgren means “a world which has a 
centre, an anchor, a ground; a centred world is one in which effects can be 
connected to causes, where external signs can be linked to internal conditions” 
(13). Put differently, a centred text is one in which “order, stability, causality, and 
resolution” are thematically and formally reaffirmed or valorized (71).  
 Malmgren’s study is structuralist and heavily invested in keeping sub-
generic boundaries intact. Nevertheless, “centred” and “decentred” are useful 
terms: they allow us to bypass stereotypes about ideological/formal conservatism, 
etc., to look, instead, at popular crime texts not just in terms of structure, or how 
well they adhere to existing sub-generic taxonomies, but as individual texts that 
produce various effects through different means. In other words, instead of 
conceiving of crime texts as manifestations of abstract ideological and cultural 
structures—a conceptualization that ignores the role of the reader and leaves no 
room for “deviations” from the structure—it might be more useful to look instead 
at the effects produced by particular elements in the text and by interactions 
between these elements. As I understand the terms, then, “centredness” and 
“decentredness” describe effects arising out of the thematic and formal features of 
                                                          
10
 Confusingly, Malmgren uses different terms for each sub-genre. The issue of generic labels is a 
fraught one, but Horsley’s argument is the most convincing: “what is lost by jettisoning the 
established labels [like “hard-boiled” or “classic detective” fiction] is the sense of how writers and 
critics have, over the past decades, used, varied, challenged and built upon them” (3). I will 
therefore continue using these terms. 
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a text. It would be impossible to reproduce Malmgren’s detailed interpretations of 
centred texts—nor do I agree with some of them, e.g., his classification of 
Christie’s work as “centred.” Instead, to illustrate what I mean by “centred,” I will 
briefly analyze two examples of what I would consider “centred” crime fiction. 
These examples also show what sorts of popular fiction might not be classified as 
“postmodernist.” 
 Alexander McCall Smith’s The Miracle at Speedy Motors (2008) belongs 
to the “cozy” sub-genre of detective fiction and is a good example of a crime novel 
which is centred despite having a postmodern awareness of textuality. The novel 
consistently presents readers with a world “in which effects can be connected to 
causes, [and] where external signs can be linked to internal conditions” (Malmgren 
13). For instance, the novel is set in an idealized Botswana where signifiers are 
securely wedded to their signifieds: “She belonged to a Botswana where names 
meant something, connected people with places, cousins, events; even with cattle” 
(145; my emphasis). Furthermore, in sharp contrast to Chandler’s, Highsmith’s, 
and Christie’s lonely worlds of isolated individuals, McCall Smith’s imaginary 
Botswana is a heartwarmingly tight-knit community: 
Yes, we were all care of one another in the final analysis, at least in 
Botswana, where people looked for and valued those invisible links 
that connected people, that made for belonging. We were all cousins, 
even if remote ones, of somebody; we were all friends of friends, 
joined together by bonds you might never see, but that were there, 
sometimes every bit as strong as hoops of steel. (4) 
 
And even though one might imagine that a detective novel would necessarily have 
to deal with the problem of how language can be deliberately manipulated to hide 
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crime and guilt, McCall Smith assures readers that language is not really slippery 
at all: “You can always read the signs, she [Mma Ramotswe, the detective] 
thought; the clues are there, and you only have to be moderately observant to 
notice them” (180; my emphasis). 
 Apart from direct statements reaffirming the centredness of the world, the 
novel uses language in a symbolic way that reaffirms the reassuring message that 
every effect has its cause, and every sign its meaning. In particular, the novel’s 
sentimental message is brought across through the motif of objects becoming 
symbols. Mma Ramotswe, head detective of the No. 1 Ladies Detective Agency, is 
identified by her beloved white van, while we are given to understand that her 
colleague Mma Makutsi is Mma Makutsi because she can be identified by her 
signature large, round glasses and shoes. So when Mma Makutsi attempts to 
replace her round glasses the changing of the sign (the glasses) gives rise to a mini 
crisis: “It was Mma Makutsi, was it not? . . . Mma Makutsi’s chair was occupied, 
but could it be somebody other than Mma Makutsi in it, some Mma Makutsi-
looking person, but not the real Mma Makutsi; some relative or friend, perhaps, of 
the same general conformation?” (187) Put differently, the glasses have come to 
stand for Mma Makutsi herself, and are markers of her identity. This identity 
crisis, however, simply dissipates when Mma Makutsi returns to her round glasses 
in the end, thereby reaffirming the strength of the bond between the glasses and 
their owner, i.e. the connection between signifier and signified.  
 Similarly, Mma Makutsi’s dream of buying “a cupboard full of new shoes” 
allows McCall Smith not only to reaffirm a sentimental anti-materialism but also 
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to reinforce the idea that one thing can stand for another: “It was all very well 
becoming Mrs. Phuti Radiphuti, wife of the proprietor of the Double Comfort 
Furniture Shop, but one should not forget where it was that one had come from; 
although, if one did, there were always one’s shoes to remind one” (49-50; my 
emphasis). That is, the symbolism of Mma Makutsi’s old shoes is strong enough to 
rein her materialism in. Mma Ramotswe re-emphasizes this view when she 
suggests that “we should all keep a few things, a few mementoes, to remind us of 
what we used to be, just in case we forgot” (69). Clearly, McCall Smith, like 
Chandler, Highsmith and Christie, is aware of the textuality of the world. What 
makes the latter authors postmodern, however, is that they, unlike McCall Smith, 
present the world as a conglomeration of isolated individuals and as a decentred 
mass of signifiers with no fixed connections to particular signifieds. 
 Another example of centred fiction would be Rex Stout’s Nero Wolfe 
series. The series foregrounds language and its effects: firstly, the stories are, of 
course, detective mysteries and therefore implicitly highlights how language can 
be used to hide, or pinpoint, wrongdoing; secondly, as in Chandler’s fiction, there 
is a great deal of witty humour; finally, how words should or can be used, or how 
words can have multiple meanings, is foregrounded simply by the fact that the 
great detective Nero Wolfe is constantly correcting the language of those around 
him.  
 However, unlike Chandler’s decentred fiction, which uses images of 
shattering, etc., to undermine the centring effect created by the identification of the 
murderer(s), etc., the Wolfe novels contain many features that undermine any 
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decentring effect that might arise from the subject matter (murder, blackmail, etc.) 
For instance, the fact that Stout chose not to let his characters age in “real time”—
unlike Chandler et al.—immediately creates a fairytale sense of static inviolability 
about the (recurring) characters and their world; the “unchangingness” of the main 
characters allows Stout blithely to ignore the problems that change can bring, and 
provides a touchstone of stability for readers. Secondly, Wolfe’s brownstone and 
lifestyle, which is invariably described in so much detail that readers can easily 
draw a plan of every floor or recite Wolfe’s daily schedule, serves as a symbol of 
order, security, and the close ties that can flourish between individuals, no matter 
how different their personalities may be.  
 Finally, reassuringly clear binaries structure the Wolfe novels: unlike in 
Christie’s fiction, where there are conflicting views of characters, and where 
characters’ motives are frequently mixed in a way that confuses attempts to class a 
character as either good or bad, the Wolfe novels have one important “Us/Them” 
binary that almost always holds. Wolfe; Archie; Fritz, Wolfe’s chef; Theodore, 
Wolfe’s resident orchid expert; Saul Panzer; Fred Durkin; Inspector Cramer; Lily 
Rowan, Archie’s girlfriend; and, until the very last novel of the series11, Orrie 
Cather: these characters constitute a tight band of, if not friends, then at least 
allies, and form a clear contrast to the other characters in the series. Reading a 
Wolfe story may, therefore, be compared to entering the “Us” group. The Wolfe 
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 A Family Affair (1975), in which Orrie is the murderer. Even then, as the word “family” in the 
title suggests, Orrie is never “cast out from the fold” despite committing murder. Unlike Christie, 
however, who in Curtain: Poirot’s Last Case (1975), uses the trope of the detective turning 
murderer to explore different conceptualizations of “justice” and suggest that boundaries between 
“good” and “evil” are not so much porous as wishful thinking, Stout ends his novel by suggesting 
that even Orrie’s murder is a brief disturbance of an orderly world—one which, moreover, can be 
“fixed” if everyone else in the group continues to maintain an “Us/Them” boundary. 
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mysteries, in short, are “centred” because of the stable, warm atmosphere they 
create, which allows Stout not only to gesture towards, but never fully engage 
with, issues like the instability of identity, language, etc., but also to undercut any 
unease that might arise from the subject matter.  
 I would not consider the Wolfe novels, and The Miracle at Speedy Motors, 
“postmodernist” fiction, but not because Stout and McCall Smith do not do avant-
garde things with form and language. Rather, these novels are not “postmodernist” 
for two reasons. Firstly, the atmosphere is simply too centred or “cozy”; such an 
atmosphere shuts down any in-depth contemplation of disorder and death, and is 
the opposite of, e.g., Christie’s mischievous humour in the face of the slipperiness 
of language—humour which undermines any coziness that may be evoked through 
Christie’s choice of setting, e.g., country homes in idyllic little villages or old 
world hotels
12
. Put differently, the atmosphere of Stout’s and McCall Smith’s 
novels is an attempt to “make a shattered world whole again,” whereas a 
postmodernist text would, instead, highlight and take delight in the “shatteredness” 
of the world. Secondly, novels like Stout’s and McCall Smith’s simply do not 
foreground the textuality of the world as Chandler et al. do. Granted, Wolfe is 
deeply concerned about words and their usage, and there are some almost self-
reflexive moments in the Wolfe novels, such as when The League of Frightened 
Men (1935) opens with Archie calling the entrance of their client/suspect “a 
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 At Bertram’s Hotel (1965), for instance, highlights the cozy, Edwardian charm of the titular 
hotel, but very quickly reveals this charm to be a simulation, an effect created through the 
calculated use of everything from furniture to the people “allowed” to stay there. Thus the manager 
of the hotel, who “could, at any moment, be all things to all people” (6), says quite frankly to 
another guest that he has shaped his hotel thus because the tourists who have money (Americans) 
“have queer ideas of what England life is like” and the kitsch Bertram’s caters to these idealizations 
and misconceptions. 
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prologue, not a part of the main action” (1). The point, however, is that these 
moments are only “almost” self-reflexive; they serve to add humour to the novel, 
and do not illustrate a particular view of the world. Therefore, neither the Wolfe 
novels nor The Miracle at Speedy Motors can be considered “postmodernist.” 
 It might be felt that these requirements—decentredness and a post-
structuralist view of language, and the world, as a mass of shifting signs—do not 
constitute sufficiently strict, definite parameters that show how some formulaic 
fiction might not be considered postmodernist. What, however, constitutes a 
“definite parameter”? To fix on particular formal, thematic, or linguistic 
conventions and then claim that adherence to these conventions precludes certain 
works from ever becoming postmodernist would be to return to a way of reading 
that emphasizes genre—a way of reading that, I would say, limits the connections 
that may be made between various works of fiction. Furthermore, it is not merely 
the use of particular motifs—the kaleidoscope image, for instance, or looking into 
a mirror and feeling alienated from oneself—that marks a work as “postmodern.” 
Similarly, other motifs—e.g., the union of a pair of lovers, or the identification of 
the villain—do not necessarily mean that that work is not “postmodern.” The same 
motif may have very different effects in two novels. In any case, a work of crime 
fiction is usually a mix of both centring and decentring elements. In fact, this is 
where Malmgren’s “centredness” and “decentredness” prove useful, because these 
terms remind us to focus on effects instead of particular textual conventions. What 
makes a crime text “postmodern” then, is not its adherence to particular 
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conventions but whether it is, on the whole, centred or decentred, and whether it 
presents the world as a text. 
 The objection might also be made that this definition of “postmodernism” 
is too wide and implies that numerous other works, even those from other genres, 
might be considered “postmodernist.” I concede that this is a broad definition. 
Nevertheless, one of the aims of this thesis is to “read against” genre—i.e. it is 
surely possible that a crime text might be “postmodernist” in a similar way to, say, 
a romance novel or a picaresque novel—and this broad definition of 
“postmodernist” allows us to see the connections, rather than just the differences, 
between texts that have been placed and are therefore thought of as properly 
belonging in different genres.   
 However, another implication of my definition of “postmodernist” is that 
the work of Chandler et al. is “postmodernist”—i.e. decentred and has a focus on 
signs and their interpretation—in ways similar to that of eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century authors ranging from Ann Radcliffe to Wilkie Collins. The 
extension of “postmodernism” to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—and 
possibly even before—could potentially rob the term of its sharpness. However, it 
still seems worthwhile to try fitting the term “postmodernist” to the apparently 
“merely” entertaining works by Chandler, Christie, and Highsmith, partly because 
the term has associations with linguistic or formal artistry and deliberate attempts 
to question received opinions about identity, etc. which help us to see the 
craftsmanship and depth of fiction that has yet to receive sufficiently in-depth 
critical attention. In other words, what the term “postmodernist” does when placed 
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in conjunction with “popular fiction” is help us to think of the “literariness” of the 
latter, while placing “popular fiction” in the context of “postmodernism” allows us 
to move away from stereotypical notions of what makes a “postmodernist text.” 
 A final qualification: I am not claiming that postmodernism and 
decentredness are binary opposites to modernism and centredness. Just as 
Todorov’s ideas are most useful if we consider crime fiction not as asking either 
epistemological or ontological questions, so Malmgren’s categories are most 
helpful when they are seen as effects which coexist in the same text, and from 
which interaction the genre derives its postmodernism. To return to the analogy of 
the distorting mirror: just as we only recognize distortion of an image when we 
retain the memory of what that image looks like “normally,” so decentredness can 
be felt because it is different from centredness. To argue that the fiction of 
Chandler, Highsmith, and Christie is postmodern, then, is not to argue that their 
fiction is decentred as opposed to centred, but to say that their texts represent a 
struggle between decentredness and centredness in which the former 
predominates. That is, Chandler et al. do not present worlds in which things have 
completely fallen apart; the paradox is that the chaos they explore is more apparent 
because there is still the semblance of, and desire to assert, order. Similarly, none 
of these authors claim that signs have no meaning but that the link between sign 
and signified is arbitrary and therefore unstable. Put differently, these authors 
encourage readers to engage with the idea that chaos is not meaninglessness, but 




Raymond Chandler: Fragmented Worlds, Fractured Selves 
 
 
Many critics—from E.M. Beekman and F.R. Jameson to, more recently, Carl C. 
Malmgren and Kristen Garrison—have argued that although Raymond Chandler’s 
Marlowe novels are set in a world of social and moral disorder, the decentredness 
of this world is ameliorated by the strong figure of the private eye/I and his unique 
voice. This chapter argues, however, that these centring elements are undercut by 
other decentring elements so that, far from providing the reader with comfortable 
assumptions or nostalgic worlds to escape to, the novels actually question 
assumptions about the stability of identity and language, and celebrate fluidity, 
disorder and theatricality. In this sense, the Marlowe novels are postmodern novels 
although they are not currently recognized as such. 
 First, I re-examine the view that Marlowe is the centring force in a world 
otherwise portrayed as disorderly and fluid—i.e. unpredictable, changeable, and 
full of various, sometimes conflicting, meanings. Although Chandler’s distinctive 
use of language seems to be a means of knitting together a fragmented existence, 
the Marlowe novels ultimately highlight the fluidity of language and deny the 
possibility of meaningful connections, regardless of whether these connections are 
relationships between people, or connections in a more metaphorical sense of 
making a coherent whole out of the “Waste Land” of (post)modern existence. 
Also, although the novels use a recognizable form where the detective moves 
“triumphantly” towards a position of knowledge, Chandler undercuts any 
Phay 30 
reassurance one might derive from such a plot by ending always with images of 
shattering, thereby suggesting that any desire for a “world made whole” is futile 
since attempts to impose order only creates more disorder. 
 
“I” is for Identity13: The Private Eye/I and Centredness 
According to Dennis Porter, formally, private-eye fiction is marked by the “use of 
the first person as narrative voice and as a point of view,” which “together . . . 
embody a whole way of observing and representing the world” (“The Private Eye” 
99). In other words, the stable identity of the detective reassuringly creates 
coherence out of a decentred world and mitigates the less palatable questions 
posed by the hard-boiled sub-genre’s cynical portrayal of society.  
 This argument has often been applied to Chandler’s work. F.R. Jameson’s 
account of how the private eye serves as “a figure . . . who can be superimposed on 
the society as a whole” to “tie its separate and isolated parts together” (69) is 
echoed in Carl D. Malmgren’s argument that Chandler’s fiction, despite dealing 
with a decentred world, “find[s] an anchor . . . in the figure of the main 
protagonist” (104). E.M. Beekman also argues that Chandler’s novels “have a 
unity which is both technically and poetically ‘right’” because “technical devices 
and the constancy of the hero carry Chandler’s novels from scene to scene” (93). 
James Guetti, Stephen L. Tanner, and William Brevda also see Marlowe, or more 
specifically, Marlowe’s voice, as a major centring force of the novels: “the saving 
presence in a landscape of absence is the colloquial voice of the speaker, which 
anchors him to himself” (Brevda 80). Kristen Garrison locates not just the 
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 Borrowed from the titles in Sue Grafton’s popular Alphabet series. 
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structural, but moral centre of the novels in Marlowe, arguing that Marlowe 
“survives as a hero . . . because he is uncompromising in his commitment to truth” 
(108). 
 I argue, however, that Marlowe is not presented as having a stable self at 
all—that, in fact, the Marlowe novels stage a search for identity that ultimately 
involves a (postmodern) rejection of the desire for fixed centres around which to 
build one’s beliefs and dreams. This section therefore looks at how Marlowe is not 
only alienated from himself—which raises questions about the stability of his 
identity—but is always already a divided self. While it cannot be argued that 
Marlowe is positioned as the moral centre of the novels, his desire to be noble 
actually leads to further tensions in his sense of identity. And while Chandler’s 
Romantic conception of Marlowe as a latter-day knight does centre the novels in 
the sense that it provides a definite value system, it is important to note the fluidity 
of this value system; Chandler uses Arthurian references not to provide a “better” 
world for readers to “escape” to, but to emphasize and valorize the Dionysian14 
aspects of Marlowe and Marlowe’s world. Put differently, the Arthurian references 
do not provide an imaginary, moral or textual “centre” but a means for Chandler to 
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 In The Birth of Tragedy (1872) Nietzsche uses the terms “Apolline” and “Dionysiac” to refer to 
two inter-related but opposing forms of Greek art. The “Apolline” is exemplified by the “art of the 
image-maker or sculptor” while the “Dionysiac” is best represented by “the imageless art of music” 
(14; my emphasis). The “Apolline” stands for rest, calmness, that which takes a clear shape, or has 
boundaries, and creation (50), while the “Dionysiac,” its opposite, has to do with “turmoil” (80), 
the overstepping of boundaries or limits, and destruction. Influenced by Nietzsche’s theories, I use 
“Apollonian” to refer to, e.g., an orderly world where clear boundaries are in place, and a mindset 
or attitude that valorizes order and balance over strife and excess, etc. By describing Marlowe as 
“Dionysian,” I am highlighting both Marlowe’s willingness to break rules or go to almost excessive 
lengths for what he considers is right, and the presentation of Marlowe’s identity as formless and 
malleable. Similarly, when I call Marlowe’s world “Dionysian,” I refer to how chaotic this world 
seems, as well as to the pessimistic, almost nihilistic atmosphere of the novels. 
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explore the inherent contradictions/tensions in Marlowe’s attempts to forge a 
“knightly” identity. 
 Marlowe’s search for missing people or murderers masks his search for a 
stable self. In the novels, Marlowe repeatedly fails to recognize himself or feels 
alienated from himself: 
I pulled away from the door and pulled it open and went back 
through the hall into the living-room. A face in the mirror looked at 
me. A strained, leering face. I turned away from it quickly. . . . (The 
High Window 74) 
 
Passing the open door of the wash cabinet I saw a stiff excited face 
in the glass. (The High Window 201) 
 
 ‘Yeah, that was about how it was,’ the voice said. 
 It was my voice. I was talking to myself, coming out of it. I 
was trying to figure the thing out subconsciously. 
 ‘Shut up, you dimwit,’ I said, and stopped talking to myself. 
(Farewell, My Lovely 65) 
 
‘There’s a nice little girl,’ I told myself out loud, in the 
car. . . . Nobody said anything. . . . Somebody said: ‘Phooey.’ 
It sounded like my voice. (Farewell, My Lovely 144) 
 
I was a blank man. I had no face, no meaning, no personality, 
hardly a name. I didn’t want to eat. I didn’t even want a drink. I was 
the page from yesterday’s calendar crumpled at the bottom of the 
waste basket. (The Little Sister 211) 
 
That last example is especially significant since it systematically negates every 
means of establishing identity: “face,” “meaning,” “personality,” and “name.” 
Marlowe’s existential despair reaches such a pitch of violence that he even ceases 
to want to eat and drink, i.e. to live on and thereby continue existing. That final 
image of the torn page from a calendar further negates the physical and temporal 
frameworks by which a person measures the progress of his/her life and marks 
Phay 33 
their identity. Clearly, Chandler is emphasizing the fluidity and insubstantiality of 
Marlowe’s identity and existence. 
 Indeed, Marlowe’s self is inherently divided. Marlowe’s occasional ally 
Bernie Ohls tells Marlowe in The Long Goodbye (1953): “You’re a shadow on the 
wall” (331). Bernie’s words are poetically accurate: to begin with, they evoke the 
idea of Plato’s cave15. If Marlowe is “a shadow on the [cave] wall,” then the 
suggestion is that Marlowe is not quite the real thing—that, in fact, Marlowe is but 
a formless approximation of some other inaccessible reality, but is taken, like the 
shadows in Plato’s allegory, to be real and meaningful. Put differently, Ohls’s 
comment points to how identity in particular, and what we take to be “reality” in 
general, are really forms of simulation: just as “signs of the real” replace “the real 
itself” (Baudrillard, “Simulacra and Simulations” 382), so Marlowe’s identity, 
which is in reality fluid and insubstantial, comes to seem stable. 
 This sense of the fragility of an individual’s reality and identity is further 
emphasized when we remember that Marlowe is a private investigator, whose job 
it is to observe but not be observed. Bernie’s words also echo the phrase denoting 
an unseen watcher, “fly on the wall.” And since, Descartes’ “cogito ergo sum” 
notwithstanding, the proof of one’s existence lies also in some form of external 
recognition, the very job that gives Marlowe his means, and reason, for existing is 
also the thing that renders him “invisible” and thus robs him, metaphorically, of 
existence. In other words, paradoxically, Marlowe’s sense of self (“private I”) is 
dependent on his chosen job (“private eye”), yet his chosen job makes various 
                                                          
15
 There is another reference to Plato’s cave in The Little Sister, this time in relation to the 
theatricality of the world. I discuss this in the last section. 
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moral and psychological demands on Marlowe that ultimately destabilizes his 
sense of self. By “psychological demands” I am referring to how Marlowe 
watches, but never takes part in, the dramas he watches—after all, the detective is 
always called in “after the fact,” so that in a sense, everything s/he does is 
reactionary, not proactive. We might say that Marlowe’s job therefore reduces the 
“I” to an “eye,” i.e. one who sees corruption and chaos but is helpless to improve 
things.  
 Furthermore, as John Hilgart shows, the desire to be independent and the 
need to “sell oneself as an employee” (375) creates a tension that splits Marlowe’s 
sense of self. Marlowe is on the horns of a dilemma: “When Marlowe has no job, 
he is adrift,” but when he is hired, he feels “compromised by his vocation” 
because, in a corrupt world, detection invariably taints the detective (Hilgart 376). 
As Hilgart puts it, Marlowe’s  
need to continue working as a private detective requires that he 
keep secret what he has learned, and in the transformation of his 
social knowledge into an empty formal pattern comparable to a 
completed game of chess, Marlowe concedes his autonomy to the 
necessities of employment. (370) 
 
We might say, then, that Marlowe’s sense of himself as an autonomous individual 
is not only compromised by his job, but that his identity is itself founded on a 
compromise between conflicting ideals and desires. Marlowe can never have a 
stable sense of self, because that self is fragmented, composed of competing 
desires and therefore always already existing in a state of tension. 
 Chandler further accentuates the instability of Marlowe’s identity by 
presenting him as a rootless, i.e. decentred, figure. If identity is imagined as a 
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series of concentric rings or layers expanding outward beyond the smallest inner 
unit, the self, then the family—and I do not restrict the term to biological family—
or home is surely the layer immediately surrounding the self. Marlowe has no 
family, so we must look to his home(s) to decide how centred Marlowe is in terms 
of identity. But Marlowe has no stable refuge either. Marlowe spends most of 
every novel travelling from place to place, with only brief stopovers at his home or 
office. He also seems to live in a different place in every novel. Granted, his home 
address is unspecified in some novels, such as The Big Sleep (1939), but this very 
reticence creates a sense of unanchored instability, especially when juxtaposed 
against the frequency with which the addresses of clients’ or suspects’ homes are 
mentioned as Marlowe criss-crosses the city. Thus Chandler highlights our 
impression that Marlowe, unlike his clients and suspects, cannot be pinned down 
to any particular, material location. 
 This nomadic life seems justified given that incursions into his private 
space, whether by the police or by gangsters, occur so frequently. But Marlowe’s 
identity is not threatened by external enemies only—his identity as a “tough guy” 
is inherently decentred. Just as the “private eye” aspect of the character is always 
already unstable because it is built on a tension between active/passive, 
seeing/being seen, autonomy/being part of the (corrupt) world, etc., so the “tough 
guy” aspect of Marlowe’s character is inherently divided by a tension between 
being rooted/centred and being tough enough to do without markers of stability 
and remembrance. In The Big Sleep the corrupt Carmen Sternwood “invades” 
Phay 36 
Marlowe’s home and propositions him. When Marlowe rejects her, she calls him 
“a filthy name,” but: 
I didn’t mind that. I didn’t mind what she called me, what anybody 
called me. But this was a room I had to live in. It was all I had in 
the way of a home. In it was everything that was mine, that had any 
association for me, any past, anything that took the place of a 
family. Not much; a few books, pictures, radio, chessmen, old 
letters, stuff like that. Nothing. Such as they were they had all my 
memories. (171-72) 
 
 That Marlowe feels Carmen’s presence as an attack on his identity, and not just 
his privacy or territory, is clear from his emphasis that the space is a repository of 
his memories and thoughts. But Marlowe’s identity is destabilized not just by 
external incursions: as this passage shows, his very identity as a tough guy is 
inherently divided. Marlowe deprecates the very symbols of his identity: he 
deflates the importance of his “books, pictures, radio, chessmen, [and] old letters” 
by calling them “stuff like that” and “nothing” (172). It is precisely because 
Marlowe plays down his own feelings that he comes across as “macho” and 
“tough.” However, his denial of the importance of these markers of identity and 
repositories of memory also reveals how, to be “tough” and “hard-boiled” 
involves, not a strong sense of the self as one might imagine, but a denial of 
rootedness. The tough guy persona, in other words, destabilizes or decentres itself 
by denying sentiment and nostalgia. Clearly, Chandler does not present Marlowe 
as having a stable identity at all: Marlowe’s rootlessness is highlighted, as is the 
fact that his identity—as a “tough” private eye—is inherently and deeply divided. 
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 I have been arguing that Marlowe’s identity is unstable and so does not 
provide a “centre” to hold together the disparate fragments of the “Waste Land” 
world of twentieth-century L.A. This may seem perverse in the context of 
Chandler’s Romantic ideals: 
In everything that can be called art there is a quality of 
redemption. . . . [D]own these mean streets a man must go who is 
not himself mean, who is neither tarnished nor afraid. The detective 
in this kind of story must be such a man. He is the hero, he is 
everything. (“The Simple Art of Murder” 991-92) 
  
However, this Romanticism does not necessitate a reaffirmation of the stability of 
identity or a presentation of identity as unchangeable ontological fact. In fact, it 
would be perfectly logical and consistent with Chandler’s Romanticism to 
highlight the fluidity and instability of identity so as to start Marlowe off on a 
“mission” which, given that fixedness and centredness exist in Marlowe’s world 
only as illusions or ideals, he is doomed to fail: a quest for a stable sense of self. 
However, Chandler’s Romanticism—as the quote above shows—does bring up the 
issue of Marlowe as a moral centre. That is, the argument remains that Marlowe 
forms the moral centre of the novels even if his identity is unstable and fraught 
with contradictions. Without arguing with the idea that Marlowe is presented as a 
“moral centre,” I wish to point out that this is a Dionysian centre, one that is not 
fixed and essential, but as Hilgart briefly and intriguingly mentions, is “mutable, 
based on circumstance” (379).  
 Arthurian allusions pepper the novels and help present Marlowe as a 
knightly, tragic, and so Romantic figure. It is important to realize, though, that 
Marlowe is Romantic precisely because he is a divided figure. As Marlowe 
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himself warns us, he is a “shop-soiled Galahad” (The High Window 214). That is 
to say, his identity cannot be summed up in an either/or fashion—he is both tainted 
and pure. Marlowe may not be as obviously corrupt as a crooked police officer or 
murderer, but he is still tainted by the very job which defines him. Sometimes, this 
taint takes the form of the lies Marlowe has to tell in order to continue with his 
investigations (The High Window 78, 107). That is, Marlowe lies to stay in 
business—which fits in nicely with the connotation of “selling out” in “shop-
soiled Galahad”—but lying destabilizes his identity both directly and in a moral 
sense.  
 More importantly, it is sometimes Marlowe’s very nobility which causes 
him to do ignoble things—which allows Chandler to problematize the idea that 
“moral” and “immoral” are polar opposites. In The Big Sleep Marlowe is hired by 
General Sternwood to investigate Arthur Gwynn Geiger, who has been 
blackmailing the General’s younger daughter, Carmen. Marlowe soon discovers 
that there is another mystery afoot: the disappearance of Rusty Regan, the husband 
of Sternwood’s older daughter. Marlowe solves both mysteries—or rather, “the 
mystery,” since both mysteries are really one—when he learns that Carmen killed 
Regan. Having discovered the truth, however, Marlowe decides to cover it up 
again, not out of greed—Mrs. Regan offers him fifteen thousand dollars to hush 
things up—but because he wants to protect General Sternwood: 
I do all this for twenty-five bucks a day—and maybe just a little to 
protect what little pride a broken and sick old man has left in his blood, 
in the thought that his blood is not poison, and that although his two 
little girls are a trifle wild, . . . they are not perverts or killers. (248) 
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Clearly, Marlowe has done a noble thing. Yet at the same time, this noble act 
necessarily involves Marlowe’s tacit condoning of the crimes he has been 
investigating: by keeping silent, Marlowe spares the General’s illusions, but also 
spares the criminals. Paradoxically, it is Marlowe’s very desire to act morally and 
nobly that tarnishes his morality, yet it is through this tarnishing that Marlowe 
becomes a true “knight.” Clearly, The Big Sleep shows how “moral” and 
“immoral” are not discrete categories and thus implicitly questions binary thinking 
itself. 
 The Arthurian references are also used in a way that implicitly valorizes a 
Dionysian lack of boundaries. Take for instance The Lady in the Lake (1944). The 
intertextuality of the novel reminds the reader that boundaries—in this case, 
between texts—are porous. To begin with, the title is a reference to the Lady of the 
Lake in Arthurian legend, with a twist: replacing “of” with “in” also switches the 
emphasis from knowability/fixability to the changeability of circumstance. The 
novel goes on to make numerous other Arthurian references which foreground 
fluidity, so that the novel enacts a movement from an Apollonian to a Dionysian 
world. In other words, paradoxically, the “quest” structure that one might associate 
with reassurance actually leads readers to contemplate Dionysian fluidity.  
 For instance, the novel valorizes the breaking of boundaries. If Marlowe is 
a knight, then his quest can only be completed through “crimes” like trespassing, 
i.e. the breaking of boundaries. First, Marlowe’s quest takes him into “the 
mountains,” where he has to navigate “around huge bare granite rocks and past a 
little waterfall and through a maze of black oak-trees . . . and silence” (35)—a 
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setting which not only recalls the enchanted forest settings of Arthurian stories but 
also evokes nature and freedom. Chandler juxtaposes nature and freedom against 
the physical boundaries and laws that Marlowe breaks, thereby highlighting the 
constructedness of the latter. In other words, society’s attempts to impose order on 
the world, e.g. through the imposition of physical boundaries and laws, are shown 
to be essentially arbitrary, artificial, and unstable.  
 The novel enacts a movement from the Apollonian to the Dionysian. At 
first, the fact that Marlowe is trespassing, i.e. not just crossing physical 
boundaries, but breaking laws as well, is highlighted when he drives past a sign 
saying “Private Road. No Trespassing” (35). Then, a “tame doe deer with a leather 
dog collar” (74) symbolically appears—a quirky little detail of setting that evokes 
the medieval world and also signals to the reader that boundaries are becoming 
blurred: the deer, a symbol of wild nature, is here “tame,” restrained by a “dog 
collar.” Later, the aforementioned doe symbolically blocks a gate through which 
Marlowe is supposed to pass and forces Marlowe to “step over the fence” (77)—
i.e. to symbolically cross boundaries. After that, Marlowe—abetted, ironically, by 
a representative of the law—breaks into a suspect’s cabin. The gathering of 
“truth,” it seems, can only be done, ironically, by the breaking of laws/boundaries. 
Clearly, what is being celebrated in the Marlowe novels is not an Apollonian 
penchant for order, but a Dionysian disregard for boundaries. Similarly, 
Marlowe’s actions are both criminal and noble, which leads us to question binary 
views that “right” is absolutely opposed to “wrong.” Marlowe, then, is not only a 
divided self, but also a Dionysian and fluid moral centre. 
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“L” is for Language: Language, Lies, and Links/Connections 
Peter J. Rabinowitz voices a common view when he says that “Chandler's 
California is a world of solitary, disconnected individuals; people are so alienated 
from their neighbors that gunshots in a building go unnoticed, and corruption 
spreads unimpeded” (238). Other critics go on to argue, though, that it is 
Chandler’s language that mitigates this bleak picture, by “knitting together” a 
coherent narrative and a distinctive voice out of a fragmented existence. According 
to Guetti, Marlowe’s one-liners  
do to the succession of Marlowe’s perceptions what punch lines to do 
[sic] jokes, organizing that succession into a set of rounded periods, 
each of which is transformed from a group of strange fragments into 
Marlowe’s own private mental property. It is this process that enables 
Marlowe to survive his piecemeal existence. (140; my emphasis) 
 
Tanner, too, argues that his “similes allow Chandler a way of ordering and 
controlling a disjointed, corrupt, and bewildering world” (173). Guetti and Tanner 
are both referring to Chandler’s colourful use of similes, such as the oft-quoted 
description of Moose Malloy in Farewell, My Lovely (1940): “[H]e looked about 
as inconspicuous as a tarantula on a slice of angel food cake” (2). Through such 
similes, Chandler not only creates a unique way of speaking—and thus, by 
extension, a unique identity—for Marlowe, but also makes the atomized, immoral 
world he portrays less disturbing: just as incongruous images can be put together 
into a memorable, enjoyable simile, so the fragmentary experiences of modern life 
can be put together to form a coherent, stable narrative.  
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 Brevda approaches the question of how Chandler’s use of language centres 
the novels from a slightly different, but no less useful, angle. He argues that 
Chandler uses language in a way that suggests that every signifier has its “true” 
signified. Brevda compares Chandler’s almost obsessive description of landscapes 
and interiors to G.K. Chesterton’s “semiotic aesthetic”: “Every fantastic L.A. 
skyline wildly and derisively signals the meaning of the mystery. There is no stone 
along Santa Monica Boulevard and no brick in the Cahuenga Building that is not 
actually a deliberate symbol” (77). Taking this view, one might argue that 
Chandler’s novels are inherently centred because they present a world where every 
signifier has its particular and “true” signified, i.e. where “external signs can be 
linked to internal conditions” (Malmgren 13). The critical consensus seems to be, 
therefore, that despite Chandler’s foregrounding of corruption and chaos, the 
Marlowe novels ultimately reassure readers that language is an orderly system 
which can restore order
16
. 
 I argue, however, that the Marlowe novels enact the opacity and 
slipperiness of language—for instance, by explicitly pointing to how language and 
signs in general are capable of giving rise to multiple meanings. Furthermore, he 
does not present a world where connections between signifiers and signifieds 
remain stable; Chandler undercuts the centring effect of Marlowe’s voice by 
emphasizing the alienation of the modern American from others around him/her, 
and from his/her surroundings in general, and by negating, in a more metaphorical 
sense, the possibility of meaningful forms of connection. 
                                                          
16
 A “message” that echoes Modernist beliefs. 
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 Chandler, like Highsmith, who will be discussed in the next chapter, draws 
our attention to the idea that the world is constituted of signs, and that these signs 
are both opaque and capable of being fitted together in different ways to produce 
various meanings. The idea that the world is a mass of signs is neither specific to 
Chandler or Highsmith, nor, indeed, only to writers of the crime genre. Chandler’s 
vision of such a world does, however, stand out because it uses crime fiction’s 
emphasis on both murder
17
 and its investigation to highlight the fragility of the 
human body. More importantly, Chandler then builds on this idea to question the 
“stability” of even physical signs.  
 The emphasis on murder—Marlowe not only investigates murders but is 
frequently threatened with his own murder during his investigations—foregrounds 
the physical fragility of the body, while the process of sieving through false 
stories/signs underlines the slipperiness of linguistic signs. I do not mean that 
Chandler highlights the fragility of the human body in the simplistic sense that he 
writes about murder, i.e. about the destruction of the body. Rather, he does so by 
juxtaposing the “real” and the “physical” against “mere words” to show that even 
physical signs—which one would assume are inimitable compared to linguistic 
signs—can be as opaque as any linguistic sign. Put differently, the Marlowe novels 
break down the sort of binary thinking which pits “solid,” “fixed,” “physical” 
reality against “fluid,” “slipper” words—and in so doing, show that the world is a 
conglomeration of signs. 
                                                          
17
 Knight has traced the increasing popularity of murder as the crime of choice in the genre: murder 
comes to the fore only during the 1920s and 1930s, i.e. the “Golden Age” of the whodunnit (Crime 
Fiction 1800-2000 86-87). The Marlowe novels are not, strictly speaking, classical whodunnits but 
do share this emphasis on murder: although Marlowe is usually hired to investigate a disappearance 
at the start of the novels, murder invariably creeps into the investigation. 
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 Chandler reveals the physical, human body to be a tissue of signs. In The 
Lady in the Lake, Muriel Chess kills her double, Crystal Kingsley, and dumps 
Crystal’s body in the titular lake. When Marlowe finds the body, it is Bill Chess 
who identifies the body as Muriel’s. It might seem surprising that even Muriel’s 
husband is fooled by the presentation of the body into believing it is the corpse of 
his wife, but Marlowe points out that this is not so surprising really: 
After a month in the water? With his wife’s clothes on her and some of 
his wife’s trinkets? With water-soaked blonde hair like his wife’s hair 
and almost no recognizable face? Why would he even have a doubt 
about it? . . . (271) 
 
Even physical signs of identity like clothes, jewellery, hair, etc. can be worked into 
different patterns to produce different “truths,” which highlights the essential 
arbitrariness of signs, even physical ones. 
 Chandler not only reveals the arbitrariness of signs—he also undercuts the 
reader’s comfortable sense that s/he is already familiar with the process of reading 
a detective novel. A reader, through prior experience with the genre, learns to 
expect that some meaning(s) will be attached to signs that have been flagged as 
significant. Chandler plays with this generic convention in Farewell, My Lovely to 
express the simultaneous opacity and openness of signs. Marlowe’s client has been 
murdered, so he goes through the client’s clothes in search of a clue as to why: 
He had loose silver and bills in one trouser pocket, a tooled leather 
keycase in another, also a small knife. His left hip pocket yielded a 
small billfold with more currency, insurance cards, a driver’s licence, a 
couple of receipts. In his coat loose match folders, a gold pencil 
clipped to a pocket, two thin cambric handkerchiefs as fine and white 
as dry powdered snow. Then the enamel cigarette case from which I 
had seen him take his brown gold-tipped cigarettes. They were South 
American, from Montevideo. And in the other inside pocket another 
cigarette case I hadn’t seen before. . . . (74) 
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The exhaustive cataloguing of these items and their exact locations seems to 
suggest that these are vital clues that, if carefully memorized and analyzed, will 
help Marlowe—and the reader—solve the mystery. But this catalogue is 
misleading, in more ways than one. At the level of the plot, most of these items are 
meaningless; they lead nowhere. The formally significant—it is introduced right at 
the end—item seems to be a clue, but earns Marlowe nothing more useful than a 
beating and incarceration, and is finally revealed to have nothing to do with 
Crystal’s disappearance. But more importantly, this list of possible clues is really a 
list of possible signs. The reader feels as lost as Marlowe when faced with this 
mountain of possibilities. Most of these signifiers never do become attached to any 
signifieds, whereas the final signifier leads Marlowe on the trail of a whole series 
of empty, but still threatening, signs. Chandler, in short, plays with readers’ 
expectations and habits only to confirm the fluidity of signs. 
 Having explored Chandler’s emphasis on the slipperiness of language I 
turn now to the second “purpose” critics ascribe to Chandler’s distinctive writing: 
the creation of order by connecting up a fragmented world. That Chandler 
produces memorable similes, and that his similes can produce a centring effect by 
“bringing together” disparate ideas is indisputable. A simile “works,” after all, by 
revealing the “hidden” connections between two apparently unrelated ideas or 
images. However, as has been pointed out, this “bringing together” of disparate 
ideas can also have a decentring effect, precisely by juxtaposing ideas in a 
surprising way. Chandler’s creative similes, then, do not necessarily centre a 
fragmented world. 
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 Furthermore, many other segments of the novels undermine the centring 
effect of the similes by emphasizing the world’s fragmentedness and the isolation 
of the individual. In The Big Sleep, for instance, we get the following description: 
Ten blocks of that, winding down curved rainswept streets, under the 
steady drip of trees, past lighted windows in big houses in ghostly 
enormous grounds, vague clusters of eaves and gables and lighted 
windows high on the hillside, remote and inaccessible, like witch 
houses in a forest. I came out at a service station glaring with wasted 
light. . . . I started in, then kept going. . . . [Marlowe moves on because 
he does not want to be remembered.] And taxi drivers remember. (43) 
 
If there is any connecting up of a fragmented experience/city, this seems only to 
occur, in a token manner, in the first clause. After that, the landscape is presented 
as a series of disconnected glimpses at fragments of images. “Enormous grounds,” 
for example, suggest great distances between houses and neighbours. Marlowe 
may have “unified” these images of loneliness and isolation by his very 
presence—but then with that last line Chandler reminds us that Marlowe himself is 
an image to others, and, moreover, one that remains unseen and therefore 
unremembered and disconnected. Even the form of the passage is ambiguous: the 
series of commas look as though they connect the clauses, but the effect they 
actually create is of a temporary and loose linking of a fragmented universe.  
 Indeed, Chandler warns readers not to be taken in by the illusion that 
connectedness is “better” than isolation in The Long Goodbye:  
Why do I go into such detail? Because the charged atmosphere made 
every little thing stand out as a performance, a movement distinct and 
vastly important. It was one of those hypersensitive moments when all 
your automatic movements, however long established, however 
habitual, become separate acts of will. . . . You take nothing for 
granted, absolutely nothing at all. (30) 
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Taken at face value this is Marlowe’s explanation of why he is dwelling on every 
small detail of that breakfast with Terry. But it is also Chandler’s defence of his 
highly descriptive, “disconnected” style of writing. That is, Chandler seems to be 
defending his writing style, which is derived, but which deviates from, the action-
driven, nearly description-less style of pulp writing. Chandler argues that it is 
precisely those “charged,” significant moments of “vast importance” that feel 
disconnected, and vice versa: Art, or as Chandler puts it, “performance,” demands 
some measure of disconnection; it is only by isolating a moment that it becomes 
significant. Disconnection is here presented as a form of what we now call 
defamiliarization: the “automatic,” the “long established” and the “habitual” all 
need to be shaken up, while “tak[ing] nothing for granted” is presented as the 
positive result of disconnection. Here, experiencing life as series of disconnected 
fragments is not something to be mourned, but a means of living more 
meaningfully—an attitude that marks Chandler as a postmodernist, rather than 
modernist, writer. Disconnection and decentredness are thereby valorized in The 
Long Goodbye. 
 Disconnection, in the form of loneliness, is, in any case, presented as the 
“natural” or safer state of things. Loneliness and isolation seem to be the natural 
state of all Chandler’s characters. When strong connections do happen they are 
injurious: “Whatever held them [blackmailer and victim, Larry Mitchell and Betty 
Mayfield] together was strong enough to go on holding them” (Playback 11). The 
one strong friendship that Marlowe forms, with Terry in The Long Goodbye, is 
betrayed. No lasting connection in Marlowe’s world, it seems, is a healthy one. 
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Indeed, the most common type of connection between people in Marlowe’s world 
is that between murderer and victim, hunter and hunted, those who threaten and 
the threatened. One loses count of the number of times Marlowe is warned to stay 
away from a witness or suspect. The Long Goodbye makes it clear that the quest of 
the Romantic private eye is a quest, not just to connect the dots and solve the 
mystery, but an attempt to connect with people. This quest, however, is doomed to 
fail: “It’s quite possible that your connection with the Wades may be incidental, 
accidental, and coincidental. Let it remain so” (272). That is, connections are 
either “incidental, accidental, and coincidental” or threatening. In short, Chandler 
not only questions the possibility of healthy connections between people, but also 
casts doubt on the possibility of meaningful connection in any form. 
 
“P” is for Postmodern: Play-acting, the Press, and a World in Pieces 
Chandler’s work is not usually associated with “postmodernism.” 
“Postmodernism,” after all, is associated with skepticism regarding grand 
narratives—which seems absent from Chandler’s work. It is odd, though, that 
Chandler has not been linked with postmodernism, given that he was fortuitously 
placed to capture the new, hyperreal world developing in America: as Tom S. 
Reck notes, Los Angeles “is artificial in a quite literal sense. All its features, 
whether flora, fauna or freeway, have had to be imported because it is built on a 
desert where nothing grows naturally. . .” (109). L.A. is therefore in itself a 
simulated world, one which is “real” and yet not “natural.” The entertainment 
industry boom would also make L.A. a world of simulations, and therefore the 
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perfect setting for an exploration of hyperreality. Reck goes on to argue, however, 
that Chandler satirizes twentieth-century L.A in the Marlowe novels. 
 I argue, however, that Chandler’s work actually celebrates this postmodern, 
hyperreal world of rampant theatricality. This section shows how Chandler reflects 
the postmodern world in his novels, not satirically, but in a way which already 
takes for granted that “reality” is something constructed out of signs, an effect 
more than an ontological fact. Thus the frequent theatrical metaphors or 
descriptions in Chandler’s novels are not criticism of the “fakeness” of twentieth-
century L.A.—instead, they allow Chandler to question our definition of, and 
assumptions about, “reality.” Chandler even suggests that attempting to “pin 
down” particular meanings for each sign is childish, and that any attempt to 
“solve” the mystery and thus put a fragmented world together is doomed to fail, 
since any attempt to put the pieces back together only creates more fragmentation. 
 The theatricality of the world and the people around Marlowe is frequently 
underlined, so as to destabilize the reader’s sense of “reality” as ontological “fact.” 
In The Little Sister (1949), references to play-acting come fast and furious, 
especially towards the ending: 
‘It’s the Technicolor dialogue,’ I said. ‘It freezes up on you.’ (232) 
 
‘I guess I don’t like the script,’ she said. ‘I don’t like the lines. It just 
isn’t me, if you know what I mean.’ (241) 
 
‘Dead, wouldn’t you say?’ Beifus remarked, opening up the act. (248) 
 
‘Wonderful casting,’ I said, looking at him [the piano-playing 
policeman] across the cards. (255) 
 
The play was over. I was sitting in the empty theatre. The curtain was 
down and projected on it dimly I could see the action. But already 
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some of the actors were getting vague and unreal. The little sister 
above all. . . . Because in a way she was so unreal. (282) 
 
This last example stands out because of its veiled reference to Plato’s cave. Instead 
of seeing shadows on the cave wall, Marlowe sees “projections” of the drama on, 
fittingly, a curtain pulled down and thus hiding the stage. There are, in other 
words, two layers of “not-quite-reality”—“unreality” seems too binary a word—
being highlighted here. First there is theatricality, which by its very nature is both 
“real”—the players do enact the action and say the words, and the audience is 
experiencing something real—and “unreal,” for a play is a piece of fiction. The 
second way of looking at “reality” suggested by the passage is in the 
philosophical, Platonic sense, i.e. that this world, real as it may appear, is not quite 
the real thing—that, in fact, the notion of the “real” is relative. 
 This idea is further explored in The High Window, which takes readers 
from a binary worldview of “reality,” to an understanding of reality as something 
constructed. Put differently, The High Window “teaches” readers to enjoy 
theatricality. The novel begins by explicitly drawing our attention to “unreality”: 
“It was a nice day outside, the sun shining, the flowers blooming, the birds 
singing. . . . In the dim room with the hard-faced woman and the winy smell 
everything seemed a little unreal” (12). Although Marlowe’s language is 
measured—“a little unreal”—and seems to contrast the scene outside with the 
scene indoors, the reader already senses that the juxtaposition of the somewhat 
stereotypical “nice” day outside with the equally stereotypical “ugly reality” 
indoors really serves to highlight the unreality of both images. Then, as the novel 
progresses, references to “unreality” become more pronounced—so that 
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“unreality,” we perceive, is the new “reality.” People do not actually play sport, 
but watch “recreated ball game[s]” (72). Buildings look like something out of 
“high-budget musical[s]” (138). And Marlowe explains that he does not play 
chess, he “play[s] over tournament games that have been recorded and published” 
(115; my emphasis). Everything takes place at secondhand. The signs of the real 
have become more important, and more enjoyable, than the real itself. 
 This litany of various forms of vicarious experience ends with the novel 
itself becoming theatrical. In the last grotesque, yet comic, scene where Alex 
Morny tries to frame his wife, Lois, for the murder of Louis Vannier, theatricality 
is not only referred to, but enacted, by the novel. To begin with, the situation is 
framed in theatrical terms: Marlowe “dodge[s] behind the curtains in the archway” 
(222; my emphasis). Thus Marlowe’s role as spectator is highlighted, while the 
Mornys are compared to actors. Chandler also highlights the fact that Morny’s act 
is a form of simulation—to frame someone is, after all, to produce “real” signs of 
their guilt as evidence even if that person is not actually guilty, i.e. to blur the 
boundary between “real” and “false” in a way reminiscent of drama’s—indeed, all 
fiction’s—ability to do the same.  
 Humour and theatricality are intertwined in this scene. The sheer 
melodrama of the scene is both a source of humour and another reminder of 
theatricality: “I can see you now, sitting on the arm of his chair, rubbing his greasy 
hair, then feeding him a slug while he was still purring” (224). Morny calls Lois’s 
histrionics “early Lillian Gish” and points out that he’s “a connoisseur of ham” 
because he’s “been in pictures” too (224). Melodrama then becomes farce: the 
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description of how Morny forces Lois to “recreate” the shooting sounds like a 
crazed director yelling at an inexperienced actor, especially given the constant 
references to the framing curtains. Finally, and perhaps most hilariously, after the 
Mornys leave Marlowe puts more “fake” fingerprints on top of the already “fake” 
fingerprints on the gun. The farcical nature and narration of the scene draw our 
attention to its theatricality
18
. The High Window, in short, not only enacts a 
movement towards full realization of life’s theatricality, but reminds us of the fun 
and enjoyment to be got out of such theatricality. 
 Chandler’s novels not only destabilize the line we try to draw between 
“reality” and “not-reality,” but also capture a changed understanding of “reality,” 
which is no longer conceived of as ontological fact, but as the result of simulation. 
Thus when Adrienne Fromsett asks, “You’re not going to be insolent, are you, Mr. 
Marlowe?” Marlowe replies: “I don’t know what your definition of that would be. 
I’m going to talk business as if it was business, not international diplomacy” (The 
Lady in the Lake 137; my emphasis). On one level, Marlowe’s reply establishes 
his “toughness.” More significantly, though, Marlowe’s “I don’t know what your 
definition of that would be” also introduces a note of relativism as well as 
highlights the textuality of the world and the difficulty of communicating in a 
world where signs can have multiple meanings. Marlowe also betrays Chandler’s 
awareness of the “simulatedness” of the world through that “as if.” Marlowe’s 
formulation may be a figure of speech we take for granted: at one level, Marlowe 
is simply saying that he intends to deal with Adrienne as he should, without 
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 This scene strongly reminds me of Highsmith’s Ripley Under Ground, which also features a 
darkly humorous narration of a farcical series of substitutions, this time of bodies, both quick and 
dead. 
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beating about the bush or giving her concessions. Yet in the light of Chandler’s 
awareness that the world is constituted out of signs, that “as if” also suggests that 
one can only be businesslike by modeling or simulating “being businesslike.” 
Chandler, in short, makes us aware that signs of the real have replaced the real 
itself. 
 Marlowe is keenly aware that the reality around him is simulated, but does 
not criticize this phenomenon. The Lady in the Lake, in particular, features 
houses—which, thanks to the Victorian cult of the Home, have become symbols of 
centredness—that speak more of theatricality and excess than “good, sober, solid” 
reality. “[Lavery’s] house was built downwards, one of those clinging vine 
effects. . .” (17; my emphasis), which suggests that the house not only has an aura 
of deviance (“built downwards”), but is built for effect rather than actual 
practicality. Later in the novel Marlowe visits the Bryson Tower: “The entrance 
was . . . through a Moorish archway, and over a lobby that was too big and a carpet 
that was too blue. Blue Ali Baba oil jars were dotted around, big enough to keep 
tigers in” (244; my emphasis). The Bryson Tower is not just excessive, but 
downright camp. In The High Window we encounter an even more superb example 
of hyperreality: 
Mr. Pietro Palermo was sitting in a room which, except for a 
mahogany roll-top desk, a sacred triptych in gilt frames and a large 
ebony and ivory crucifixion, looked exactly like a Victorian parlour. It 
contained a horseshoe sofa and chairs with carved mahogany frames 
and antimacassars of fine lace. There was an ormolu clock on the grey-
green marble mantel, a grandfather clock ticking lazily in the corner, 
and some wax flowers under a glass dome on an oval table with a 
marble top and curved elegant legs. . . . There was even a cabinet for 
bric-à-brac. . . . (189) 
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Palermo’s sitting room is not unreal, not a “travesty” of “the real thing.” Distanced 
though it may be from the Victorian age by time, the sitting room has all the 
identifying signs of a Victorian middle-class parlour, a fact that Chandler 
reinforces when Marlowe admits that the place “looked exactly like a Victorian 
parlour.” The suggestion here is that the room only looks like a Victorian parlour. 
Yet the fact remains that Marlowe/Chandler does not directly or even implicitly 
convey disapproval of this attempt to simulate a bygone era and lost way of life; 
Marlowe merely registers the shifting of emphasis from ontologies to effects. 
Clearly, Marlowe’s is already a noticeably postmodern world which borrows 
unashamedly from the past in what one might call a “kitsch” way.  
 Equally clear is Chandler’s tacit acceptance of this postmodern attitude 
towards the past, which in turn is predicated upon an awareness that symbols are 
fluid and can be manipulated. In fact, Marlowe reserves his scorn for those who try 
to arrest the play of signs—suggesting that far from being hostile to the idea that 
signs may not have fixed meanings, Chandler might actually be critical of those 
who try to fly in the face of what we would now call postmodernity and attempt to 
assert control over a fluid world. Attempts to do so, the novels suggest, are both 
childish and a form of hubris. Thus in Farewell, My Lovely there is a comic scene 
where Marlowe is summoned to meet the Chief of Police:  
A door . . . was lettered: John Wax, Chief of Police. . . . [There was 
another] door marked John Wax, Chief of Police. . . . I walked to the 
desk. A tilted embossed sign on it read: John Wax, Chief of Police. I 
figured I might be able to remember the name. (229) 
 
The series of doors symbolize Wax’s desire to erect and enforce strict boundaries, 
while his pompous reiteration of his name and rank speaks not just of a desire to 
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assert and elevate himself, but also of a related desire to pin down identities and 
maintain hierarchies. Yet Wax’s attempts to create a world where there is a place 
for everything and everything has its place and designation is rendered puerile and 
laughable by Marlowe’s sarcasm. Even the name—wax melts—seems to be 
Chandler’s way of commenting sarcastically on the futility of attempts to give a 
fixed, stable form to things, such as identity, that are essentially formless
19
.  
 Wax’s anxiety seems even more childish when juxtaposed against 
Marlowe’s calm awareness that even something supposedly as “final” and 
“unchangeable” as “proof” is “‘always a relative thing. It’s an overwhelming 
balance of probabilities” (293). All signs are contingent and open to interpretation, 
and this is a “fact” to be treated calmly; attempts to control the “chaos”—like 
Wax’s—are childish. It is this valorization of openness and relativism which 
marks Chandler’s novels as postmodern texts that, instead of “shutting down” 
readers’ doubts by presenting comforting illusions of signs having stable 
meanings, actually encourages readers, not just to face up to, but to celebrate 
language’s slipperiness. 
 Another marker of Chandler’s postmodernism is his refusal to distinguish 
between “originals” and “copies.” If it is futile to try to arrest the play of signs, 
then there is no value in distinguishing “originals” from “copies.” That is, since 
the world is constituted out of signs, and signs can be endlessly replicated, the 
distinction between “originals” and “copies” loses any meaning. In The Long 
Goodbye Marlowe displays: 
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 My thanks to Dr. Ang for pointing this out, and for suggesting that there is another subtle joke 
here: the character Wax is shaped by Chandler. 
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. . . a certified copy of a marriage certificate. The original came from 
Caxton Hall Register Office. The date of the marriage is August 1942. 
The parties are Paul Edward Marston and Eileen Victoria Sampsell. In 
a sense Mrs. Wade is right. There is no such person as Paul Edward 
Marston. It was a fake name because in the army you have to get 
permission to get married. The man faked an identity. . . . (354) 
 
The irony here is that the “certified copy” is as meaningless as the original. All the 
spatial (“The original came from”), temporal (“The date of the marriage is”) and 
linguistic markers (“The parties are”) of identities and oaths can be identified, but 
none of them have any meaning since “There is no such person as Paul Edward 
Marston.” There is, in other words, no originary “real” or centre which would 
enable a tracing of truth. 
 More importantly, Chandler valorizes free replication over attempts to 
regulate the copying of signs and texts. He makes a distinction between the 
“certified copy” of the marriage certificate—which, being “certified,” is yet 
another attempt to arrest the play of signifiers and meanings—and the illegally 
photocopied confessions of the real murderer, Mrs. Wade. The authorities had 
earlier arrested someone else for the murders; to save face, the Deputy D.A. 
attempts to suppress the new results by covering up Mrs. Wade’s confession. In 
other words the D.A.’s office is attempting a more corrupt version of what Wax 
tried to do, which is to fix one desired meaning to the relevant signs. Marlowe, 
aided by non-corrupt members of the police, leaks Mrs. Wade’s confession to the 
press. That is, part of the “truth” is revealed through unauthorized copies of the 
original confession. Furthermore, these copies are themselves further mass-
reproduced in the newspapers (386). The “certified copy” is meaningless, whereas 
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the illegal, mass-reproduced copy is a conduit of (part of) the mystery’s truth. 
Clearly, Chandler is on the side of the Dionysian free play of signs. 
 We might then ask: if Chandler is for openness and fluidity, why does he 
reaffirm a form in which the detective finally achieves knowledge of the 
murderer(s) and thereby centres the world again? My reply to this is that Chandler 
uses such a form, but undercuts any comfort we might derive from it by suggesting 
that every closure spawns new fragments. For instance, the novels compulsively 
feature images of shattering and dissolution: even when the detective seems to 
have put the clues together—thereby connecting up the fragments of the “Waste 
Land”—thereby vindicating the innocent and symbolically avenging the victim, 
the revelation of “truth” always spells disaster for someone else.  
 Thus, in The Big Sleep, when Marlowe comes to the conclusion that “It all 
ties together—everything” (243), the centring effect of his statement is negated by 
Carmen’s falling apart: “For a brief instant her face seemed to come to pieces, to 
become merely a set of features without form or control. Her mouth looked like 
the prelude to a scream. But only for an instant” (245). That final sentence seems 
to be reassuring, since it limits the images of shattering to “an instant,” but what it 
actually does is frame the images of shattering in a larger image of fluidity. There 
is, in the novels, no image of lasting wholeness. Sometimes, even the solution to 
the mystery needs to be cut up into fragments: “After a while I took scissors and 
cut out the piece that contained the folded newspaper with the headline. I put the 
two pieces in separate envelopes. . .” (The Little Sister 121). That is, the quest for 
order and completeness actually spawns more shattering. 
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 Decentredness, then, is highlighted both formally and in the novel’s 
content. The following lines sum up what I have been saying about the 
decentredness of the Marlowe novels: “A place called Los Penasquitos Canyon. A 
place of dead land. Nothing in his car, no suitcases. Just an empty car parked at the 
side of a road hardly anybody ever uses” (Playback 170). Chandler’s awareness of 
the textuality of the world is reflected in Marlowe’s almost compulsive 
naming/labeling of places. Place names pepper the books; in the space of a few 
chapters in The Big Sleep alone we get: “the Boulevard near Las Palmas” (22); 
“The La Baba” (26); “Laverne Terrace, a hillside street off Laurel Canyon 
Boulevard” (28); “Lauren Canyon Drive” (33); “3765 Alta Brea Crescent, West 
Hollywood” (34); “Lido” (48); “the Chinese Theatre” (54)—the list runs on. These 
“signposts” do not, however, give the reader a sense of order—as if Los Angeles 
can be mapped out and thus, understood—or familiarity. Indeed, Marlowe’s 
compulsion to reiterate place names reveals, paradoxically, a hunger for order, 
which in turn implies the sheer lack of order in his world.  
 At the same time, Marlowe’s concern for labels is tinged with an 
awareness of the arbitrariness of signs—hence his emphasis that the place is 
“called” Los Penasquitos Canyon. That word “called” reminds us that such labels 
are constructions that we “attach to” a chaotic world so as to create some 
semblance of order
20
. There is really no inherent link between the sign and the 
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 The same book has many other instances of this: “a stuffy volume called Famous First Editions” 
(21); “it was called The La Baba” (26); “a curving ribbon of wet concrete which was called 
Laverne Terrace” (33); “toy cigars called Entractes” (47); “The street at which it turned was called 
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referent: the words “Los Penasquitos Canyon” really have nothing to do with the 
place they are attached to. Even if one argues that this name is less arbitrary than 
most because the words “Penasquitos” and “Canyon” presumably point to 
geographical features, while the fact that the name is Spanish refers to the history 
of the settlement of California, the name reminds fundamentally arbitrary in the 
Saussurean sense that the sounds that make up the words “Los Penasquitos 
Canyon” really have no relation with the physical place they are applied to.  
 That is, without claiming that Chandler is directly referring to the theories 
of Saussure
21
, I am arguing that that word “called” evokes a sense of distance 
between the actual place, and the name used to refer to it, and that, when taken in 
the light of the novel’s insistence on the fragility of connection, the word “called” 
therefore expresses a very postmodern awareness of the arbitrariness of language. 
In this light, it is unsurprising that Marlowe “[doesn’t] mind” when Carmen “call[s 
him] a filthy name” (171; analysed earlier in this chapter): Marlowe does not 
“mind what anybody call[s]” him (172) not just because he is a hard-boiled 
detective, but because he understands the arbitrariness of signs, linguistic or 
otherwise. It is this awareness that the world is constituted out of arbitrary signs 
that marks the Marlowe novels as postmodern. 
 Furthermore, the “Waste Land” images and diction—“dead,” “nothing,” 
“no,” “empty”—draw our attention, once again, to emptiness and 
meaninglessness; Marlowe does not, however, put the shattered world together—
                                                                                                                                                                
Brittany Place” (57); “The place is called the Casa de Oro” (133); “a fellow called Joe Brody” 
(177). 
21
 Although Chandler could very well have been exposed to Saussure’s ideas, given Chandler’s 
private school education and interest in the world of literature. In any case, The Big Sleep was 
published in 1939, decades after the publication of Saussure’s lectures on linguistics. 
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his staccato sentences “allow” the scene to remain in fragments. The passage also 
draws our attention to the fragmentariness, and loneliness, of existence. The car, 
which potentially symbolizes movement and connection, is stationary. The road is 
“hardly . . . ever use[d].” And Chandler’s attitude of cynical amusement is evident 
from the fact that the character who discovers this car is named Gates, and who 
was on his way to collect stones to build a wall (159). That is, the image of 
desolation—the empty car abandoned by the side of a lonely road—is discovered 
by a man whose very name evokes the porousness of boundaries, and whose 
intention was to build a wall, i.e. create new boundaries. Just as Gates’s attempt to 
build a boundary was halted, so we are reminded that the world is not neat or 
orderly; through the Marlowe novels, Chandler presents us with a fluid world 
created out of signs which can be made to mean anything. 
 Despite the association of his chosen sub-genre with “formulas” and 
“conventions,” then, Chandler raises questions about what it means for something 
to be “real,” and destabilizes the boundary between “truth,” “reality” and the 
“original” on one hand, and “falsehood,” “unreality,” and the “copy” on the other. 
Dionysian disorder and irrationality are valorized over Apollonian order and 
method. Identity is less of an ontological fact than an effect created out of signs, 
and therefore unstable. Meaningful connections—in both the linguistic and social 
senses—are illusory. In short, Chandler’s fiction is postmodern. By recognizing 
Chandler’s fiction as such, we open the way to recognizing the postmodernism—




Patricia Highsmith: Deviance in the Open 
 
 
This chapter argues that Patricia Highsmith’s Ripley novels, like Chandler’s 
Marlowe novels, are distinctly postmodern, for three reasons. Firstly, they question 
the Modernist distinction between “crass” materialism and “redeeming” Art, and 
in so doing reveal the hypocrisy and constructedness of the ideologies informing 
daily life, e.g. capitalism and Christianity. Secondly, they anticipate Baudrillard in 
suggesting that “reality” is an effect created from a mass of arbitrary signs; even if 
Highsmith’s use of form is not as pointedly avant-garde or metafictional as, say, 
Umberto Eco’s or Paul Auster’s, the novels’ focus on Thomas Ripley’s ability to 
read and manipulate social codes implies that the world is a text, and also 
decentres readers’ comfortable assumptions about the stability of identity and 
language.  Thirdly, the Ripliad does not foreground the chaos of a reality created 
through signs to mourn the loss of a centred world—rather, Highsmith’s humour 
and foregrounding of play are further markers of her postmodernism. 
 
Materialism, Identity, and Language 
The world of the Ripley novels is in fact the postmodern world of simulacra and 
simulation posited by Jean Baudrillard. In this world, signs constitute reality. 
Because the link between signifier and signified is always arbitrary, this is a world 
in which there is no external, easily verifiable “truth.” Anyone who is capable of 
manipulating signifiers can create “truth.” Ripley’s power—and thus, attraction for 
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the reader—lies not just in his ability to assume identities at will, but in his 
mastery of signs and his ability as a forger. In other words, the Ripley novels are 
unsettling not just because they valorize a character who lies and murders his way 
to success and happiness, but also because they reveal two things: on a 
metaphysical level, the chaos that underlies apparently stable systems such as 
language; at the level of social critique, the materialism and hypocrisy of capitalist 
society. 
 Highsmith explores how the world, and identity, are constituted through 
signs. At the start of The Talented Mr. Ripley (1955), Ripley is posing as one 
George MacAlpin of the IRS; he sends out forms “taken from the Internal 
Revenue office when he had worked there a few months ago” to a “carefully 
chosen” “list of prospects,” informing them of an error in their tax payments and 
asking them to pay up (14). Anyone who balks at this is treated to a phone call 
calculated to bore them out of making further inquiries. Highsmith devotes quite a 
few paragraphs to showing the reader the care Ripley takes—the reader is even 
given, for instance, the full text of the letter, supposedly from “Ralph F. Fischer,” 
the “Gen. Dir. Adj. Dept.,” that Ripley writes to every victim (15). This opening 
episode, then, more or less establishes Ripley, not simply as a con artist, but more 
importantly as a forger and impersonator, which necessarily implies that he is a 
reader and manipulator of signs.  
 The victims have been specially selected—that is, “read”—for their 
likeliness to fall for the con, and Ripley’s high success rate is a testament to his 
skill as a reader of signs/people. His success also attests to his skill as a 
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manipulator of signs. The phony letter from the cryptically designated “Gen. Dir. 
Adj. Dept.,” “signed . . . with a scrolly, illegible signature” (15), is a darkly 
humorous comment on society’s blind faith in incomprehensible but impressive-
sounding signs. Ripley knows that it is the very illegibility and indecipherability of 
the signature and the designation that make the letter seem official and therefore, 
true. His striking out of the official address printed on the forms and substitution 
of his own address is therefore fitting. It symbolizes not so much Ripley’s 
willingness to “steal” authority, but the ease with which authority can be “stolen,” 
which in turn challenges the stability we usually associate with the idea of 
authority. That is to say, the striking out of the official address, and the lack of 
reprisal for the act, reminds readers that authority is not so much an ontological 
“reality” as an effect created and maintained through signs. Since these signs can 
be “hijacked,” or negated, authority itself can be usurped. The “scam” episode, in 
short, establishes not only the novel’s concern with signs and their spurious 
“truth,” but also Ripley’s power as a master reader and manipulator of signs. 
 Highsmith, writing decades before Baudrillard, seems to have captured the 
sense of hyperreality that Baudrillard claims is the state of the world today: “the 
age of simulation thus begins with a liquidation of all referentials—worse, by their 
artificial resurrection in systems of signs. . . . It is no longer a question of 
imitation. . . . It is rather a question of substituting signs of the real for the real 
itself” (382). Ripley’s world is one in which signs are all that are left—people, that 
is to say individuals, do not, by comparison, seem as powerful or as important. 
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 Ripley’s panicked moment after killing Dickie is a case in point. The 
passage is worth reproducing here at some length: 
The text [newspaper headlines] said that the stains were believed to 
be bloodstains, not that they were. . . . The boatkeeper could 
probably tell the police the very day the boat was lost. The police 
could then check the hotels for that day. The Italian boatkeeper 
might even remember that it was two Americans who had not come 
back with the boat. If the police bothered to check the hotel 
registers around that time, the name Richard Greenleaf would stand 
out like a red flag. In which case, of course, it would be Tom 
Ripley who would be missing, who might have been murdered that 
day. Tom’s imagination went in several directions: suppose they 
searched for Dickie’s body and found it? It would be assumed to be 
Tom Ripley’s now. Dickie would be suspected of murder. Ergo, 
Dickie would be suspected of Freddie’s murder, too. . . . On the 
other hand, the Italian boatkeeper might not remember. . . . Even if 
he did remember, the hotels might not be checked. The Italian 
police just might not be that interested. Might, might, might not. 
(163-64) 
 
Clearly, this is a world where many events are not experienced firsthand, but 
through texts like newspapers. Ironically, to be more accurate—or to be perceived 
as accurate—the newspapers must say that the stains “were believed to be 
bloodstains, not that they were.” That is, accuracy actually involves an element of 
uncertainty. Uncertainty is, in fact, a key word in this passage. Take, for instance, 
the interplay between “could” and “would” throughout the passage.  
 More importantly, there is tension regarding the importance of the physical 
or “real”: facts and bureaucracy (hotel registers) are what could potentially 
threaten Ripley, yet the fact of Dickie’s body does not really matter. Rather, there 
is a body, but whose body it is does not matter. The physical body is stripped of 
identity, i.e. a signifier without a clear, fixed signified. The same thing happens 
with the fingerprints on the paintings which “Dickie” left in the Venice train 
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station: they are really Tom’s but the police simply assume they are Dickie’s. 
Throughout the Ripley novels, in fact, we are constantly faced with signs without 
referents. The Ripley novels, then, are postmodern, firstly, in the sense that they 
present the world in general, and identity in particular, as a decentred 
conglomeration of “empty” signs. 
 
 We can easily discern another shift from the modern to the postmodern in 
Highsmith’s non-condemnatory—indeed, faintly indulgent—attitude towards 
Ripley’s materialism. Moreover, if disapproval of the “merely” materialistic 
coloured modernist writers’ attitudes towards art and life, then Highsmith’s re-
examination of modernism’s positioning of Art and “filthy lucre” as polar 
opposites represents a postmodern questioning of yet another “grand narrative,” 
the valorization of  the spiritual nature and power of Art.  
 We saw in the previous chapter how Chandler clearly sees that in a 
changed world where grand narratives are questioned, the idea of the “original” 
being somehow more authentic—i.e. having more “truth”—than the “copy” no 
longer holds. Highsmith makes a similar comment on the value of originals versus 
forgeries. However, Chandler’s characterization of Marlowe as a figure torn 
between his need to earn a living—“shop-soiled Galahad” (The High Window 
214), with the emphasis on “shop-soiled,” meaning tainted by the need to “sell his 
services” for money—and his need to rise above material concerns (Galahad is, 
after all, the knight who achieves the Holy Grail) is clearly underpinned by a 
lingering disapproval of the mass and the material. Where Highsmith and Chandler 
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differ is that Highsmith believes that materialism and a love of beauty go hand in 
hand, and thereby questions not just binary thinking, but also the idea that there is 
a “pure truth” out there that can be accessed by art. 
 Ripley’s devotion to art is foregrounded, but so is his materialism. That is, 
Highsmith has created a protagonist who blurs the boundaries between the crass 
and the artistic, and therefore challenges the sacred versus profane, spiritual versus 
material binary that continues to underpin much of contemporary discourse. Most 
importantly, Highsmith suggests that in a world where even apparently 
foundational beliefs are revealed as arbitrary constructs, material objects may be 
the best, or only, remaining way of securely establishing some form of self. We 
are told that Ripley “loved possessions, not masses of them, but a select few that 
he did not part with” because “[p]ossessions reminded him that he existed, and 
made him enjoy his existence. It was as simple as that” (The Talented Mr. Ripley 
249). Thus Tom’s purchases bulk large throughout the novels: in Ripley’s Game 
(1974), for instance, buying a harpsichord “[gives] Tom a heady lift, [and makes] 
him feel invincible” (148). Clearly, unlike Chandler, Highsmith is not scornful of 
this new materialism: her minute descriptions of Ripley’s—and other 
characters’—purchases, and her descriptions of the joy these material objects 
bring, seem to encourage the reader, instead, to partake vicariously of the pleasure 
of material objects. At the simplest level, then, the Ripley novels might be called 
“postmodern” in the sense that they reflect not just a new world of increasing 
consumerism, but a new, positive attitude towards materialism. 
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 Furthermore, Highsmith likens crimes such as impersonation to the Art of 
acting, thereby dismantling the binary worldview underlying the grand narrative 
that Art can provide a moral bulwark against corruption and venality represented 
by the acts of impersonation and forgery. That is, we think of “impersonation” and 
“acting” as separate acts, and valorize the latter while condemning the former. By 
highlighting the artistry, aesthetic beauty, and value of Ripley’s impersonation, 
Highsmith points out the inherent similarity between “impersonation” and 
“acting,” and also asks readers to question the assumption that all that is “good,” 
“right,” “truthful” and “artistic” is inherently opposed to “evil,” “wrong,” “false” 
acts like “impersonation.”  
 Thus in The Talented Mr. Ripley Tom reflects that his impersonation of 
Dickie  
gave his existence a peculiar, delicious atmosphere of purity, like 
that . . . which a fine actor probably feels when he plays an important 
role on a stage with the conviction that the role he is playing could not 
be played better by anyone else. He was himself and yet not himself. 
He felt blameless and free. . . . (137) 
 
Tom’s comparison of his theft of Dickie’s identity to an art is not fatuous. Tom is 
a better son to the Greenleafs than Dickie ever was, and is presumably more 
appreciative of the wealth that surrounds Dickie and which Dickie takes for 
granted. In this sense Tom is better suited to the role of “Dickie” than the original 
Dickie ever was. Clearly, the novel seeks to question readers’ assumptions about 
“truth” and what is “right,” and to that end has set up this situation, where the 
flouting of “truth” and the law actually produces happier results for most 
concerned. Furthermore, as with the earlier quote, Highsmith seems to be being 
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deliberately provocative: “purity,” “blameless” and “free” are strong words—
particularly the last, if the novel is read in the context of the Cold War, when the 
question of freedom was especially fraught. By comparing impersonation to Art, 
then, Highsmith is destabilizing our assumptions about “truth.” 
 Comparing impersonation to Art also allows Highsmith to point out 
underlying hypocrisies in conventional value systems. It is no coincidence that in 
The Talented Mr. Ripley Tom makes his public debut as Dickie on Christmas Eve; 
Tom is figuratively reborn at the Christmas party he is invited to: “This was the 
clean slate he had thought about on the boat coming over from America. This was 
the real annihilation of his past and of himself, Tom Ripley, who was made up of 
that past, and his rebirth as a completely new person” (127). The quasi-religious 
overtone of Highsmith’s language is provocative, and tacitly points out that 
although the conventional attitude towards a crime like impersonation is 
condemnation, the desire to remake oneself or better oneself is not condemned, but 
valorized, in two major ideologies: that of Christianity and capitalism. 
 Highsmith also questions the idea of “truth” through her foregrounding of 
art forgery. Although art forgery really comes to the fore in the second Ripley 
novel, Ripley under Ground (1971), which introduces readers to the Derwatt 
forgery scam, Highsmith’s defence of Ripley’s actions will recur in every novel 
after that. Again and again, Ripley tries to convince his—usually self-righteous—
antagonists that there is nothing inherently wrong with the act of forgery itself if 
the act is done in good faith—as, for instance, in Bernard’s case, where the forgery 
arose out of a sincere desire to benefit, and certainly not to deceive, others—and if 
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the forgery produces art that is as good as the original. Put differently, Highsmith 
questions, through Ripley, the distinction between “the original” and “the copy.” 
And since the prioritization of “the original” over the copy is underpinned by the 
value conventionally placed on “truth,” Highsmith’s blurring of the lines between 
“the original” and “the copy” is akin to a re-examination of the idea of truth itself. 
 In The Talented Mr. Ripley, for instance, Tom’s impersonation of Dickie is 
so successful that one has to ask if “impersonation” is the right word to use. That 
is to say, Tom is so good at being Dickie, that it calls into question the distinction 
we might be tempted to make between “the original” Dickie and the “false copy.” 
To make the point, Highsmith plays an elaborate game with her use of pronouns: 
as the novel progresses, the reader becomes less and less sure, when Tom uses 
pronouns like “he” or “him,” if these pronouns refer to Tom or to Dickie. After he 
kills Dickie, Tom begins to feel estranged from himself: “It was a good idea to 
practise jumping into his own character again, because the time might come when 
he would need to in a matter of seconds, and it was strangely easy to forget the 
exact timbre of Tom Ripley’s voice” (122). “Tom,” like “Dickie” has become a 
role to Ripley.  
 Furthermore, though the narrator never stops referring to Tom as “Tom,” it 
becomes clear, as the novel progresses, that the narrator’s use of pronouns 
becomes increasingly ambiguous. For instance, as Tom settles down to enjoy what 
the reader knows are Dickie’s possessions—“When he spent evenings alone, 
handling Dickie’s possessions, simply looking at his rings on his own fingers, or 
his woollen ties, or his black alligator wallet, was that experiencing or 
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anticipation?” (180)—it becomes clear that “his” could refer to both Tom and 
Dickie. Or again: “He was standing in front of the mirror, buttoning a blue-and-
white seahorse-patterned sport shirt of Dickie’s that he had never worn. . .” (139). 
The first “he” refers obviously to Ripley, but the second is slightly more 
ambiguous. By creating this ambiguity, the novel impresses upon the reader the 
sheer success of Ripley’s impersonation—i.e. the reader is put in a position where 
s/he cannot tell the “real” from the “fake.”  
 Highsmith is, of course, not the first novelist to employ this technique
22
, 
and I am not arguing that Highsmith is postmodern only because she plays with 
pronouns to render them ambiguous—nor, indeed, am I suggesting that any one 
feature I choose to highlight about Chandler’s, Highsmith’s, and Christie’s works 
makes them postmodern as opposed to, perhaps, modern. Highsmith’s use of 
pronouns to blur the line between “Dickie” and “Tom” needs to be read in 
conjunction with her emphasis on the theatricality of “real life” and on Ripley’s 
alienation from himself. Most importantly, it needs to be read in the light of the 
novels’ attitude towards the idea that the world is a conglomeration of signs with 
no fixed meanings: as I shall show in the next section, the novels do not suggest 
that this continuously changing world of signs needs “fixing,” or that through Art, 
some higher “Truth” might be found to mitigate this unstable state of things. That 
signs can be manipulated and narratives can be put together at will and cannot 
easily be judged either “true” or “false”—because the line between “truth” and 
“falsehood” is revealed to be a construction in itself—might be dangerous to one’s 
safety, but is presented as a game, and even as something “natural.” Before I look 
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at how Highsmith presents this shifting, hyperreal world in a positive light, 
however, I examine how she critiques what we might call a “modernist” viewpoint 
that acknowledges the fluidity of language and the world, yet strives for “higher 
truths” nonetheless. 
 In Ripley under Ground, Highsmith suggests that the binary distinction 
conventionally made between “the original” (truth) and “a copy” (falsehood) is 
merely that: convention. Murchison voices conventional thinking when he 
castigates Tom for Tom’s “total disconnection with the truth of things” (63). That 
is to say, Tom and Murchison’s fight over forgery is really a battle of conflicting 
views about truth. The reader is clearly given more cause to agree with Tom, since 
Murchison’s arguments seem trite and somewhat meaningless: “An artist’s style is 
his truth, his honesty. Has another man the right to copy it, in the same way that a 
man copies another man’s signature? And for the same purpose, to draw on his 
reputation, his bank account? A reputation already built by a man’s talent?” (63)  
 In contrast, Ripley’s, or rather Highsmith’s, rebuttal is spirited, and worth 
quoting here in full: 
What the hell was Murchison doing dragging in truth and signatures 
and possibly even the police, compared to what Bernard was doing in 
his studio, which was undeniably the work of a fine painter? How had 
Van Meegeren put it (or had Tom himself put it that way, in one of his 
notebooks)? ‘An artist does things naturally, without effort. Some 
power guides his hand. A forger struggles, and if he succeeds, it is a 
genuine achievement.’ Tom realized it was his own paraphrase. But 
goddamn it, that smug Murchison, holier-than-thou! At least Bernard 
was a man of talent, of more talent than Murchison with his plumbing, 
his pipe-laying, his packaging of transportable items, an idea which 




Ripley’s rebuttal is emotional—“what the hell”; “goddamn it”—but it is this very 
emotion which lends his words a sense of authenticity. In other words, the 
suggestion seems to be that Murchison is merely mouthing what he has been 
socialized to believe are the “correct” things to think, and that there might, 
ironically, be more “truth” in Tom’s apparently deviant way of thinking.  
 At the same time, the passage subtly reminds us that there is a “grey area” 
between “an original” and “a copy.” Tom’s defence of forgery might have the ring 
of truth, but it is not “original” in the strictest sense of the word—it is a 
“paraphrase” (64) of something someone else had said. This, then, is a reminder 
that the world is not black or white, that ideas are not either original/truthful or 
copies/false. What, for instance, of paraphrased ideas or forgeries that are 
“undeniably the work of a fine painter” (63)? The paraphrased idea is neither a 
forgery/copy—Ripley/Highsmith does give Van Meegeren23 credit—nor an 
“original” idea. Bernard’s “forgeries,” too, are neither forgeries in the strictest 
sense of the word—he does not make copies of Derwatt’s paintings, but paints in 
the style of Derwatt—but nor are they strictly speaking, original, since the style 
originally came from the mind and eye of Derwatt. The implication, then, is that 
the chasm that we think separates “an original” from “a copy” is not ontological so 
much as ideological and imaginary. The Ripley novels, then, are postmodern in 
that they challenge our assumptions about “truth” and suggest that “original” and 
“copy” are not so much polar opposites as convenient terms of reference on a 
spectrum. 
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Displacements, Games, Liminality 
The Ripley novels are also postmodern in the sense that they reflect a major aspect 
of postmodernity: the increasing porousness of boundaries. Highsmith suggests 
that because the world is a mass of signs with only arbitrary meanings, we can no 
longer even endorse the idea that “identity” is essential or unique, nor can we put 
our faith in attempts to impose boundaries. This breakdown of barriers does not, 
however, lead to a “bringing together” of a shattered world. We might say, in fact, 
that Ripley’s world, like Marlowe’s, is a shattered one where people go through 
the social motions but ultimately lead atomized lives.  
 This section therefore explores, firstly, the significance of displacement in 
the Ripley novels, and secondly, how, like Chandler, Highsmith casts doubt on the 
possibility of meaningful connections between people by suggesting that 
loneliness may be the “natural” state for human beings—a suggestion conveyed 
also through the tension between Ripley’s desire for company or allies and his 
concomitant awareness of his separation from others. And again, like Chandler, 
Highsmith is skeptical that this “shattered world” can be made whole again: the 
novels suggest that in a chaotic world, to be lonely is perhaps to be safe. 
` The word used to refer to the theft of another individual’s identity is 
“impersonation.” However, in the light of Highsmith’s almost Baudrillardian 
conceptualization of the world, “impersonation”—which suggests that one 
individual has wrongfully taken over another’s stable identity—seems an 
inadequate word. It would be more accurate, instead, to view Ripley’s identity 
thefts as displacements. Displacement is a motif that runs throughout the Ripley 
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series, and Highsmith uses this motif to convey her vision of a decentred world, 
i.e. a world without “essential truths” on which to anchor one’s beliefs—after all, 
if one person can easily and seamlessly take the place of another, then even the 
foundational ontological sense of self is shaken, which in turn destabilizes yet 
another foundational way of understanding existence: the self/other divide, and so 
on. 
 Ripley Under Ground, in particular, features a series of physical and 
metaphorical displacements: when the famous painter Derwatt disappears 
(presumably he commits suicide—Highsmith rarely provides “facts” in her work) 
in Greece his friend and fellow painter Bernard Tufts is persuaded to forge 
Derwatt’s work so that the gallery which stocks Derwatt paintings can continue to 
generate revenue. This is the first displacement. An American collector, Thomas 
Murchison, begins to suspect that there is a scam going on. Highsmith’s diction 
links Murchison with the traditional figure of the detective hot on the trail of clues, 
but never quite portrays Murchison as a detective, amateur or otherwise. Speaking 
of Murchison, for instance, Ripley says: “He may have a point about the purples. 
One might call it a clue that might lead to worse” (38; my emphasis). Murchison, 
therefore, is and yet is not a detective—it is as though the character has been 
displaced from a role he might have played in a more traditional crime novel. This 
is displacement number two.  
To quiet Murchison, Ripley pretends to be Derwatt and is interviewed by 
the press to “prove” that Derwatt is alive and no one is forging Derwatt’s work 
(displacement number three). When that fails, Ripley lures Murchison back to his 
Phay 75 
home in France and kills him in the wine cellar. Ripley buries Murchison in his 
backyard, but starts to regret this obviously risky maneuver when the police start 
looking for Murchison. Eventually, Ripley is forced to reveal to Bernard what he 
did and asks Bernard to help him move the body. They dig up Murchison’s 
remains and throw them off a bridge into a river but the trauma is too much for 
Bernard and he hangs himself in effigy in Ripley’s cellar. In other words, not only 
is Murchison’s body literally displaced—by hanging himself in effigy Bernard is 
also displacing himself metaphorically. But that does not expiate Bernard’s guilt, 
and he tries to murder Ripley and even succeeds to the point of burying Ripley in 
the hole that once held Murchison’s body. By now, the whole incident has blown 
up: the police are looking not just for Murchison, but also Derwatt, whose 
disappearance is deemed suspicious. Bernard is shaken when he thinks he sees 
Ripley’s ghost. This is yet another displacement because it echoes another earlier 
scene in the book where Ripley mistakes Bernard for Murchison’s ghost (109).  
The strain becomes unbearable to Bernard; he commits suicide by throwing 
himself off a cliff in the forest. In his typically ingenious yet unethical way, Ripley 
cremates the body to render it unidentifiable and pretends that Bernard’s body is 
Derwatt’s. In other words, Bernard, who has “displaced” Derwatt once by forging 
Derwatt’s art, now “displaces” him in “reality”—or rather, the “reality” created by 
Tom’s false narrative. Tom also tells the police that Bernard has “destroyed 
himself probably—probably by drowning himself in the river” (254). This is the 
final displacement: originally, it is Derwatt who is believed to have drowned 
himself. Tom’s false narrative—the latest in a series of false narratives—comes to 
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displace the potentially true narrative that the reader hears at the beginning of the 
novel. The underlying message, clearly, is that even if “truth” exists and is 
somehow accessible, it can be displaced by other narratives that become new 
“truths.” Furthermore, there are bodies, but any name and identity can be attached 
to them. An individual’s identity is divorced from the physical body and reduced 
to what we might call “a random meaning.” 
 It is important to note, however, that Highsmith is not bemoaning this 
decentredness. The general effect is of a surreal, darkly humorous game of musical 
chairs, so that even if readers are brought face to face with the unpalatable idea 
that all the world is a fluid chaos and all the men and women merely replaceable 
ciphers, they are also encouraged to laugh at the sheer absurdity of the situation. 
Indeed, a sense of play/humour pervades the Ripliad, in which games are an 
important motif. Through the use of this game motif, Highsmith takes what is an 
unsettling view of the world—the world as a fluid, lonely, chaos comprising 
arbitrary signs—and turns it into a source of humour. More importantly, the 
foregrounding of games in the Ripliad is a valorization of play—and therefore of 
irrationality, laughter, pleasure, etc.—and also a reminder that, “correct” ideas of 
utility and sobriety notwithstanding, there is a deep-seated element of play in 
humanity’s psyche and in cultural forms. This ability to see humour in chaos, and 
the valorization of the play-element in sociocultural forms are yet more signs of 
Highsmith’s postmodernism. 
 Games are a motif throughout the novels. The Talented Mr. Ripley opens 
with Ripley perpetrating a “scam” which, to him, is a “practical joke” and a game: 
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“Good clean sport” (14). And as we have seen, Ripley thinks of his later criminal 
activities as “a lonely game he was playing” (Talented 186). In Ripley under 
Ground the very plot—burials and re-burials, characters mistaking other characters 
for yet other characters, as discussed above—evokes both slapstick and farce and 
thus, implicitly brings up the idea of the game. The third Ripley novel foregrounds 
games in the title, Ripley’s Game, while the key events of The Boy who Followed 
Ripley (1980) take place in Berlin, which Highsmith characterizes as a “bizarre” 
and “artificial” city whose inhabitants are forever playing “a who-am-I game” in 
order to prove that “[they] exist” (134).  
 Finally, Ripley under Water (1991) takes the motif to yet another level, by 
reprising the “game” played by Ripley in Ripley’s Game: just as in the third novel 
Ripley’s “game” with Jonathan is an attempt to “put a little crack in [the latter’s] 
self-confidence” (36), so the Pritchards in the final novel play mind games with 
Ripley because David Pritchard “thinks [Ripley’s] too sure of [himself]” (80). 
David Pritchard even digs up Murchison’s bones—the very bones that were the 
focus of the farcical events of Ripley under Ground—and deposits them on 
Ripley’s doorstep, whereupon Ripley promptly dumps the bones into the 
Pritchards’ pond, causing them both to fall in and drown. That is, at a metatextual 
level, by reprising the events of her earlier Ripley novels, Highsmith seems to be 
playing an intertextual game of her own. And to further highlight games, the 
events of the novel are bracketed between descriptions of a slot-machine game 
which both fascinates and repels Ripley. Games, clearly, are a major motif in the 
Ripliad. 
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 By foregrounding games Highsmith also highlights, and valorizes, humour, 
play, and pleasure. To begin with, reading the Ripley novels, one is quickly made 
to feel the disjunction between received opinion about seriousness and levity, and 
what people actually find humorous. Highsmith persistently highlights the humour 
in events/ideas one would usually have been socialized into finding “unhumorous” 
or “serious”—e.g., the burial, digging up, and unceremonious disposal of the 
remains of a murdered man. This not only destabilizes the binary distinction 
between “serious” and “funny” subjects, but also allows readers to indulge in the 
sort of black humour that may be deemed “incorrect” or “insensitive” if voiced in 
public. The game motif, then, serves firstly to challenge conventional, binary 
views of the world that try to carve life into “serious” versus “humorous,” 
“correct” versus “incorrect,” etc.  
 But more importantly, the game motif also points out that play is an 
intrinsic part of the world—i.e. Highsmith is echoing Johan Huizinga’s thesis that 
“the great archetypal human activities of human society are all permeated with 
play from the start” (Homo Ludens 4). In turn, by foregrounding play, Highsmith 
also foregrounds irrationality, excess, pleasure, and the fragility of order. That play 
is a disorderly activity might surprise those who, on the contrary, associate play 
with rules and order. While it is true that, at one point, Huizinga states that play 
“creates order, is order” (10; emphasis original), he quickly goes on to make clear 
that: “Into an imperfect world and into the confusion of life it brings a temporary, 
a limited perfection. Play demands order absolute and supreme. The least deviation 
from it ‘spoils the game,’ robs it of its character and makes it worthless” (10; 
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emphasis mine). Clearly, the “perfection” or order brought about by play is 
“temporary” and “limited.” 
 Furthermore, the rest of Huizinga’s book reveals how play is much more 
aligned with chaos than order. Although he does not put the case in quite such 
terms, Huizinga’s analysis of play in the rituals of African societies does suggest 
that what makes play so important, and enjoyable, is its ability to highlight the 
fluidity of identity or challenge binary views of the world. Thus “the ‘extra-
ordinary’ nature of play reaches perfection” when “the disguised or masked 
individual . . . is”—that is to say, becomes, rather than mimics or impersonates—
“another being” (13). Thus, also: “the unity and indivisibility of belief and 
unbelief, the indissoluble connection between sacred earnest and ‘make-belief’ or 
‘fun,’ are best understood in the concept of play itself” (24). Apollonian attempts 
to neatly separate life/reality into neat, binary categories are defeated by play.  
 Huizinga makes it clear, in fact, that the spirit of play is in opposition to 
“utilitarianism” and “prosaic efficiency” (192), an idealization of “work and 
production” (193), as well as the valorization of “technical organization and 
scientific thoroughness” (199). We might say, then, that the spirit of play is 
Dionysian. Play is also central to human society and culture. What Huizinga is 
positing, therefore, is the centrality of the irrational, excessive
24
, and fluid to 
human society and culture, which only seem orderly. Although Highsmith is not 
deliberately and consciously echoing Huizinga’s thesis, by foregrounding play, she 
is highlighting the irrational, fluid, perverse and ungovernable nature of a world 
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which only seems orderly because humanity has set in place various constructions 
to simulate order—e.g. grand narratives about Art that conflate “the original” with 
“truth.” 
 Thus when the Pritchards begin to emotionally torture Tom the latter’s 
response seems surprising: 
Tom laughed aloud. Games, games! Secret games and open games. 
Open-looking games that were really sly and secret. But of course 
beginning-and-end secret games went on behind closed doors, as a 
rule. And the people concerned merely players, playing out something 
not in their control. Oh, sure. (Ripley Under Water 68) 
 
Tom’s response might seem surprising, but only when taken out of context. “Of 
course” and “as a rule” highlight two points that the Ripliad as a whole implicitly 
makes. At the level of social critique, Ripley’s comment is an indictment of the 
hypocrisy of society, which tries to appear “correct” to hide some inner depravity.  
 In the context of play, however, the Ripliad’s persistent reminder that what 
would normally be deemed horrible, serious events might also qualify as games, 
i.e. as play, does suggest that beneath the thin layer of socialization and received 
opinion, there still functions an urge to play, i.e. an urge for the irrational, 
excessive, even perverse. This example strikingly brings out, in fact, the many 
“features” that Huizinga singles out as being characteristic of play. Tom’s 
pleasure—as signified by his laughter—is a reminder of the pleasure we take in 
contests, i.e. in agonistic play. Furthermore, Ripley’s scorn—“Oh sure” (68)—at 
the idea that people are “merely players, playing out something not in their 
control” (68) recalls Huizinga’s insistence that “play is a voluntary activity” (7) 
and that play is, “in fact freedom” (8). That is, Highsmith, through Ripley, is 
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rejecting a deterministic view of the universe, giving us instead a view of the 
world as fluid, but whose very fluidity is the source of freedom and agency. 
Highsmith not only adds to the novels’ presentation of a fluid, decentred world but 
also points out that this decentredness—i.e. non-determinism—is also a good 
thing. The word “players” has, moreover, two meanings here25. I have been 
reading “players” in the context of Huizinga’s theory about play, but players might 
also be taken to mean “actors.” In which case, Ripley’s dismissal of the idea that 
people are “merely players” (68) is a further reference to the Ripliad’s theme—
discussed above—that individuals do not so much “act,” as simulate, identity.  
 As a whole, then, by foregrounding games/play, Highsmith foregrounds the 
decentredness of identity in particular, and life in general. Games are, however, 
generally associated with rules, which would in turn suggest that the game- or 
play-element in life also creates order out of chaos. Highsmith foregrounds the 
play-element of life, but denies the rules associated with games. Thus, although 
Ripley at first laughs at the Pritchards’ game in Ripley under Water he modifies 
this idea by novel’s end: “It was in fact odder than a game, because in a game 
there were rules of some kind” (212). Ripley is referring to the Pritchards’ 
relationship, but the line also resonates as a self-reflexive comment. That is, 
Highsmith seems to look back on the series and its game motif and comes to the 
conclusion that her books are “odder than a game”—odder because there are no 
rules, i.e. the novels in fact question the very idea that one can impose some form 
of order, like rules, on a chaotic and fluid existence. Put differently, Highsmith 
manages to have her cake and eat it as well: the game motif allows her to present 
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the humour and freedom in the chaos of postmodern life, even as she denies the 
rules/order that one would associate with games/play. 
 
Besides suggesting that the world is a fluid wilderness of signs that can 
easily stand in for each other, Highsmith also suggests that it is futile to try and 
impose order on this chaos since reality is intrinsically fluid. The total effect of the 
almost farcical series of displacements in Ripley under Ground is, in a surreal 
moment, summed up in a description of one of Bernard’s/Derwatt’s paintings:  
This was a pinkish picture of a man in a chair, a man with several 
outlines, so it seemed one was looking at the picture through 
someone else’s distorting eyeglasses. Some people said Derwatts 
hurt their eyes. But from a distance of three or four yards, they 
didn’t. This was not a genuine Derwatt, but an early Bernard Tufts 
forgery. Across the room hung a genuine Derwatt, ‘The Red 
Chairs’. . . . Tom loved both pictures. By now he had almost 
forgotten to remember, when he looked at them, that one was a 
forgery and the other genuine. (15-16; my emphasis) 
 
Reading Ripley Under Ground is precisely like viewing the world “through 
someone else’s distorting eyeglasses.” The atmosphere of constant doubt, 
uncertainty, lies, and paradox is captured in the choice of vague words like 
“pinkish”—the suffix indicates vagueness—and “seemed,” as well as in the image 
of “a man with several outlines.” Most important, though, is Ripley’s realization 
that he has “forgotten to remember” the difference between forgeries and the 
genuine article. That is, one has to “remember,” i.e. to make an effort, “to 
remember” that there is a difference between “true” and “false.” The boundary 
between “true” and “false” is really a matter of human effort, constructed to give 
the illusion of order in a fluid world. 
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 Besides a self-reflexive symbol for the book as a whole, the painting is also 
an ambiguous image of enclosure.
26
 Images of enclosed spaces and their opposite, 
liminal spaces, are another motif in the series, and serve to draw our attention, 
once again, to the novel’s questioning of attempts to impose order on fluid reality. 
Water features constantly in the setting, characterization and symbolism. 
Surprisingly, Tom, whose character is so fluid, “hated water” (Talented Mr. Ripley 
25) because his parents were drowned. Ironically, his hatred of water is the 
reader’s first introduction to a long list of associations between Tom and watery 
spaces. Tom’s first adventure takes place after he crosses the Atlantic to Europe 
and meets Dicky in a seaside town. Tom even commits his first murder in a boat. 
The second novel features several real or purported drownings (Derwatt, Bernard, 
Murchison). Ripley under Water features a murky pond in which the Pritchards 
eventually drown. The water motif, in short, serves as a constant reminder of 
fluidity. 
 Other liminal spaces that play important roles in the novels include cliffs: 
Bernard commits suicide by jumping off a cliff, as does Frank in The Boy Who 
Followed Ripley. Ripley’s Game centres on, among other things, an assassination 
attempt in a moving train. Furthermore, Jonathan Trevanny consents to undertake 
the assassination because he is himself a dying man. Being on the threshold of 
death himself, he becomes like Ripley—that is to say, his value systems start to 
shift and become fluid. The preponderance of fluid, liminal spaces therefore 
underlines the idea that the world is fluid and disorderly. 
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 It is also a pun on “Ripley”: the many outlines are reminiscent of the distorting ripples on the 
surface of water. 
Phay 84 
In contrast, the safe, enclosed space is always an illusion. At one point in 
Ripley under Ground, Ripley imagines “Bernard working in secret on his Derwatt 
forgeries in a closed, even locked room in his studio apartment. . . . Tom had never 
seen the sanctum sanctorum where he painted his masterpieces. . .” (20). The 
image of the “closed, even locked room,” “the sanctum sanctorum” hidden from 
all eyes calls up the idea of limits, safety, and closed borders, which will be echoed 
in the painting of the man with several outlines. However, this vision of the artist 
almost hermetically sealed away in a safe space is merely Tom’s imagination, 
coloured by his scorn of Bernard’s inability to shake off his guilt over 
impersonating Derwatt. In truth, Bernard is more like Tom than either realizes. 
Bernard visits Tom and takes a walk in the rain. He tells Tom: “I was myself in the 
rain. And that’s become a rare thing” (111). Feeling like himself is a rare thing 
because he has been forging Derwatt’s work and has begun to suffer an identity 
crisis. What is more significant is that he feels like himself in the rain, and that 
“Tom understood, only too well” (111). Given the constant association of Tom 
with water, this scene draws yet another similarity between Tom and Bernard—
who are anyway already similar in the sense that they are both forgers. The 
“closed, locked room” never exists—people feel at home in or near water.  
In the Ripley novels, this is quite literally a fact. Nearly every home we 
visit in the Ripley novels is near a river, or has a pond on the grounds, or is near 
the sea. Ripley’s mansion and Reeves Minot’s apartment are the only exceptions, 
but Ripley’s backyard melds into the woods, and Reeves’s apartment is bombed, 
so that he is forced to move around constantly. And since the bodies of water are 
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frequently dumping grounds for bodies or sites of drownings, no home in the 
Ripley novels is ever a safe, stable place. Just as the painting of the man with 
several outlines gives an illusion of stability that is revealed to be just that, merely 
illusion, so safety and stability are revealed to be illusions in Highsmith’s world. 
The Ripley novels, then, call into question ontological certainties, suggesting that 
“essential,” unique identities do not really exist but are futile attempts to impose 
order on a fluid universe. 
 
The Impossibility of Connection 
The world of the Ripley novels is not only fluid, and therefore chaotic—it is also a 
“waste land” of intrinsically disconnected individuals. Loneliness is, indeed, 
presented as the “natural” state, and this because we live in a world where signs 
have no intrinsic meaning. Tom has an epiphanic moment in The Talented Mr. 
Ripley: 
He stared at Dickie’s blue eyes that were still frowning, the sun-
bleached eyebrows white and the eyes themselves shining and 
empty, nothing but little pieces of blue jelly with a black dot in 
them, meaningless, without relation to him. You were supposed to 
see the soul through the eyes, to see love through the eyes, the only 
place you could look at another human being and see what really 
went on inside, and in Dickie’s eyes Tom saw nothing more now 
than he would have seen if he had looked at the hard, bloodless 
surface of a mirror. Tom felt a painful wrench in his breast, and he 
covered his face with his hands. . . . They didn’t know each other. 
(89) 
 
Again, we have in this passage the meaninglessness of physical signs. The eyes, 
which are supposed to signify something, signify nothing except what is reflected 
there by Tom himself. To return again to the image of the man with several 
outlines, the outlines now take on an additional meaning: they stand for the 
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barriers between individuals that render true communication impossible. This 
should not be taken in just the physical sense, though Highsmith does include a 
motif of telephones failing to work throughout Ripley under Ground. Rather, no 
communication is possible because we live in a world of signs, but the signs say 
nothing, and can never be attached to any stable meaning. Put differently, the self 
has no language with which to communicate with others—only the illusion of 
language. And because the self has no language with which to communicate, 
knowledge of the other can never be achieved—“they didn’t know each other” 
(89). 
 Highsmith’s understanding of the impossibility of connection is borne out 
in the structure of the novels as well: besides the main plot—i.e. the sequence of 
events that tell the story—we can discern what might be called the “connection 
plot.” All five novels have this plot: Ripley is alone—Ripley makes a friend or 
ally, or reconnects with a friend—the connection is broken. Put differently, the 
novels enact the impossibility of connection.  
 Thus Ripley under Water begins with Ripley cynically relishing his 
“aloneness”: “[H]ow many people in the world were like him, with a cynical 
attitude toward justice and veracity?” (46) Then, when the sinister Pritchards show 
up—significantly, because they got wind of some shady mystery surrounding 
Ripley at “a big stand-up [party] where nearly anybody could get in” (72), i.e. yet 
another symbol of openness and fluidity—and begin to threaten Ripley with the 
exposure of his crimes, Ripley calls up his old allies, Ed Banbury and the 
appositely named Jeff Constant.  
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 However, this sense of being in connection with allies/friends does not last. 
As the Pritchards keep up their emotional torture Ripley finds himself alienated 
even from his two emotional mainstays: his wife Heloise—the Ripleys had 
planned a holiday in Morocco but Ripley returns to France halfway through to deal 
with the Pritchard menace—and their faithful housekeeper Mme. Annette, who he 
even tries to “get rid off”: 
Should he suggest to Mme. Annette now . . . that she might begin her 
holiday [and so leave Tom alone at Belle Ombre], if she wished? 
 Should he, for safety’s sake? There was a limit to what he wanted 
Mme. Annette to see or hear in the village. 
 Tom became aware that he was worried. . . . 
 Tom decided to ring Jeff or Ed; they each seemed now of equal 
value to Tom. It was a friend’s presence that he needed, a helping hand 
or arm if necessary. After all, Pritchard had one in Teddy. (215; my 
emphasis) 
 
Significantly, Tom wishes to remove Mme. Annette from the scene because she 
might inadvertently gain information about Tom, i.e. even the apparently devoted 
Mme. Annette is less of a true friend than someone who is currently of use to, but 
who might instead become a threat to, Tom. Similarly, Tom now seeks a 
connection with “Jeff or Ed”—once again, the idea that people have no inherent 
uniqueness and are replaceable—because they are useful—“of value”—to him.  
 Significantly, even this businesslike connection between Ed and Tom does 
not last: after the Pritchards fall into their pond and Tom prevents Ed from saving 
them, Ed is horrified, though he tries to hide it, and “Tom realized, with a sense of 
frustration, that Ed didn’t understand it in the same way that he did” (255). By 
enacting a movement from loneliness, to alliance, and then to loneliness again, 
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Ripley under Water reveals the impermanence and cold-bloodedness of so-called 
friendship, suggesting that true connection is impossible.  
 The world of the Ripliad, then, is similar to that of the Marlowe novels: it 
is not just chaotically fluid, but also lonely—a “waste land” where individuals are 
merely ciphers and thus replaceable/displaceable. The Ripliad also presents the 
world as a “waste land” of unstable signs, while the “correct” attitudes that we are 
socialized into having—e.g. reverence for “truth” and thus, a preference for “the 
original” over “a copy—are revealed to be a thin and unstable layer beneath which 
run a deep-seated play impulse, i.e. an impulse towards irrationality, excess and 
freedom. But the novels also suggest that these “negative” views of reality as a 
“waste land” need not be cause for sadness or an attempt to patch things up with 
Art—the healing power of Art is, in fact, called into question—since that same 
play-impulse is ample proof that we can find humour and freedom in 




Agatha Christie: A Multiplicity of Meanings 
 
 
Thus far I have discussed the postmodernism of Raymond Chandler and Patricia 
Highsmith. In this chapter I tackle that supposedly coziest and most reassuring—
i.e. not postmodernist—of writers, Agatha Christie, arguing that Christie’s 
reputation for cozy conservatism is overstated, and for a recognition of the 
postmodernist elements of her novels. Specifically, Christie’s postmodernism 
takes the following forms: one, formal and thematic valorization of the open
27
, 
polyvalent text; two, rejection of narrow, “either/or” definitions of self and 
foregrounding of the constructedness and fluidity of identity; finally, a 
presentation, through the image of the kaleidoscope, of the world as a 
conglomeration of signs that can randomly shift, or be manipulated into, different 
patterns—an awareness, in Baudrillard’s terms, that we live in a hyperreal world. 
The Christie corpus is huge; I focus on selected novels in this chapter due to the 
space constraints, but I do not mean by this to imply that Christie’s postmodernism 
can only be located in these particular novels. Her tongue-in-cheek tone, parodic 
humour, and emphasis on the fluidity of identity, etc., can be found in all her 
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 Cf. Umberto Eco, The Open Work (1962). 
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Re-reading Christie: The Spy Novels  
The critical consensus on Christie seems to be that her work is formulaic and even 
escapist—i.e. fiction that allows readers vicariously and repeatedly to experience a 
movement from order, through disorder as symbolized by murder, back again to 
order when the detective unmasks the murderer(s), explains how the crime was 
committed, and smiles upon the union of a pair of (usually young) lovers. 
However, it seems to me that it is the a priori assumption that Christie’s work is 
particularly amenable to structuralist readings that has produced this image of a 
formulaic Christie in the first place. Put differently, since the critical emphasis thus 
far has been on searching and accounting for Christie’s use of formulaic elements, 
and since Christie’s popularity makes it easy to assume that we “know” her fiction, 
it is unsurprising that our picture of Christie’s work has been skewed towards the 
reassuring or even the trite
28
. 
 I show, however, that Christie’s detective novels also contain meditations 
on language that are so similar to theories on language and literature after the 
linguistic turn that they would surprise anyone who considers Christie’s work 
“mere” light literature. In Death Comes as the End (1945), for example, Christie 
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 Even critics who think her work worth devoting book-length studies to seem to have mixed 
feelings about Christie. Patricia D. Maida and Nicholas B. Spornick, for example, give Christie 
credit for “forg[ing] a style so simple, so artless and natural, that even today it baffles critics and 
charms readers” (194), yet they also complain that Christie’s focus is “decidedly myopic” (178). 
“What emerges through Christie’s lens,” they argue, “is a comfortable, encapsulated world shaped 
by homely details or glamorous adventures, but protected from otherwise threatening events” 
(178). Similarly, Earl F. Bargainnier is willing to move away from the denouement-obsessed type 
of reading which lends itself to the view that classical detective fiction unsettles only to reassure—
“More important than the puzzle itself is the process of discovery leading to its solution, which 
generally requires three-fourths or more of the work” (17)—but he too recycles the idea that the 
sub-genre is formally and therefore ideologically conservative (10). 
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makes a prediction that will only be articulated by Baudrillard as a theory of 
hyperreality three decades later:  
[I]t is so easy and it costs so little labour to write down ten bushels of 
barley, or a hundred head of cattle, or ten fields of spelt—and the thing 
that is written will come to seem like the real thing, and so the writer 
and the scribe will come to despise the man who ploughs the fields and 
reaps the barley and raises the cattle—but all the same the fields and 
the cattle are real—they are not just marks of ink on papyrus. (27; 
emphasis original) 
 
That is to say, while recognizing that words may not have real referents, Christie 
also foresees a future where those do “real,” physical work are less valued than 
those who work with words or “signs of the real”—i.e. as Baudrillard puts it, 
“signs of the real” replace “the real itself” (382). 
 Furthermore, my sense of Christie is of someone who uses the rules and 
clichés of her sub-genre(s) as a means of questioning or even critiquing various 
forms of conventional thinking, whether these are conventions in the literary sense 
or “polite” affirmations of the existence of order in society. That is, like Val 
McDermid, I see Christie as a postmodernist writer: in her introduction to The 
Seven Dials Mystery (1929) McDermid notes that the novel in question “isn’t a 
thriller. It’s a pastiche of a thriller. . . . It’s wry, it’s got its tongue firmly planted in 
its cheek and it subverts the whole genre it appears to be part of” (xi). McDermid 
goes on to suggest, provocatively, that: 
If one of our Young Turks did something similar with the thriller 
now, we’d all nod sagely and go, ‘how very post-modern, how very 
self-referential and knowing, how very metafictional.’ 
 But that was then and this is now. So Christie gets no credit 
for poking her tongue out at the big boys who set the agenda for 
what a thriller should be [i.e. A.E.W. Mason, Sapper, and John 
Buchan]. I mean, how can a nice middle-class wife and mother be 
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considered a subversive? How embarrassing would that be for the 
leather-jacketed iconoclasts? (ix-x) 
 
McDermid is “not suggesting that [Christie] was actually a secret radical who was 
aiming to subvert the narrow-minded intolerance of her time and class” (xiii). 
However, as McDermid convincingly points out, Christie’s obvious delight in 
satire—both self-referential29 and of other texts or literary conventions/clichés—
suggests a greater capacity for laughter and play as well as critical reflection than 
most critics, and indeed fans, tend to give her credit for. 
 Indeed, Christie’s spy thrillers are good case studies of how her texts 
decentre our expectations and beliefs, and are themselves decentred formally and 
thematically. The spy novels may not be the most well-known of Christie’s 
work—Christie is associated so strongly with the “Golden Age” and the classical 
clue-puzzle form that it is easy to forget that she ever wrote spy thrillers—but they 
serve as a good introduction to her self-reflexive wit, sarcastic humour, and love of 
the intertexual and open text. They are also good points of introduction to themes 
and motifs running throughout Christie’s fiction—from her whodunnits to the 
“romantic” novels written as “Mary Westmacott.” Such themes and motifs 
include: the fluidity, and thus “unknowability” or “unclassifiability,” of identity; 
the fluidity and impermanence of life; the arbitrariness of the link between 
signifiers and signifieds; the motif of travel, etc. This section will, firstly, examine 
how The Seven Dials Mystery—hereafter Dials—highlights the textuality of the 
world while simultaneously, despite the fact that it is itself a romance narrating 
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 McDermid’s point is that The Seven Dials Mystery mocks everyone, from the nouveau riches to 
the upper middle class to which Christie belongs. She also notes that Christie’s self-referential 
satire can be found in the detective novels as well—in, e.g., the characterization of Miss Marple’s 
writer nephew or the scatter-brained mystery novelist, Ariadne Oliver. 
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wildly improbable events, undercutting the idea of romance and reaffirming, 
instead, a more pragmatic, determinedly mundane worldview; and secondly, look 
at how Christie uses disjointed forms and reflects on the fragmentary nature of 
postmodern life in The Man in the Brown Suit (1924), Destination Unknown 
(1954) and Passenger to Frankfurt (1970)—hereafter Suit, Destination, and 
Passenger. 
 
 If a skepticism regarding grand narratives and a conception of the world as 
a text are necessary “ingredients” for a postmodern novel, then Dials clearly meets 
requirements. As McDermid notes, Dials is a send-up of the early-twentieth-
century patriotic spy thriller
30
. More specifically, Dials is a parody of G.K. 
Chesterton’s surreal The Man who was Thursday (1908). The central paradox of 
Chesterton’s novel is that the anarchists who are being investigated by the 
protagonist Syme all turn out to be policemen, and that the mysterious arch-
anarchist, Sunday, is the policeman who recruits Syme in the first place. Similarly, 
in Dials, the mysterious villain No. 7 is revealed to be Superintendent Battle, the 
officer in charge of apprehending No. 7 in the first place. The following 
melodramatic scene should make Christie’s parodic humour apparent: 
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 Even the plot of Dials is recognizably parodic: the novel opens with a country house party, 
where a practical joke by several “bright young things” turns to tragedy when one of the young 
men is found dead in bed. Strange references to the mysterious “Seven Dials” start appearing. The 
heroine, Bundle Brent, is drawn into the mystery when another of the guests runs out onto the road 
in front of Bundle’s car, talks about “the Seven Dials,” collapses, and is found to have been shot. 
Bundle, with the help of Jimmy Thesiger, and against the wishes of Superintendent Battle, launches 
her own investigation. Military secrets are stolen, beautiful foreign women appear and disappear, 
the amateur investigators “infiltrate” a house party which is really a cover for an important meeting 
between the British and German governments, gunshots are heard in the library in the dead of 
night. Finally, Bundle manages to infiltrate a meeting of the Seven Dials, only to discover that this 
mysterious organization is not working against, but for, Britain. Jimmy turns out to be the villain, 
and Bundle is invited to join the Seven Dials. 
Phay 94 
 Very slowly No. 7 raised a hand to his head and fumbled with the 
fastening of the mask. 
 Bundle held her breath. At last—she was going to know. 
 The mask fell. 
 Bundle found herself looking into the expressionless, wooden face 
of Superintendent Battle. (252; italics in the original) 
 
The motif of the mask in Chesterton’s novel even reappears in Dials as a bizarre 
detail that both parodies the thriller genre as well as adds to the surreal atmosphere 
of the novel: the conspirators wear masks with clock faces on them.  
 But Dials does more than parody the plot, atmosphere, and motifs of 
Chesterton’s novel. Dials undercuts the romance of the very genre it professes to 
be part of—i.e. professes a more pragmatically-inclined, but tolerant, skepticism of 
Chesterton’s Christianity-infused, Romantic, patriotism. Dials admits that 
romantic ideals do add flavour to life, but nonetheless valorizes the prosaic over 
the romantic. Thus Lady Coote reminisces:  
 ‘. . . I remember when I was a girl, one of my—my young men—
picked up a handful of gravel, and a girl who was with me said at once 
that he was treasuring it because my feet had trodden on it. Such a 
pretty idea, I thought. Though it turned out afterward that he was 
taking a course of mineralogy—or do I mean geology?—at a technical 
school. But I liked the idea—and stealing a girl’s handkerchief and 
treasuring it—all those sorts of things.’ 
 ‘Awkward if the girl wanted to blow her nose,’ said the practical 
Mr. Thesiger. (205) 
 
The romantic idea may be “pretty,” but is punctured twice—once when Lady 
Coote admits the prosaic motivation beneath the romantic illusion, and again 
when, after Lady Coote says that she “like[s] the idea,” another character destroys 
the sense of wistfulness generated by Lady Coote’s statement with a reminder of 
the “practical” and the mundane.  
 Later, Superintendent Battle voices this central theme of the novel: 
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[T]here’s a lot of romance in the world, Lady Eileen. People, 
especially young people, like reading about such things, and they like 
still better really doing them. I’m going to introduce you now to a very 
creditable band of amateurs that has done remarkably fine work for my 
Department, work that nobody else could have done. If they’ve chosen 
rather melodramatic trappings, well, why shouldn’t they? They’ve 
been willing to face real danger . . . and they’ve done it for these 
reasons: love of danger for its own sake . . . and an honest wish to 
serve their country.’ (253-54) 
 
Romance, then, is equated to an “idea” (205), an illusion, or “melodramatic 
trappings” (254). Romance is enjoyable, but what really matters, the novel 
suggests, is the “real” and the “honest.” Of course, that last sentiment—about 
“fac[ing] real danger” for the “love of danger for its own sake . . . and an honest 
wish to serve their country” (254) could come straight from the pages of a Buchan 
thriller. But therein lies the paradox of Christie’s parody. Clearly, the novel 
advocates hearty adventurism and patriotism. It is also aware of the “entertainment 
value” of romance. Yet it constantly punctures romance and mocks the melodrama 
of the thriller genre. We might say, therefore, that only the ending of Dials 
reaffirms the sort of worldview, centred on God, king and country, that one might 
find in Chesterton, and that even this “last minute” reaffirmation is mitigated by 
the parodic mode Christie is writing in and accompanied by a pragmatist’s 
skepticism of Romantic ideals. Overall, then, “skepticism” is a good word to 
describe the novel’s tone and theme. 
 But more importantly, what makes Christie’s work “postmodern” is how 
she reworks generic conventions in order to foreground textuality. In fact, despite 
the association of Christie with formulaic and conservative fiction, the spy novels 
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provide numerous examples of Christie’s experiments, not just with generic 
conventions, but with narrative technique and form. 
 Beneath its thriller plot
31
 Suit is structured as a struggle for control over 
narrative; Christie uses this struggle to point to textuality and highlight the 
openness of texts. The novel begins with two alternating narrators, Anne 
Beddingfield and Sir Eustace Peddler (who turns out to be the villain), and with 
each narrator neatly “confined” to a chapter of their own—i.e. each chapter is 
wholly narrated from one point of view. However, as the novel progresses, the 
chapters get shorter and begin mixing Anne’s and Sir Eustace’s points of view, 
creating not just the sense of rushing towards a climax so necessary to thrillers but 
the impression that Anne and Sir Eustace are “losing control” of their narratives. 
The form of Suit, then, serves as a reminder that texts are open, i.e. made up of 
multiple, perhaps even conflicting, voices.  
 On top of that, hitherto silent voices break in towards the end of the novel, 
thereby emphasizing the “openness” of the text: e.g., towards the end parts of the 
novel are narrated from Harry Rayburn’s point of view. Not only that—Harry’s 
narrative takes readers back to events already narrated by Anne, so that we look at 
familiar events through unfamiliar eyes. The text thereby shows that even what we 
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 As with Dials, the plot is parodic: Anne Beddingfield is drawn into a thrilling sequence of events 
when she witnesses a man falling onto the train track. Cryptic notes are found and deciphered; 
stolen diamonds are mentioned; exotic foreign women are murdered; various characters drop hints 
about a master criminal known only as “the Colonel”; a mysterious man, Harry Rayburn, stumbles 
into Anne’s cabin, wounded; Anne is lured into an ambush by a false note; Anne is rescued, but 
captured again—only this time, Anne and Harry are prepared. Reinforcements arrive, and the 
avuncular MP Sir Eustace is revealed to be “the Colonel.” 
Phay 97 
think of as lived experience or “facts” can be revised or look completely different 
from even a slightly different point of view
32
. 
 More importantly, Suit highlights textuality and the link between 
authority/power and control over the text by staging a struggle for control over the 
narrative—a motif we saw in Highsmith as well. However, as the outcome of this 
“struggle for narrative control” shows, Christie valorizes the openness of the text 
to a far greater extent than even the “subversive” Highsmith does. Anne is at first 
determined to share her adventures and knowledge with no one. Thus when things 
seem too dangerous to handle by herself she briefly considers confiding in Colonel 
Race but rejects this option because “[h]e would take the whole matter out of my 
hands. And it was my mystery!” (94; emphasis original) “Mystery” refers, of 
course, to the question of who the mysterious, villainous “Colonel” is but could 
also be a self-reflexive reference to the novel/narrative. Anne is desperate to centre 
the narrative on herself, as it were.  
 But other characters are competing with her for mastery over the narrative: 
Sir Eustace and Harry co-narrate the story, and the fracturing of the narrative into 
multiple points of view coincides with Anne’s epiphany that she is not the 
panoptic centre of the story that she would like to have been: 
What of my part in the affair? Where did I come in? . . . In 
some way, unknown to myself, I was a menace, a danger! Some 
knowledge that I had, or that they thought I had, made them anxious to 
remove me at all costs. . . . There was one person, I felt sure, who 
could enlighten me—if he would! The Man in the Brown Suit—Harry 
Rayburn. He knew the other half of the story. But he had vanished into 
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 This is not a new idea per se: Wilkie Collins, for instance, made this same point, and also 
through the form of his novels. However, the fact remains that Christie’s use of form to express the 
openness of texts goes unacknowledged. 
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the darkness. . . . In all probability he and I would never meet 
again. . . . [this ellipsis in the original] 
 [. . .] 
 I, priding myself upon my rôle of watcher, had become the 
watched. And I was afraid! . . . I was the little piece of grit that was 
impeding the smooth working of the great machine—and I fancied that 
the machine would have a short way with little bits of grit. . . . My 
enemies were all around me in every direction, and they were closing 
in. If I continued to play a lone hand I was doomed. (157-58) 
 
The sudden upsurge of questions in Anne’s normally confident narrative, the 
vagueness of her diction (“some”), and her realization that Harry “[knows] the 
other half of the story” are all reminders that no one character can claim sole 
authority over the narrative, regardless of how much they desire such authority. 
The novel thereby implies that texts are open, fluid and “inherently” fragmented 
insofar as they consist of a plurality of voices. 
 A skeptic might argue that this foregrounding of openness notwithstanding, 
the conventional plot—the “good guys” ultimately solve the mystery and thwart 
the villain—still reaffirms the idea that order can be re-imposed or that a 
fragmented world might be made whole again. I would like to suggest, though, 
that the very form of the novel negates a “comfortable” or reassuring way of 
reading. That is, I do not deny that there are centring elements in the novel. These 
centring elements are, however, undercut. For instance, the novel ends with Anne 
and Harry living on an island—evoking the prelapsarian ideal of Adam and Eve in 
their own private Eden—but the “fragmentation” of the narrative continues in the 
form of the letters Anne receives, which are quoted in full and thus represent 
multiple voices still active in Anne and Harry’s “closed-off” paradise.  
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 Even if the letters are taken as a symbol of connection—i.e. reassuring 
reminders that the world can be made whole and people joined together in 
friendship—the fact remains that the letters themselves raise more questions that 
the ostensible resolution of the mystery either failed to definitively answer, or, 
more ironically, created. Thus the continuing existence of multiple and conflicting 
viewpoints are alluded to in Anne’s statement that even in their honeymoon bliss 
there is “one point on which [Harry] and [she] do not see eye to eye”: Sir 
Eustace’s motives and character (276). The continuance of the mystery 
surrounding Sir Eustace is further highlighted by the symbolic fact that his last 
communication to Anne (and the reader) “appeared to be written from somewhere 
in Bolivia” (275). In other words, just as his letter cannot be pinned down to one 
particular location/origin, so Sir Eustace’s motives and character—Anne and 
Harry continue to debate the question of whether Sir Eustace is a villain—cannot 
be definitively classified and understood.  
 Moreover, the very atmosphere of prelapsarian bliss is destabilized when, 
in Mrs. Blair’s letter, she points out that the Rayburns’ “idea of renouncing a vast 
fortune is absurd” and that “honeymoons don’t last forever. . .” (274). In other 
words, the novel ends on a note of uncertainty; the Rayburns’ Romanticism is 
juxtaposed against Mrs. Blair’s pragmatism, so that the novel ends, not on a cozy 
note with all conflicts resolved, but with a question: which worldview does the 
novel subscribe to, if any? The ending of Suit does not encourage the reader to 
“lock down” the “meaning” of the novel by imposing one reading on it. Also, the 
debate over whether Sir Eustace is a villain further undercuts any reassurance the 
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ending might give: if one assumes that every thriller must have certain 
characters—a hero, a heroine, and a villain—the fact that Sir Eustace’s 
“suitability” for that last role is debated further destabilizes the text (it is a thriller, 
yet it has no villain—most of the novel is spent, in fact, in trying to identify “the 
Colonel,” so that the villain is only present in absence) as well as our expectations 
of the thriller text. In short, Suit deflects any attempts to “close down” the text 
even at the ending, where one would traditionally expect closure and/or 
comforting images of a world/body of knowledge made whole. This, as well as 
Christie’s use of a fragmented form and valorization of sharing, fluidity and 
openness through the underlying structure of the novel, make Suit a clear reminder 
of Christie’s valorization of the open, multivalent text. 
 I should point out that Christie’s reluctance to “lock down” the meaning(s) 
of a novel comes through in her detective novels as well. That is, although a 
murderer is—or murderers are—identified at the end, Christie scatters other 
“clues” throughout the ending that prevent this one plot element—the 
identification of the murderer(s)—from creating a sense of centeredness and 
closure. This is not to say that Christie leaves hints that the murderer(s) identified 
is/are not truly the murderer(s) or leaves loose ends dangling—the decentred 
endings of her novels do not arise out of plot devices or poor writing. Rather, 
motifs throughout the novel combine to create a sense, not that the mystery has not 
been solved, but that the identification of the murderer(s) merely raises larger 
questions, e.g., about the meaning of “justice” and the means taken to achieve 
“justice.” Therefore, although the endings of the spy thrillers and the detective 
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novels may involve “simple” plot closure in the sense that the murderers are 
identified, any sense of closure is undercut by how the endings continue to draw 
attention to unresolved—or unresolveable—issues. As an exhaustive analysis of 
all Christie’s detective novels would be impossible, it should suffice to look at two 
notable examples. 
 Taken at the Flood (1948)—hereafter Taken—contains many of the 
elements of a “classic” Christie mystery: the village and country home setting; a 
dysfunctional family—comprising numerous siblings, a disagreeable patriarch, 
and his (possibly) gold-digging young wife—quarreling over an inheritance; a pair 
of young lovers; Poirot; numerous sub-plots carefully designed to maintain the 
suspense, etc. Poirot is called in by Rowley Cloade to investigate the murder of the 
man who will help the Cloades regain their inheritance from the gold-digging 
Rosaleen and her brother David Hunter. 
 The ending, however, is startling, not least because the heroine’s fiancé and 
supposed hero, Rowley, turns out to be one of the murderers of the novel—there 
are two: David, who deliberately murders the woman who has been posing as his 
sister, and Rowley, who “accidentally” kills Robert Underhay33 when Rowley 
pushes Underhay and the latter falls and hits his head. Equally startling is the fact 
that the supposedly “simple” (169) Rowley decides to turn this event to his 
advantage by framing David, thereby preventing David’s “sister” from inheriting 
the Cloade estate. Most startling of all, however, is how the heroine, Lynn, 
discovers that she loves Rowley: Rowley begins strangling Lynn in a rage when 
Lynn tells him that she loves David, whereupon Lynn realizes that it is Rowley 
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 The man whose murder Poirot is called in to investigate in the first place. 
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whom she loves: “Actually, it was just when I thought you had killed me, that I 
began to realize what a really thundering fool I’d been making of myself!” (247) 
 Such an ending is unsettling, not because of the quick plot twists, but 
because it raises serious issues without “closing down” the novel’s meaning by 
nudging readers into “taking sides.” For example, in Taken, the resolution of the 
murder plot and the romance plot create more questions than answers. To begin 
with, Lynn’s stormy reunion with Rowley is a disturbing portrait of masochistic 
adoration that raises questions about gender stereotypes. For instance, that spunky 
Lynn’s desire for Rowley is suddenly ignited when Rowley lays violent hands on 
her should give readers pause because this simply seems out of character. The 
novel has thus far presented readers with an unconventional couple—contrary to 
conservative ideas about the masculine gender being more active or physical, Lynn 
took part in the war effort as a Wren, while Rowley stayed “plodding on” (231) at 
home. It might therefore seem as though the ending returns each gender to their 
“correct” (in conservative terms) box, so to speak. Yet, reading the passage quoted 
above, one gets not so much a sense of things returning to their appointed places, 
as a jarring sense that this is entirely out of character. The link between (male) 
violence and (female) desire also seems perverse, especially when compared to the 
other murders in the novel, e.g., David’s murder of the woman who pretended to 
be his sister. In other words, this seemingly conservative but in reality jarring 
ending is Christie’s way of leaving readers with questions about gender 
stereotypes. 
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 Furthermore, the presence of both “deliberate” and “accidental” murderers 
asks questions about what constitutes “murder” and “manslaughter.” Significantly, 
the novel ends, like Suit, with an argument between the lovers—i.e. what would 
have been a symbol of a new, almost Edenic world, the young lovers, loses its 
reassuring effect: 
 ‘Rubbish,’ cried Lynn. ‘Don’t be pigheaded and melodramatic. If 
you have a row with a hulking big man and hit him and he falls down 
and hits his head on a fender—that isn’t murder. It’s not even legally 
murder.’ 
 ‘It’s manslaughter. You go to prison for it.’ 
 ‘Possibly. . . .’ 
 ‘And there’s Porter. I’m morally responsible for his death.’ 
 ‘No, you’re not. He was a fully adult responsible man—he could 
have turned down your proposition. One can’t blame anyone else for 
the things one decides to do with one’s eyes open. . . .’ 
 Rowley shook his head obstinately. (247) 
 
On the surface this is Lynn trying to comfort her fiancé and thereby restore 
harmony to a world disordered by murder. The problem, though, is that at the 
same time, this discussion presents different views about what constitutes 
“murder.” Lynn’s “it’s not even legally murder” (247), for instance, not only 
suggests that there are various ways to define “murder,” so that there is “legal,” as 
opposed to other kinds of, murder. That subtly disparaging “even” actually places 
the legal definition below other ways to define “murder,” which presumably have 
to do with “[moral] responsibility” (247). The reader, then, is left with a novel 
where, as is the norm, the murderers have been identified but, what is not so 
normal, continues to ask questions about what constitutes “murder” in the first 
place.  
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 Rowley’s response to Lynn’s argument then implicitly raises yet another 
question: language may be slippery, yet serious consequences are attached to these 
shifting signifiers—whether Rowley will be handed a death sentence depends 
partly on whether his act is deemed “murder” or “manslaughter.” The novel 
therefore allows readers not just to realize the unsettling fact that we live in a 
world of conflicting conceptions, ideas, and opinions, which are themselves 
constituted out of shifting signifiers, but also to ask themselves, ultimately, how 
words matter and how they shape our perception of things.  
 Rowley’s certainty is then once again undercut by Lynn’s ambiguous 
“possibly” (247)—ambiguous not only because the word suggests the failure to 
pin down something to a certainty, but also because that “possibly” could mean 
both that Rowley’s act is “possibly” manslaughter and that Rowley’s going to jail 
for manslaughter is merely a possibility. Finally, Rowley’s “obstinate” (247) 
negation of Lynn’s arguments reinforces the fact that the argument remains 
unresolved, as do, by extension, the “larger issues” it raises. Taken, then, is a good 
example of how Christie continues to maintain the “openness” of her novels even 
at the endings. 
 I turn now to Evil under the Sun (1941)—hereafter Evil—to illustrate yet 
another way in which the endings of Christie’s novels manage not to “close down” 
meaning: although Evil ends conventionally with the identification of the 
murderers
34
, any sense that Poirot’s narrative of how and why the deed was done 
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 Poirot is on holiday at a seaside resort when the femme fatale of the hotel, ex-actress Arlena 
Marshall, is murdered. Since Arlena has apparently been having an affair with another of the 
hotel’s guests, Patrick Redfern, Patrick’s wife Christine and Arlena’s husband Kenneth are leading 
suspects. The twist at the ending is that Arlena was murdered by Christine and Patrick, acting as a 
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is the definitive explanation is undercut by the other characters’ doubts. That is, 
the idea that there is only one authoritative version of events, or that one should 
simply accept the views of authoritative figures, is negated. 
 Throughout Evil, as in many other Poirot novels, Poirot’s self-assurance 
and authority are subtly and comically called into question
35
. At the beginning of 
Evil, Poirot claims to have foreseen that Arlena would be murdered, in response to 
which Hastings asks: 
 ‘Then why didn’t you stop it?’ 
 And Hercule Poirot, with a sigh, said as he had said once before in 
Egypt
36
, that if a person is determined to commit murder it is not easy 
to prevent them. He does not blame himself for what happened. It was, 
according to him, inevitable. (48-49; my emphasis) 
 
Hastings’s question reveals the faith he has in Poirot’s abilities, and is precisely 
the sort of question that might be asked by those who, like Hastings, might 
occasionally question, but will never seriously rebel against, what they perceive as 
“Authority.” Christie, however, reveals how almost puerile such an attitude is 
through that weary-sounding “with a sigh.”  
 In fact, the paragraph following Hastings’s question casts doubt on the idea 
that the detective is an omniscient figure who stands for “justice” and whose 
viewpoint is the only correct one. For one thing, the shift from dialogue to reported 
                                                                                                                                                                
team. Patrick is what we now call a serial murderer; he exploits women and then disposes of them 
when they are no longer useful to him, and Christine is his adoring “fan.” 
35
 In Death in the Clouds (1935), the heroine and another policeman, after listening to Poirot 
explain how he [Poirot] came to his conclusions regarding the identity of the murderer and the 
method of murder, both privately object to his reconstruction of events. The heroine even secretly 
calls Poirot “a mountebank” (207).  In Peril at End House (1932), Poirot is described as “a kind of 
fantastic clown” (233). Similarly, in Taken, Poirot is compared to “a ruddy fortune teller” (227) and 
a “conjuror” (169). There are also references to Poirot being “gaga”: see, e.g., Evil 234, Cards on 
the Table (1936) 245. 
36
 See Death on the Nile (1937). 
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speech and the sudden use of Poirot’s full name create a distancing effect that 
signals a need to stand back and think about what Poirot is saying. They also 
remind readers, as does that subtly critical phrase, “according to him,” that 
Poirot’s is merely one of many—possibly competing—viewpoints and need not be 
taken as gospel. Finally, Poirot’s defensiveness—“[h]e does not blame himself for 
what happened”—does not “clear” him in the reader’s eyes. On the contrary, it is a 
reminder slipped in by Christie to show Poirot’s essential helplessness in the face 
of someone else’s agency. The sense of authority one might associate with the 
“great detective” of a mystery novel is therefore undermined right from the 
beginning; we are reminded that the detective’s interpretation of events, motives, 
and characters is just that—one interpretation of many. 
 Evil proceeds to highlight the openness of texts by showing, right up to the 
end, that even if Poirot is capable of identifying the murderers he cannot solve a 
yet bigger mystery that the novel persistently foregrounds: what sort of person 
Arlena Marshall is
37
. Put differently, the novel, by foregrounding the multiple and 
conflicting ways to view Arlena, reminds us that Poirot’s interpretation is not 
definitive even if he is the “great detective” of the novel and that, by extension, no 
one interpretation may be presented as “the” truth. Arlena is at first presented as a 
“bad lot” (24, 48) and “evil through and through” (28), but this view is then 
overturned by Poirot, who explains that, “though evil was present” and “connected 
with” Arlena, she is not the source, but “an eternal and predestined victim” of evil 
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 The unreadable vamp/femme fatale seems to be a favourite motif of Christie’s. See, especially: 
Murder in Mesopotamia (1936), Towards Zero (1944), Dead Man’s Folly (1956), Death on the 
Nile, Death in the Clouds, The Hollow (1946), and Peril at End House. 
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(298; emphasis original). It is this view of Arlena, Poirot claims, that allowed him 
to solve the mystery. 
 Yet the debate over how one might “read” Arlena continues even on to the 
last pages of the novel, where Poirot chats about the case with the Gardeners, an 
American couple staying at the hotel. Mrs. Gardener overturns Poirot’s 
authoritative-sounding “reading” of Arlena’s character when she says: “And if you 
ask me, even M. Poirot here is what I should call a shade on the indulgent side 
about her, calling her a natural victim and all that” (314). Mrs. Gardener also 
dismisses her husband’s carefully neutral “I never did think very much of her 
[Arlena]” with a simple “That’s the kind of thing men say to their wives” (314), 
which reminds us that the act of interpretation is never politically neutral, so to 
speak. Thus this ending destabilizes both Poirot’s explanation and the issue of 
identity. We don’t know how to “read” Arlena, we don’t know how accurate 
Poirot’s explanation is, and we don’t know where we/the novel stands on the issue 
of “vamps,” etc.  In short, this final discussion about Arlena’s character serves not 
only to remind readers that texts are “open” in the sense that multiple 
interpretations exist, but also to point out the fact that few—or no—interpretations 
are entirely unbiased. 
 I have explored, then, how the endings of Suit, one of Christie’s spy 
thrillers, as well as Taken and Evil—which are “classical” detective mysteries—
not only refuse to “close down” the meaning of the novel, but even reaffirm the 
openness of texts. While it cannot be denied, then, that the endings of Christie’s 
novels do give a sense of closure in that the murderer(s) is/are identified, it would 
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be a mistake to place too much emphasis on what is simply a plot convention. The 
sense of closure or centredness created by allowing the detective to pin down the 
identity of the murderer is, in fact, undermined by numerous other emphases on 
the open text. 
 
 Readers and critics who identify Christie only with the “Golden Age” 
detective novel are likely to end up with a skewed view of the author, especially 
her association with the “closed circle” setting, which is a setting with “limited 
space” and a limited number of suspects (Bargainnier 22). Setting aside for the 
moment the question of how “closed” her detective novel settings are, let us look 
now at how Christie’s spy thrillers utilize form to comment on the fragmentary 
nature of postmodern life. 
 Christie’s spy thrillers usually involve many changes of scene and a huge 
cast of characters. In fact, a comparison of her spy novels over time shows that 
they become increasingly fragmented in form: from Dials and Suit, both written 
and published in the 1920s, to Passenger—published in 1970—there is a clear 
escalation in the disjointedness of the novel’s form and therefore a greater sense of 
transience, evanescence and instability. Passenger opens with an authoritative 
sounding “Introduction” where “The author speaks” (xiii), moves into a scene set 
in Frankfurt airport, then suddenly leaps to the Festival Youth Theatre in Berlin, 
after which the point of view starts switching among a dizzying array of characters 
in a whirl of settings. Lady Matilda, Colonel Pikeaway, Herr Heinrich Spiess (a 
hitherto unintroduced character), various government officials, Professor John 
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Gottlieb (another hitherto unintroduced character), and the cryptically named The 
Squadron Leader all take turns being the focalizer. Even the subtitles of each 
chapter—“Interrupted Journey”; “Journey to Siegfried”; “At Home and Abroad”—
speak of broken and continuing journeys, which self-reflexively draws our 
attention to the “fractured” form of the novel. 
 Destination may be less adventurous in form compared to the other spy 
thrillers. But, as the novel’s very title suggests, Destination is a meditation on the 
transience and disconnectedness of postmodern life as well as the pleasure of 
fragmentation, evanescence, and the unknown
38
. As Alison Light points out, “not 
for nothing is Christie’s most usual character a tenant. . . . It is an essentially 
rootless and unsettled world she invents in which people have very shallow 
lineages. . . .” (93). I would add that Christie not only invents such a world, but 
explicitly draws attention to the sense of evanescence such a world necessarily 
evokes. In Destination, for instance, the heroine reflects on modern day travel:  
How alike, Hilary thought to herself, all airports were! They had a 
strange anonymity about them. They were all at some distance 
from the town or city they served, and in consequence you had a 
queer, stateless feeling of existing nowhere. You could fly from 
London to Madrid, to Rome, to Istanbul, to Cairo, to anywhere you 
liked and if your journey was a through one by air, you would never 
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 Destination revolves around Hilary Craven, who, when the novel opens, is contemplating suicide 
as a means of escaping her depression (the result of her broken marriage and her young daughter’s 
death.) Hilary is saved when she is asked by Jessop, a British intelligence agent, to undertake a 
mission. Hilary very much resembles Olive Betterton, whose husband Thomas, a nuclear scientist, 
has disappeared. More worryingly, other spies have disappeared recently—Jessop suspects that all 
the disappearances are linked, but to whom? Hilary is therefore asked to impersonate Olive in an 
attempt to track down the missing scientists. The impersonation is successful; Hilary infiltrates The 
Unit, an organization set up by the wealthy Mr. Aristides, who intends to create a monopoly on 
scientific research by imprisoning the world’s most important scientists in a secret research 
institution hidden in the Atlas mountains. Hilary discovers that another of the “scientists,” Andy 
Peters, is a spy too. Hilary and Andy fall in love. Jessop manages to locate this facility with 
Hilary’s help, and The Unit is broken up. By embracing the unknown Hilary gains the courage, and 
will, to live on. 
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have the faintest idea of what any of these cities looked like! (105; 
my emphasis) 
 
The airport is not a means of centring the world, linking up its various parts. 
Rather, it destroys meaningful differences and gives rise to feelings of isolation 
and impermanence. Far from evoking a lost, secure utopia within a small and thus 
identifiable community, here we have Christie coolly and explicitly examining one 
manifestation of decentredness in (post)modern life. 
 The novel is also postmodern in the sense that it celebrates the sense of 
openness, fluidity and “unfixedness” evoked by its very title, Destination 
Unknown. To further emphasize transience, evanescence, and fluidity, Destination 
contains numerous references to dreams and journeys: “She was all eyes and ears, 
living and walking in a dream world” (92); “I feel as though I were taking part in a 
dream” (122); “Like a dream” (144); “It was a queer, dreamlike existence” (193); 
“A dream journey” (129). Dreams and journeys are, of course, motifs that 
underline the novel’s focus on transience. One might think that the conventional 
romantic ending of the novel dispels the atmosphere created by these motifs, but 
the ending is far more ambiguous than one might expect: “‘Those two,’ said 
Jessop. ‘I sent Hilary Craven off on a journey to a destination unknown, but it 
seems to me that her journey’s end is the usual one after all’” (279). Jessop is 
alluding to Twelfth Night: “Journeys end in lovers meeting” (2.3.44). Jessop’s 
allusion may seem to celebrate the successful pairing of lovers, but there is a bitter 
undertone to Jessop’s “the usual one after all”—almost a sense of 
disappointment—which undercuts the pleasure one might feel at the 
consummation of the romance plot. This ending, then, is a decentred one which 
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points outwards to other texts and keeps the sense of journeying—i.e. fluidity, 
transience, impermanence—intact. Clearly, it is the “unknown” in Destination 
Unknown that is being valorized. 
 Destination is, finally, postmodern also in its awareness of the world as a 
shifting mass of signs that may be arbitrary, but nonetheless have effects on how 
we view/understand the world—a conception shared, once again, by Chandler and 
Highsmith, and which will later be explicitly articulated and given critical cachet 
by literary theorists. Thus, when Dr. Barron attempts to “name” and thus mitigate 
the power The Unit has over him, by calling it “a Fascist show,” Hilary criticizes 
Dr. Barron for “go[ing] in too much for labels” (197). The latter capitulates and 
admits that his attempt to use the power of names/words to wrest some 
authority/self-respect back for himself is in vain, because “these words we throw 
around don’t mean much. . .’ (197). Christie’s diction is telling: “labels” highlights 
the arbitrariness of the link between signifier and signified. At the same time, 
however, Hilary’s critique of Dr. Barron’s attempt to name, and thus “pin down,” 
reality implies that signs, however arbitrary, do have an effect on how we perceive 
reality. That is, Hilary is not simply objecting to Dr. Barron giving The Unit a 
wrong “label.” She is also objecting to the fact that labeling The Unit as “Fascist” 
will give the wrong impression of the situation. The link between signifier and 
signified may not be inherent, but words like “Fascist” will nevertheless shape the 
characters’—and, on a metatextual level, the reader’s—perception of The Unit 
inaccurately. Words, then, have “real” effects, but have no intrinsic, inherent 
meaning. Christie, like Highsmith and Chandler, is highlighting the arbitrariness of 
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the link between signifier and signified, and it is this view of the world as a 
shifting pattern of arbitrary—and therefore unstable—signs that marks these 
authors’ work as postmodern. 
 As in Highsmith’s and Chandler’s fiction, identity is also revealed in 
Christie’s fiction to be a form of simulation. Nowhere is this more clearly seen 
than in Destination. It is precisely the arbitrariness or “emptiness” of signs that 
allows Hilary to impersonate Mrs. Betterton and thus renew herself emotionally 
and spiritually. Christie’s description of the process of impersonating someone 
else is, in fact, intriguingly similar to Highsmith’s. When Hilary asks Jessop if the 
“seemingly meaningless information [about Olive Betterton’s likes and dislikes] 
that had been massed together” would actually “matter” (56), i.e. prove 
useful/significant, the latter replies: 
Probably not. But you’ve got to make yourself into the authentic 
article. Think of it this way, Hilary. You’re a writer. You’re writing a 
book about a woman. The woman is Olive. You describe scenes of her 
childhood, her girlhood; you describe her marriage, the house she lived 
in. All the time that you do it she becomes more and more of a real 
person to you. Then you go over it a second time. You write it this 
time as an autobiography. You write it in the first person. Do you see 
what I mean? (56-57; emphasis original) 
 
Identity is less an ontological fact than a text: Olive’s identity can be broken down 
into “information” that is transmitted, in the form of words/signs, to Hilary, who 
can reconfigure these linguistic signs into physical signs that mark her as “Olive 
Betterton.” That identity is a form of simulation is further reinforced by Christie’s 
use of writing as a metaphor for the process by which Hilary becomes “the 
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authentic article
39” (56). That is, as in the Ripley novels, “impersonation” is not so 
much a matter of submerging one’s “true” identity beneath a false one, as it is a 
matter of performing the signs associated with a new identity—which in turn 
implies that the “first” identity is, similarly, a performance of particular signs, and 
not, as is commonly (and comfortingly) assumed, an “inherent essence.”  
 Furthermore, Hilary is able to pass herself off as Olive because The Unit 
have never seen Olive before—they have only a passport description of her that, as 
Jessop points out, could fit both women (48). To reinforce the point Christie brings 
it up again at the end of the novel when Andy Peters says:  
Yes, it’s like descriptions on passports. Take Ericsson. Height six foot, 
fair hair, blue eyes, face long, demeanour wooden, nose medium, 
mouth ordinary. Even add what a passport wouldn’t—speaks correctly 
but pedantically—you still wouldn’t have the first idea what Torquil 
[Ericsson] really looked like. . . . (222) 
 
Christie is highlighting not just the slipperiness of words, but also the increasing 
hyperreality of the world—governments’ and whole societies’ increasing “faith” in 
words to “capture” or “classify” reality—while making us aware of how this 
“faith” is founded on false assumptions about the link between signifier and 
meaning. We might say, therefore, that Destination is postmodern in that it reflects 
social and technological developments that constitute postmodernity as well as 
reaffirms a view of the world—i.e. of the world as a text and, moreover, a 
decentred one—that is distinctly postmodern. 
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 “Article” is a significant word: by “the authentic article” one usually means “the real thing,” i.e. 
“article” in this sense refers to a “thing” rather than a text. However, “article” also refers to a piece 
of writing. The play on the dual meanings of “article” further highlights, then, the textuality of life, 
which we might assume is merely “physical.” 
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Breaking Binaries: The Detective Novels 
However, Christie’s postmodernism is not confined to the spy novels; her 
postmodernist reluctance to help the reader “close down” the meaning of her 
novels and her postmodern understanding of identity and “reality” can also be 
found in her detective novels, which, if existing studies of the sub-genre are 
anything to go by
40
, are seen as idealistic, or nostalgic, projections of an orderly, 
centred world which is only briefly decentred by crime. Such a view of Christie’s 
detective fiction is heavily influenced by W.H. Auden’s famous critique of the 
“classical” detective sub-genre in “The Guilty Vicarage41,” which relies on a series 
of sharply defined binaries: good/evil, us/them, concealment/manifestation, 
true/false, innocence/guilt, victim/murderer, knowing/not knowing, etc. (“The 
Guilty Vicarage”). Auden’s analysis might hold true for other novels in the genre42 
but it certainly is not applicable to Christie, since her detective fiction actively 
plays with binary thinking.  
 In Auden’s conceptualization of the detective form, order is associated 
with the identification of the murderer(s) and pitted against disorder/murder. 
Christie, in contrast, questions the association between order and the identification 
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 See, e.g., Knight, Form and Ideology, 109-28; Hilfer, “Inversion and Excess”; Cawelti 112-19, 
132. Even Kathy Mezei, who argues that the spinster as detective allows female writers to 
“covertly query power” by “forcing” readers to look through the eyes of the spinster’s “marginal 
and indeterminate position” (104), nonetheless insists that any questioning of the status quo 
remains covert and temporary (116). 
41
 See also Thompson 132: “In the case of the formal English novel of detection, the detective 
figure’s identification of the murderer has the ideological effect of extirpating the diseased agent 
(the murderer) and thereby confirming the body politic in its sense of its own collective moral and 
political decency.” 
42
 Such as Rex Stout’s cozy Nero Wolfe series, where readers’ familiarity with Wolfe’s and 
Archie’s habits and routines forms a major source of pleasure, and which is pervaded by a clear Us 
(the tight-knit closed community consisting of the inhabitants of Wolfe’s brownstone, Wolfe’s 
associates, certain favoured policemen, and, comfortingly, the reader) versus Them (everybody 
else) mentality. 
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of the murderer(s). To begin with, Christie suggests that attempts to impose order 
could, in fact, create more disorder. The “casting out” of the murderer from the 
community does not guarantee order and stability in Christie’s work, because this 
“casting out” might be ambiguous and could even spawn a new murderer.  
 Many of the Poirot novels
43
 end, not with the criminal being turned over to 
the Law, which is a symbol of centredness and order, but with Poirot taking extra-
legal authority upon himself. He might “allow” the murderer to commit suicide—
which is to say, to kill yet again while escaping the Law. Or, more disturbingly 
still, Poirot might play God. Curtain: Poirot’s Last Case (1975) is perhaps the 
most obvious instance of Poirot’s vigilantism: to stop a murderer who kills by 
proxy and who therefore cannot be charged, legally, with murder, Poirot himself 
becomes a murderer. Plots like this not only question the association of Law with 
Justice and order but also suggest that sometimes, paradoxically, order may be 
inseparable from disorder. In other words, Christie’s work does not move 
simplistically from order, through disorder, to a final restoration of order; like 
Chandler and Highsmith, as discussed in the previous chapters, Christie challenges 
attempts to keep guilty/innocent or order/disorder binaries intact. 
 More importantly, far from “closing down” the text by providing one fixed, 
singular “truth,” e.g. via the identification of the murderer and the detective’s 
subsequent explication of the murderer’s methods and motives, and thus 
suggesting, reassuringly, that the unknown can be made known and containable, 
Christie’s detective novels, like her spy thrillers, actually foreground the openness 
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 The Murder of Roger Ackroyd (1926), Peril at End House (1932), Murder on the Orient Express 
(1934), Dumb Witness (1937), Death on the Nile, Appointment with Death (1938), Five Little Pigs 
(1942), The Hollow, Dead Man’s Folly, Curtain (1975). 
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of texts and prevent a “one-note,” comfortable reading of the novel. For a detailed 
look at how she does this I turn now to Christie’s very first detective novel, The 
Mysterious Affair at Styles (1920; henceforth Styles). 
 The opening lines of Styles
44
 already foreground the inherent ambiguity of 
any attempt to “shut down” texts by imposing one particular reading on them: 
The intense interest aroused in the public by what was known at the 
time as “The Styles Case” has now somewhat subsided. 
Nevertheless, in view of the worldwide notoriety which attended it, 
I have been asked, both by my friend Poirot and the family 
themselves, to write an account of the whole story. This, we trust, 
will effectively silence the sensational rumours which still persist. 
(1; my emphasis) 
  
To Carl D. Malmgren, this paragraph is a “guarantee of pastness” which “signals 
its commitment to a world which is safe, orderly, and domesticated—a written 
world, a matter of record. This record puts an end to the reckless “play” of 
signification” (18). It is important to remember, however, that any written record 
is itself a tissue of signs and thus necessarily yet another source of the play of 
signification. It would be more accurate to say, perhaps, that the opening cheekily 
promises an ordered, centred, world/text while calling our attention to its opposite. 
Hastings’s words do not set the record straight—they merely express the desire to 
set the record straight. What phrases like “sensational rumours,” “intense interest 
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 The plot is as follows: Hastings is invited by his old friend John Cavendish to stay at Styles, 
which now belongs to John’s stepmother Mrs. Inglethorp. Mrs. Inglethorp has recently married—
hence her name—Alfred Inglethorp, a man disliked by everyone else at Styles, which includes 
John’s wife, Mary; John’s brother, Lawrence; Cynthia Murdoch, an orphan taken in by Mrs. 
Inglethorp; and Mrs. Inglethorp’s companion, Evelyn Howard. One night Mrs. Inglethorp is found 
poisoned and dying in her locked bedroom. Hastings calls in Poirot to investigate. At first all the 
clues seem to point to Inglethorp, but Poirot shifts suspicion to John instead. A final twist comes 
when Poirot reveals that in fact, Inglethorp, abetted by Evelyn Howard, was guilty all along. It was 
a double bluff: exploiting the double jeopardy rule, the murderers had left a trail of clues so 
obvious that the police would certainly have to arrest Inglethorp, upon which he would “produce 
his irreproachable alibi” and thus be “safe for life” (187). 
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aroused in the public,” and “worldwide notoriety” actually do is call up the spectre 
of gossip, speculation, rumour—which are ways of conveying information that are 
not and cannot be regulated, i.e. open texts. Furthermore, it is significant that the 
family and Poirot have asked Hastings to publish this record just at a time when 
interest in the affair has “somewhat subsided.” This suggests an underlying desire 
to keep the play of signification alive, rather than its opposite. Styles opens, in 
short, with a reminder that it is futile to attempt to police the play of signification, 
and a suggestion that we may subconsciously desire, not a sterile, orderly world 
where meanings can be controlled, but the free play of meaning. 
 Just as language cannot be “locked down” and forced to mean only one 
thing, so identity is not fixed, but fluid. Christie deliberately plays with, among 
other categories
45
, stereotypical notions of “insiders,” “outsiders,” and who 
belongs (or not) “within the family circle” to show that individuals cannot be 
easily placed in neat categories, i.e. that identity is fluid and cannot be “organized” 
into neat, binary models. That is, I am not claiming that no binaries are in play 
within the novel, but that Christie has specifically picked the “insider/outsider” 
and “friend/enemy” binaries among a host of possibilities to suggest that trying to 
fit people into neat “either/or” categories is neither wise nor safe. 
 Many of the people living at Styles don’t seem to have a “home,” i.e. the 
“insiders” are also “outsiders.” Inglethorp is the easiest to single out since he is 
                                                          
45
 Even gendered categories are played with, for example. Evelyn Howard, for instance, may be the 
feminine half of what must even in Christie’s time have been a staple of the genre, the murdering 
(heterosexual) couple, yet nothing more unlike a “femme fatale” can be imagined. Evelyn 
Howard—even her name is misleadingly androgynous—displays all the signs of the manly 
spinster: “hearty, almost painful grip”; “very blue eyes in a sunburnt face”—like an explorer; 
“pleasant-looking woman of about forty”; “deep voice, almost manly in its stentorian tones”; “large 
square sensible body”; “good thick boots” (5). 
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explicitly associated with rootlessness. He is introduced by John as “an absolute 
outsider” who “turned up from nowhere, on the pretext of being a second cousin or 
something of [Evelyn’s], though she didn’t seem particularly keen to acknowledge 
the relationship” (3). His origins are a mystery, and he does not fit in at his 
destination—even his cousin seems unwilling to accept him. His status as 
“outsider” is, in other words, heavily underlined. Indeed, his status as an interloper 
is bitterly emphasized by the other inhabitants of Styles, particularly John. There is 
therefore a suggestion that it is John’s desire to sort the world neatly into 
“insiders” and “outsiders” that motivates Inglethorp to seek to become an “insider” 
by killing his wife and inheriting the house. 
 But Inglethorp is not the only “outsider” residing at Styles, merely the most 
obvious one. Styles is peopled with men and women who are simultaneously 
insiders and outsiders. The Cavendish brothers are presented as men who have, in 
effect, been disinherited in favour of their stepmother. The reader is told that their 
father’s will is “an arrangement that was distinctly unfair” to them, even if their 
stepmother “had always been most generous to them” (2). With this detail Christie 
kills two birds with one stone. She implies that the Cavendish brothers both have, 
and at the same time do not have, a home. She also implies that Mrs. Inglethorp is 
seen as a thief or usurper, so that an aura of the “outsider” begins to envelop Mrs. 
Inglethorp as well. In fact John would have “preferred his mother to increase his 
allowance, which would have enabled him to have a home of his own” (3). The 
implication is that John feels himself an outsider in his own ancestral home and 
would prefer to be away from Styles, the ostensible centre of the story.  
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 Similarly, Cynthia has to live with Mrs. Inglethorp because her father left 
her “an orphan and penniless” (4). In other words, Cynthia is associated with 
rootlessness/homelessness as well. Furthermore, when Mrs. Inglethorp calls her, 
the girl “jumped up promptly, and something in her manner reminded [Hastings] 
that her position was a dependent one, and that Mrs. Inglethorp, kind as she might 
be in the main, did not allow her to forget it” (9). That is to say, Cynthia may 
reside at Styles, but she is treated as an “outsider”; Styles is not her “home,” just as 
it is not a home to everyone else actually living at Styles. 
 Evelyn Howard is perhaps the figure who most destabilizes any attempt to 
differentiate between “insiders” and “outsiders.” By committing murder Evelyn 
has performed an action commonly associated with “outsiders” which puts her 
beyond the pale, as it were. Yet Evelyn has lived with Mrs. Inglethorp for many 
years, and seems to have strong ties, not just to Styles, but to Mrs. Inglethorp 
herself. When Poirot seeks assistance in the investigation he goes to Evelyn 
because, “in all this house of mourning, [hers] are the only eyes that have wept” 
(68). Upon Poirot’s saying this, “Miss Howard blinked, and a new note crept into 
the gruffness of her voice” (68). Is Evelyn only playing the faithful companion, or 
is this truly a moment of grief? That “new note” in her voice might signify real 
emotion, or it could be a testament to Evelyn’s powers of dissembling, or it could 
be a mixture of both. By asking such a question the novel calls up the spectre of 
the unknowability of those supposedly closest to us.  
 Furthermore, this spectre is never laid to rest: the novel does not provide a 
definitive explanation, which leaves readers with the unsettling idea of a murder 
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committed by two people, neither of whom can be said to be either an “outsider” 
or an “insider.” That is, Styles is disturbing precisely because it points out that 
murder can be committed by people who are “insiders” as well as “outsiders,” and 
are therefore, paradoxically, neither “insiders” nor “outsiders.” Put differently, the 
novel does not simply unsettle by reminding us of the disorder wreaked by the act 
of murder, regardless of whether this murder is committed by “insiders” or 
“outsiders” or a combination of the two. Styles is unsettling because it shows us 
that murder does not create or cause disorder, but merely reveals the disorder that 
lies beneath what most people would like to think of as an orderly world. This 
“false” appearance of order, the novel points out, is maintained, for instance, using 
binary ways of thought that attempt to classify people into neat, “either/or” 
categories. In short, Styles is unsettling because it presents “order” as an invention 
of sorts. At the same time, the novel highlights the futility of attempts to pin down 
identity in terms of neat categories like “outsider,” “insider,” “friend,” and 
“enemy”—thereby reaffirming the fluidity of identity. 
 
Back to the Future: Signs, Signifiers, Simulation 
Christie not only foregrounds the futility of attempting to control the play of 
signification or to place individuals in neat categories and thus “fix” their identity, 
but also presents the world as a text, i.e. a mass of shifting signs, and our attempts 
to understand or bring order to this chaotic “reality,” e.g. through concepts of 
teleological or linear time, as forms of simulation. 
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 In theory, the detective novel reaffirms the possibility of tracing a chain of 
disastrous events back to its hidden source, and thus confirms the possibility of 
“knowing” with certainty as well as the “restorability” or “imposability” of order. 
However, in Styles, Christie uses a chain motif to suggest that this imposition of 
teleological order on lived reality is an illusion. The image of the chain first 
appears when Poirot expounds his thought process: “One fact leads to another—so 
we continue. Does the next fit in with that? A merville! Good! We can proceed. 
This next little fact—no! Ah, that is curious! There is something missing—a link 
in the chain that is not there” (34). Later, Poirot highlights the necessity of finding 
the missing “last link” (156, 158). This image of the chain draws attention to 
sequences, endings and origins, effects and causes.  Styles suggests, however, that 
much as no text can be “closed,” so no attempt to impose a sequential, chain-like 
organization on life can be entirely successful. The chain necessarily has missing 
links. Although the title of Chapter 12, “The Last Link,” suggests that Poirot does 
achieve “the complete chain,” as it were, his triumph is illusory. Christie is playing 
on the double meaning of the word “last”: has Poirot found the final piece that 
completes the puzzle, or does “the last link” refer merely to the fact that it comes 
as the end of a sequence of events? Even at the level of plot, there is still a missing 
link in the chain in the form of “first causes”—which is to say, Poirot has not 
found the final puzzle piece/link in the chain.  
 That final link is, moreover, impossible to find, since it is a matter of 
motives, which Christie deliberately makes difficult to pin down. Poirot might say 
that “there is no murder without a motive” (113) but Christie provides a variety of 
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motives. Does the blame stop at the murderers for being greedy and ungrateful, or 
does the first cause of the murder lie in Mrs. Inglethorp’s controlling, patronizing 
personality? As Evelyn puts it, Mrs. Inglethorp “was very generous, but she 
always wanted a return. She never let people forget what she had done for them—
and, that way, she missed love” (68). Put differently, does the root of disorder 
(murder) lie in excessive desire (the murderers’ greed) or in the sort of mindset, 
like Mrs. Inglethorp’s, that tries to impose order and value even on the intangible? 
The novel implicitly asks these questions, but leaves them unanswered, thereby 
remaining an open text, and suggesting that life and the inner workings of the 
human mind cannot be organized into neat, knowable forms like “a” motive or “a” 
originating cause. 
 In Murder in Mesopotamia Christie further explores this idea, suggesting 
that attempts to “go back in time,” e.g. through the study of history, are forms of 
simulation. Mesopotamia is set in an archaeological dig. When the narrator, Nurse 
Leatheran, is told that the archaeologists are “planning” the newly excavated 
palace of Ur, she exclaims: “how you can plan for a thing that’s happened long 
ago I’m sure I don’t know!” (67) Nurse Leatheran’s “naïve” exclamation is deeply 
perceptive. The study of history, which one would imagine is a rational enterprise 
that allows one to access a “hidden, prior truth,” is recast as a form of simulation, 
where the “real” is only accessible through plans, models, and signs. To 
paraphrase Baudrillard, the fragmentary signs of the past replace and construct the 
past. Nurse Leatheran’s naïve surprise hinges on the idea that one can only “plan 
for” something that happens in the future—i.e. hinges on an understanding of time 
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as strictly linear or teleological—which highlights the fact that archaeology 
enables the construction of a story of the past, thereby decentring a strictly 
teleological understanding of time. That is, we can, through archaeology or 
detection, resurrect the past in the present, which destabilizes our understanding of 
time as strictly linear. The setting of Mesopotamia, then, points to the 
superimposition of past upon present, world upon world. In short, Christie 
emphasizes fluidity and multiplicity and produces a postmodern understanding of 
a decentred world and how we attempt to make sense of it. 
 It is unsurprising, then, that the image of the kaleidoscope recurs so often 
in Christie’s novels. The word “kaleidoscope” directly appears in the following: 
One, Two, Buckle My Shoe (177); Curtain (107); The Murder of Roger Ackroyd 
(13, 282); The Man in the Brown Suit (109). Similar images appear in Evil Under 
the Sun (244-45) and Hickory Dickory Dock (14). In her Autobiography, Christie 
also speaks of a painting by an Iraqi artist that was “a kaleidoscope of every colour 
imaginable, which looked like patchwork at first, but suddenly could be seen to be 
two donkeys with men leading them through the Suq—a most fascinating 
picture. . .’ (543). To Christie, the world, and language, is a mass of shifting signs 
and connections which form patterns, break loose, and then reform elsewhere or in 
different patterns—that is to say, a kaleidoscope.  
 It is this conception of “reality” as a kaleidoscope of shifting signs—
shifting because the link between sign and meaning(s) is arbitrary and infinitely 
changeable—and the awareness of the simultaneous disconnection and 
multiplicity—symbolized, e.g., by the modern airport—that make Christie’s work 
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recognizably postmodern. It is her commitment to the open text, despite the 
longstanding perception that her work is “formulaic,” that makes her fiction 
postmodernist. One could argue, indeed, that generic conventions and expectations 
are foregrounded in her fiction—as, for instance, in The Seven Dials Mystery, 
discussed above—only to be parodied and questioned. That is, Christie is 
performing an immanent critique, not just of any particular generic 
convention/assumption/expectation, but of the comfortable mode of reading that 
has for its goal reassurance and a reaffirmation of order, certainty, and finality. 
And if the postmodern text is one which challenges readers’ assumptions and 
illusions about the stability of language or identity, or about the orderliness of the 






The preceding chapters argued for recognition of the postmodernism of Chandler, 
Highsmith, and Christie. “Postmodernist” may seem a surprising, maybe even 
perverse, label to apply to these authors, since critics continue to reject 
“comfortable” modes of reading that utilize generic conventions and do not 
encourage the asking of questions about language, ideology, etc. This means that, 
to be “postmodern,” a text cannot be genre fiction, particularly popular genre 
fiction, since the assumption is that such texts are only popular because they ask 
no questions and project escapist visions of the world. Alternatively, to be 
“postmodern,” a text might, like Eco’s and Auster’s metaphysical detective fiction, 
use the trappings of popular crime fiction, but only to subvert our assumptions 
about genre, language etc.  
 Given this definition of “postmodernism,” Chandler et al. seem to be ruled 
out as postmodern writers. But if we do not allow negative assumptions about 
genre and popular fiction to colour our reading, and look at the fiction of Chandler 
et. al. under a postmodern lens, a very different picture of these novels emerges. 
Without denying that in some ways the Marlowe novels, the Ripliad, as well as the 
spy thrillers and detective novels of Christie, do present comforting images of the 
“knowability” of crime, etc. such centring elements are constantly undercut. The 
fiction of Chandler, Highsmith and Christie not only challenges comfortable 
assumptions about the stability of identity, language, and “reality”—they do so in 
a way that is distinctly postmodern: they present identity in particular, and the 
Phay 126 
world/reality in general, as a kaleidoscope of signs that, lacking inherent links to 
fixed meanings, can be endlessly formed and reformed into multiple patterns. 
 Specifically, in the first chapter I argued that Chandler presents Marlowe as 
an unstable, divided self, and thereby questions the “solidity” or stability of 
identity. Furthermore, the centring effect of Marlowe’s unique voice is undercut 
by Chandler’s foregrounding of the instability of language. On top of that, the 
novels present disconnectedness as the “natural” state of the world: meaningful, 
positive relationships among individuals remain an illusion. Finally, Chandler uses 
Arthurian allusions to highlight the tension at the centre of Marlowe’s identity and, 
by extension, at the centre of society’s anxiety over law and order: it might be 
necessary to do ignoble things in order to be noble, while attempts to search for 
“truth” might involve the breaking of other social and moral laws. In other words, 
attempts to make the world “whole again” are futile since they invariably create 
more fragmentation. It is important to note, however, that Chandler does not 
bemoan the fragmentedness of the world. In fact, Chandler suggests that there is 
little value in binary worldviews that force a distinction between “the original” and 
“the copy,” and that attempts to arrest the play of signification are childish. It is 
this willingness, not just to face, but to celebrate the textuality and fragmented 
nature of the world, that marks the Marlowe novels as postmodern. 
 In the second chapter I argued that the Ripliad is radical not just because it 
features an anti-hero or challenges conservative sexual mores. What is “radical” 
about it is its presentation of the world as a conglomeration of signs. Ripley is 
“shocking” not because he is a blatantly conscience-less crook, but because he 
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reveals how our world is constituted out of arbitrary signs, which can be 
manipulated by anyone savvy, and ruthless enough. That is, like Chandler, 
Highsmith presents identity as a form of simulation, and our world as a world 
where “signs of the real” replace “the real itself” (Baudrillard, “Simulacra and 
Simulations” 382), i.e. as a hyperreal world. Highsmith also reveals how the 
individual is a cipher, easily replaceable or displaceable. The novels also have 
“(dis)connection plots” which always end with Ripley realizing the impossibility 
of meaningful connections between people—that is, like Chandler, Highsmith 
foregrounds the disconnectedness of the individual. Other significant motifs in the 
novels, such as images of water, contribute to the novels’ emphasis on the fluidity 
of language, identity, and “reality.” And again, like Chandler, Highsmith does not 
present this fluid, unknowable world in a negative light: she not only compares 
Ripley’s impersonation and forgery to Art, thereby implicitly valorizing the 
fluidity and arbitrariness of signs, but also encourages readers to laugh at a world 
in which live and dead bodies alike can become caught in a “game-like” sequence 
of displacements. Games, in fact, are another major motif in the Ripliad, and they 
foreground the spirit of play running through Highsmith’s vision of a postmodern 
world. 
 Finally, I argued that far from being “mere entertainment,” and 
“conservative” entertainment at that, Christie’s novels actually reveal a heightened 
postmodern awareness of the world as a conglomeration of ever-shifting signs. 
Christie’s spy thrillers light-heartedly parody other works in the sub-genre and 
therefore highlight textuality and intertextuality. The spy thrillers also give the lie 
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to stereotypical views of Christie as a “formulaic” writer: Christie experiments 
with form to emphasize openness, fluidity, and multiplicity. Indeed, Christie 
constantly undercuts attempts to “close down” the text and “fix” its meaning. In 
the detective novels Christie continues to challenge simplistic, binary ways of 
classifying individuals as either “insiders” or “outsiders,” “good” or “evil,” etc. On 
top of that, both the spy thrillers and the detective novels suggest that identity is an 
“effect” created through the manipulation of signs. In fact, for Christie as for 
Chandler and Highsmith, the world is a conglomeration of signs that have no 
inherent links to particular meanings and therefore may be rearranged into various 
patterns. The image Christie uses to capture this idea is the kaleidoscope. The 
beauty of this image, as well as its associations with games and play, is telling: 
Christie’s attitude towards a decentred world, like Chandler’s or even Highsmith’s, 
is light-hearted and playfully parodic. Christie’s fiction, then, is not simply 
postmodernist in form, but also in tone and attitude. 
 Recognizing the postmodernism of Chandler’s, Highsmith’s, and Christie’s 
fiction opens up further questions of how people read what they read, and of the 
place of popular crime fiction in a postmodern world. It is a truism that people 
read popular, entertaining fiction for “pleasure”—but how exactly is this pleasure 
generated? The current assumption, given the widespread equation of “popular” to 
“reassuring,” is that the pleasure to be found in a popular text is directly 
proportional to the text’s ability to reaffirm a rose-tinted view of the world and 
“shut down” readers’ questioning faculties, which may lead to uncomfortable 
answers. But is this actually what happens? Is this really how one experiences a 
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novel by Chandler, Highsmith, or Christie? Perhaps, contrary to existing 
assumptions about popular fiction, Chandler, Highsmith and Christie are so 
popular because they manage to combine reassurance with a deeply unsettling 
vision of the world. In other words, we need to rethink our assumptions about 
popular crime fiction and how it “works.”  
 Recognizing Chandler, et. al. as postmodern writers also has implications 
for crime studies—specifically, for how we read crime fiction. To call a novel a 
“detective novel,” “spy novel,” or “thriller” is, currently, to mark it as “genre 
fiction.” That is, the association of “genre” with “crime fiction” goes beyond an 
awareness of how every literary work necessarily generates its meaning from its 
“deviance” from what has come before, to an assumption that conventions and 
rules shape crime fiction, especially popular crime fiction, to a far greater degree 
than is the case with “literary works.” Critics’ awareness of the need to read 
without prior assumptions or biases notwithstanding, sub-generic differences 
continue to be so entrenched that links between texts that have been placed in 
different sub-genres are easily obscured. I have made the case, therefore, through 
my selection of authors, that it may be productive to read, not so much across sub-
genres, as without the “restriction” of assumptions about genre altogether. 
 A final word: acknowledging the postmodernism of Chandler et. al. not 
only helps “bring new life” to familiar texts, but could help us see other texts in a 
new light as well. Given that I could only work with a limited number of 
authors/texts, I chose to focus on authors who are so popular that they have 
become “representative of” their sub-genres—Christie and Chandler are, indeed, 
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pioneers of their sub-genres. The question, then, is: might Chandler, Highsmith 
and Christie be representative of their sub-genres even in the case of their 
postmodern worldviews? That is, might other works of crime fiction, which we 
might assume to be “merely entertaining,” “formulaic,” or formally and 
ideologically “conservative,” actually contain postmodern worldviews as well? 
Such re-reading might also extend to other crime sub-genres not “represented” in 
this thesis, e.g., the spy thriller or the police procedural.  
 In short, once we widen our definition of “postmodern crime fiction” and 
revise our assumptions about “popular crime fiction,” a very different view of 
crime fiction emerges. As the work of Chandler, Highsmith, and Christie shows, 
popular crime fiction need not be anodyne—instead, it can challenge our 
comfortable assumptions about the stability of identity and language, and 
foreground the unsettling possibility that “reality” or “truth” may not be as fixed, 
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